FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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NUCLEAR POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY

By Henry DeWolf Smyth

THE forces of nature filled our ancestors with awe and fear. Eclipses, great storms, even the change of the seasons gave rise to rituals of thanksgiving or appeasement. Gradually understanding lessened fear. Men learned to adjust themselves to their natural environment and even to make effective use of it. First by observation, later by experiment, men learned to relate cause to effect in the sequence of events that occur in the physical world. Such knowledge was increasingly turned to man's advantage until today we find that the structure of modern society depends on our understanding of the laws of nature through science and on our use of those laws through technology. Not only the way we live but the way we think is affected by the results of science. Yet we remain instinctively aware of the dangers and the limitations of our knowledge. When a great discovery is made in science and applied in technology, our hopes are tempered by awe. We are now more afraid of what man will do with nature than of what nature will do with man.

Probably the three greatest technological discoveries ever made have been the use of fire, the production of mechanical work from heat and the conversion of nuclear energy into heat. Of these, the first was prehistoric, the second largely empirical with little assistance from science and the third came almost directly out of the scientific laboratory—inevitably so, since there is no natural process on earth which produces significant quantities of nuclear energy.

Recognition of the extraordinary nature of the discovery of nuclear energy has gone around the world, emphasized of course by the melodramatic manner of its announcement. If one recalls the persistent and profound popular interest in the theory of

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relativity 30 years ago, one hesitates to attribute all the interest in nuclear energy to atomic bombs. It seems likely that the minds and imaginations of men everywhere would have been kindled by this discovery regardless of its first use. The idea that the kind of energy which keeps the stars alive can be produced and controlled by men is a stirring one. If the extraordinary nature of the discovery was not sufficient to excite men's minds, certainly the manner of its revelation was. The first use of nuclear energy was in the greatest war the world has known; it was incorporated in the most destructive weapon ever devised; and it was immediately followed by the war's end.

I have recalled this history to emphasize the fact that decisions about the peacetime development of nuclear energy have not, cannot and probably should not be made on the basis of strict economic realism. Paradoxically, it is more realistic to take account of the profound hopes and illusions which surround the peacetime use of nuclear energy. In the mind of the world it is linked with the desire to promote peace, with regret that one of man's greatest discoveries was first used for destruction and with the belief that such a triumph of the human mind must ultimately bring good.

In his address before the United Nations in December 1953, President Eisenhower announced this Government's "atoms for peace" program. This was an idealistic speech appealing to the hopes and longings of people everywhere. It proposed that our knowledge of atomic energy should be used as a major instrument to promote our foreign policy of universal peace and freedom. It was a bold proposal not easily implemented. In the nearly three years that have elapsed since that speech, its principles have been reaffirmed but it can hardly be said to have been put into effect.

There are three aspects to the use of atomic energy. Of these, the military aspect is familiar and has been discussed several times in these pages. It will be omitted from the present article. The use of radioactive isotopes both directly and for research may well be the most important application of atomic energy in the long run. However, this second aspect of atomic energy does not involve large expenditures of funds or great concentration of technological effort. It will be felt in a multiplicity of small activities no one of which is very important in domestic or international politics. Distribution of radioactive isotopes and knowl-

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edge about them should and can play an important rôle in our atoms for peace program but it is only a part and the least controversial part of that program.

Nuclear energy as a source of industrial power is the idea that has caught the imagination of the world. The belief prevails that energy from the nucleus can be cheap and that cheap power will solve many of the world's ills. In fact, however, there is real uncertainty as to how cheap nuclear power can be and how important it will be in the next ten or twenty years.

One reason for the uncertainty is our delay in turning our attention to this third aspect of atomic energy. Because we already have cheap and plentiful power in this country, we have fixed our attention on discharging our military obligations. Until recent years, our efforts have been concentrated on improving atomic weapons and building up a stockpile of such weapons. We are operating 13 large reactors for the production of plutonium and many smaller reactors designed for research or test purposes. But it is misleading to cite the number of reactors in existence as proof of progress toward nuclear power. We have not entirely neglected the power field. We have built nuclear power plants for submarines, we have acquired knowledge and we have materials available. But we do not have a single plant in operation producing significant amounts of commercial power from nuclear energy. One such plant is under construction. Others are planned but the future of such plans is clouded by controversy arising out of the old public versus private power issue. By contrast, the British with less knowledge and experience but with far more pressing domestic needs have embarked on an ambitious program of construction of full-scale power plants.[1] Announcements from Russia suggest a large program there also. However greatly the idea of nuclear power may appeal to the imaginations of our people and our leaders, there would seem to be a discrepancy between our statements and our actions.

We should be aware of the known facts. We should examine the assumption that the development of nuclear power is of major importance to us. We should review the factual basis for decisions about specific policy and actions. On the technical side we need to know the present status of nuclear technology and what problems remain to be solved. How much is nuclear power going to cost? What are the limitations and probable future costs of power

[1] *Editor's Note*: See "Britain's Drive for Power" by Sir George Thomson on p. 95.

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from conventional fuel? What are the predicted needs for power in the future in this country and elsewhere? How important is cheap power in an industrial economy? Are the aims of our foreign policy consistent with the aims of our domestic policy as far as nuclear power is concerned? How can we help foreign countries to obtain nuclear power? If we ought to accelerate our own program, how can we do so? The answers to these questions should determine the size, scope and methods of our Government's activities in nuclear energy for the next several years.

As a basis for answers to some of these questions it is necessary to review the present status of nuclear technology and its implications. Particularly we should understand the uncertainties that still surround this field.

II

As early as 1920, it was suspected that certain rearrangements of the particles in atomic nuclei might release large amounts of energy. Such rearrangements usually involve two nuclei and are called nuclear reactions. Specifically, such energy was expected from the combination or fusion of light nuclei like hydrogen or from splitting or fission of heavy nuclei like uranium.

Soon after nuclear energy was first discussed, astronomers suggested that perhaps the stars were kept hot by fusion of light nuclei in their interiors where the temperature is many millions of degrees. By 1939 this theory had been worked out in detail and had been successful in explaining relevant astronomical data. In this sense, energy released by fusion was observed before the discovery of fission in uranium.

While the astronomers had been establishing their explanation of the heat of the stars in terms of fusion, atomic physicists had been studying nuclei in the laboratory. Many nuclear reactions that released energy had been discovered but none of them was self-propagating. None appeared to be of value as practical sources of energy. There was no indication that any drastic splitting of heavy nuclei could be brought about in spite of the theoretical knowledge that such a splitting would release energy. Much to everyone's surprise, such a splitting in uranium was discovered in 1939. This splitting we call nuclear fission.

The fission of uranium is a remarkable kind of nuclear reaction. Because of a freak of nature, a high temperature is not required either to initiate it or to sustain it. Fission is caused by neutrons

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and produces neutrons. Under the right conditions, more neutrons are produced than are used up so that the reaction is self-propagating (*i.e.* a "chain reaction" occurs). Apparently all that is needed is a mass of uranium and some neutrons. There are always some neutrons around and there is ample uranium in the earth's crust. Why, then, 17 years after the discovery of fission, do we not have a single plant in the United States producing commercial power from uranium?

There is one basic reason for this delay, besides a host of technological difficulties arising from it. When a uranium atom fissions it produces two or three neutrons to replace the one it has absorbed, but it is by no means certain that any one of these new neutrons will be absorbed by uranium in such a way as to cause another fission. On the contrary, they may be absorbed in uranium without causing fission, they may be absorbed by other materials present or they may escape entirely. This problem of "neutron economy" dominates any nuclear reactor design. Obviously, the chain reaction must occur; that is the first requirement. It will not occur if neutrons are wasted.

There are two principal ways in which the neutron economy question can be answered. One is to use enriched uranium and the other is to use a "moderator." If natural uranium is dispersed in lumps or rods through a mass of graphite or heavy water (called a moderator), the probability of neutrons causing fission is enhanced and the reaction can be made self-sustaining, though not by a wide margin. Enriched uranium is uranium from which some or all of the naturally dominant U-238 has been removed, leaving the rare U-235 isotope in which the probability of fission resulting from the absorption of a neutron is much higher. There is no reason why both these measures for insuring a chain reaction cannot be used in the same reactor, and they often are.

Once a chain reaction is started it produces radiation (neutrons and gamma rays), energy (principally in the form of heat), plutonium and fission products. All of these products have their uses. For purposes of this paper, heat energy is the most important. It is this heat energy which we wish to convert into electrical power. From the power point of view, the neutron's gamma rays and fission products are a nuisance, whereas the plutonium is a potential nuclear fuel either *in situ* or after processing.

An assembly consisting of uranium, moderator, cooling ducts and other components for producing and controlling a fission

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chain reaction is called a nuclear reactor. Both the design and method of operation of a reactor depend on its primary purpose. Without going into technological problems of reactor design, it may be well to list the categories into which most such problems fall. They are: heat removal, corrosion and similar effects enhanced by radiation, fuel elements and their reprocessing, health and safety, and control. Let me repeat that neutron economy dominates all elements of design. Because the number of neutrons produced in fission is barely enough to maintain the chain reaction, limiting conditions, often difficult to meet, are imposed on the answers to all other design questions.

All of these problems have been attacked in a number of different ways and all have been solved with varying degrees of success. Several different moderators have been used. Heat has been extracted by water, by molten sodium or by air. Uranium fuel has been introduced in solution, as metal protected by various coatings and as oxide. Novel structural materials have been tried. In short, if we think of a nuclear reactor as made up of various components corresponding roughly to the fuel, the boiler, the water and the controls of a conventional steam plant, a great variety of such components has been considered and many of them tested successfully.

It is not yet clear what combination of such reactor components will give the cheapest power nor, in fact, whether any combination will give power cheaply enough to compete with other sources. Only one combination has been thoroughly tested by use for sustained production of power. That is the power plant in the submarine *Nautilus* which uses enriched uranium fuel elements clad in zirconium with ordinary water under pressure acting as both coolant and moderator. Costs were not the dominant factor in the design of that reactor.

An effective summary of the technical situation was presented at the Geneva Atomic Energy Conference of 1955 by Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. He pointed out that there were no less than 900 conceivable types of nuclear reactors made up of various combinations of components tried or suggested. To be sure, many of these combinations can be discarded without trial, yet there are probably at least 100 combinations worthy of serious consideration. A well-rounded development program must select from this welter of possibilities the five or ten most promising types and carry them to the point

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where some are demonstrably better than others. The cost of carrying one type of reactor through the experimental and prototype (large plant) stages is roughly $100,000,000, which suggests the magnitude of the research and development program that may still be necessary to learn how to get cheap power from nuclear fission.

The amount of energy that can be extracted from a ton of natural uranium is still very much in doubt. Natural uranium contains two different species (isotopes) of uranium. One of these, uranium-235, is readily usable as fuel for the fission chain reaction; the other, uranium-238, is not. Unfortunately, uranium-235, the useful one, is present only to 0.7 percent in natural uranium. By neutron bombardment such as occurs in any nuclear reactor it is possible to convert U-238 into plutonium which is suitable as a reactor fuel. Similarly, neutron bombardment of the element thorium produces a new material (U-233) which is also suitable as a reactor fuel.

A properly designed reactor can produce one of these new fuels faster than it consumes U-235. Such reactors are called "breeders." Successful development of breeder reactors will make it possible to multiply the energy available from a ton of uranium by more than a hundred, since all the uranium would then be used—not just 0.7 percent. Thorium is somewhat more plentiful than uranium so that its use would mean a further doubling of nuclear fission energy available from the ores in the earth's crust. Unfortunately, the design of a large-scale breeder reactor is particularly difficult.

Even with breeders there is a foreseeable end to the fuel in the earth's crust available for nuclear fission reactors. On the other hand, were it possible to use the fusion of deuterium (heavy hydrogen) as a source of electric power, we would no longer need to worry about fuel for our children, our grandchildren or our descendants to the hundredth generation. Deuterium is present to about one part in 5,000 in all water. The energy released by the fusion of the deuterium in the oceans would supply man's needs for millions of years.

It has been known for some time that if hydrogen nuclei could be forced to combine, forming helium, great amounts of energy would be released. In fact, this is the nuclear reaction that occurs in the so-called hydrogen bomb. Unfortunately, the techniques worked out for producing nuclear fusion of hydrogen in a bomb

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are entirely inapplicable under controlled conditions in a fusion power plant. Unlike the fission chain reaction where much of the technology is common to reactor and bomb, the only basis that hydrogen bomb technology gives for controlled fusion is knowledge of the nuclear reaction itself, and this was already familiar before nuclear bombs—fission or fusion—had been thought of.

The amount of energy given off per gram by the fusion of deuterium is comparable to the energy given off per gram by the fission of uranium. However, there is no known way of producing fusion on a useful scale except to heat a gas to a temperature of millions of degrees. This is difficult and it is still more difficult to confine a gas at such temperatures. It is hoped that electromagnetic fields can be used as a non-material container. A substantial effort to achieve such conditions of temperature and confinement in the laboratory has been going on in this country for a number of years under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. Such work is also going on in Great Britain and in Russia.

No one knows yet whether the fusion reaction can be produced under controlled conditions. I believe it will be. Once that is achieved, no one knows how long it will take to make a practical power plant nor how much it will cost. We shall be lucky if we get a prototype thermonuclear power plant running before we have spent a billion dollars.

III

In spite of the fact that no reactor yet exists in this country designed for the production of commercial power, innumerable studies have been made of the probable cost of power from such plants. To orient ourselves, it should be recalled that the cost of electrical energy in this country ranges from a low of perhaps 2 mills per kilowatt hour from certain hydroelectric stations up to 4 mills for modern coal-burning plants near the mines and to 10 mills or more in less efficient plants in regions where fuel is more expensive. These are prices at the generating station. There are many special uses or special locations where much higher costs occur and are acceptable. In Western Europe costs are perhaps 40 percent higher and elsewhere much higher. In Japan, for example, power from coal-burning plants costs about 20 mills.

All cost studies made at this stage of experience, or lack of it, have to make a number of assumptions. The optimism with which these assumptions are made determines the cost figure

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which is derived. Inevitably, there has been a great variation in the conclusions reached. The most reasonable conclusion seems to be that power from large central station nuclear power plants can eventually be generated at a cost between 5 and 10 mills. The word "eventually" is used advisedly since the cost of the first power from the Shippingport plant now under construction will be about 50 mills and is expected to be reduced to 15 or 20 mills only after several years of operation.

We are forced to the general conclusion that the cost of nuclear power in this country will be barely competitive within the next five or ten years. If conventional fuel goes up in price after that period, successful competition becomes more likely since it is probable that nuclear power costs will go down. Nuclear power is almost certainly competitive in some countries, such as Japan, and is probably competitive now in parts of Western Europe.

Not only is the present situation different in this country and in Europe; the disparity in power costs is likely to increase within a very few years. There are still great coal reserves in this country that can be mined at little or no increase in costs beyond the present level. In Western Europe, mining costs are high and likely to go higher because of the exhaustion of readily accessible coal reserves. It is for this reason that the British are pushing the construction of power reactors, even though they are of a type that our technical people consider somewhat primitive.

Enthusiasts not only assume that nuclear power is going to be cheap but that it is a panacea which will bring prosperity to all. In the thousands of words published about the world paradise that nuclear power will make possible, there has been little sober discussion of the importance of power to paradise. To anyone who has visited the Tennessee Valley or the low-cost power areas of the Northwest the advantages of cheap power appear obvious. But are they so essential? Certainly the Delaware Valley is in the midst of an industrial boom; yet it is not a conspicuously low-power area. In fact, economic studies show that the cost of power is a significant part of the cost of production only in a few specialized industries like aluminum. In international trade, great differences in power costs might tip the balance in highly competitive industries, other things being equal. But, of course, other things are not equal. Japan can be a very effective competitor in many areas of international trade even though its power costs are very high.

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Nor can we say that cheap power will be a panacea to raise the standard of living of Asia or other industrially undeveloped areas. It is obvious that some of the backward countries of the world have vast sources of water power which have remained undeveloped. Again, the Near East has been supplying half the world with oil for a generation but does not have cheap power. Initiative and capital are needed to develop such resources. There would remain the problem of finding markets for the power.

On purely economic grounds nuclear power is of most immediate importance in countries already highly industrialized but facing rapid increases in power costs. Such countries are to be found principally in Western Europe.

Though cheap power cannot by itself revolutionize the economy, it can indeed be an important factor. Furthermore, the uses for power multiply rapidly as industrialization progresses and the standard of living rises. For example, electrical generating capacity in the United States has recently been doubling about every ten years and this trend shows every sign of continuing in the coming decades. Similar increases are occurring all over the world. The availability of large amounts of power independent of foreign sources of fuel may be very important to a country even if costs are high.

IV

Evidently our "atoms for peace" program rests more on faith than on solidly established economic and technical data. Furthermore, we have the curious situation in which economic estimates, uncertain as they are, suggest stronger reasons for nuclear power development in other countries than in our own.

Yet there remain three reasons why the United States should pursue a vigorous development of nuclear reactors for the production of power. These reasons are: first, the responsibilities of our present world leadership; second, the implementation of our stated foreign policy; third, the rapid growth of our need for electrical power in this country.

During the past 15 years we have developed a great industrial technology devoted to the extraction of energy from uranium. It is generally recognized that at present we lead the world in this development. We have not been backward in claiming that the peacetime uses of nuclear energy can be an important factor in lifting the general standard of living everywhere. We are at pres-

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ent the richest country in the world and technologically the most advanced. The United States has a great opportunity and a great obligation to maintain leadership in the development of this new technology of nuclear power.

We have not only spoken of the importance of peacetime use of atomic energy. Beyond that, this Government has specifically offered to assist other nations in this development. Consequently, we have a specific obligation to back up our foreign policy gestures in this field with growing technological strength. To do so, we must maintain a vigorous program of reactor development. How can we offer to build reactors abroad without building enough reactors here to know what we are doing? How can we expect to send materials and helpful information abroad if we let our technology fall behind?

It is true that power in this country is now relatively cheap. It is true we have great coal reserves. But our growing need for electric power has been clearly demonstrated in recent years. Our power needs in 1970 or 1975 will certainly be several times greater than our total electrical generating capacity at present. Possibly the coal industry, with help from oil and natural gas, can be developed to take care of these needs. But these conventional sources of fuel are not unlimited. We should be investigating now, long before our present fuel supplies are exhausted, every other promising source of energy. The fission of uranium is such a new source. Common sense and national prudence alike require us to explore its possibilities.

Both inside and outside the Government there seems to be general acceptance of the need for nuclear power development, but there is a great difference of opinion as to how this responsibility should be discharged. Such differences of opinion about the scope and methods of our nuclear power program are exacerbated by the domestic issue of public versus private power but arise principally from the technical uncertainties of the situation. Before discussing how our nuclear power program should be shaped to meet both our domestic needs and those of our foreign policy, we should inquire what help we might be able to give foreign countries and the mechanism of providing that help.

To outline specifically the kinds of action that may gain us advantages in foreign fields we need to distinguish between different countries. The kind of help that might be welcome and useful varies greatly between countries like England and France,

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which already have vigorous atomic energy programs backed by large groups of technically trained people, and more backward countries where the atomic energy programs have hardly started and there is a great shortage of scientists and engineers.

For the most advanced countries our most useful contributions would probably be materials, not only uranium but enriched uranium, heavy water, zirconium and possibly others. Instruments and special reactor components such as pumps and perhaps fuel elements might also be useful. In nearly every case such materials or component parts could be obtained elsewhere so that we will have to compete in quality or price. A second category, perhaps as important, is information. Again this is competitive with other sources. To retain viability the information we supply must constantly be refreshed and brought up to date to a degree effective only if we maintain a vigorous program of research and development. Included in such information should be operating data on full-scale commercial power plants. The actual export of nuclear power plants or construction of such plants abroad by American firms is important for countries just starting nuclear energy programs. For those countries which are highly industrialized, demands of this sort might diminish rapidly after the initial phase of their program is completed.

For the least developed areas, small-output nuclear power plants should be important for a considerable period. This is a field which has not been considered very important domestically since it is generally believed that power costs will be high for such plants. Consequently, this can be considered as part of our program specifically aimed at the foreign field. It is important to develop packaged power units as cheap and foolproof as possible. Probably such units sent abroad would have to be accompanied by trained crews for the initial operating period. Information, supported by trained people, is also needed by the less developed countries. Visits by scientists and engineers to all countries will be important but in the less developed countries the visits should be longer and should include not only specialists but men capable of teaching basic background material.

There are two advantages to foreign aid in this form. It might be used as a lever to control future use of nuclear materials and reactors, specifically to prevent diversion to military uses, and it might be far more effective psychologically than equal amounts of money for more prosaic purposes.

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The mechanisms which can be used to provide foreign aid are limited by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Under that act it will be possible for the United States to coöperate with other countries individually, in groups or through the medium of an international agency such as is under discussion in the United Nations. Already some 40 bilateral treaties have been negotiated for the exchange of materials and information. However, it should be pointed out that all but a few of these are concerned not with power reactors but only with research reactors. These have their uses as training instruments but the amounts of material and of information they require are trivial compared to the needs of power reactors—roughly in the same ratio as costs, or about 1 to 100.

V

At present we are in a strong position to help foreign countries obtain nuclear power. However, if we are to make our "atoms for peace" program an effective part of our foreign policy we must realize that we are in a highly competitive situation. Other countries have vigorous atomic energy programs. They have already proven their competence. They have already shown that there is no such thing as a monopoly on the laws of nature. In many instances they have more compelling domestic reasons than we have for pushing nuclear reactors as practical operating components of their national power systems. Our present commanding lead is bound to lessen. It could easily disappear if any part of our program lags seriously.

Unfortunately, one whole part of our program is currently in a state of confusion. In 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission recognized that the time had come to build some full-scale nuclear power plants that could be run on a continuous basis supplying power to regular customers. The question arose as to whether such full-scale "demonstration" power plants should be financed by the Government or by private industry. This question immediately involved the Atomic Energy Commission in the long-standing private versus public power question, an involvement accentuated by the unfortunate Dixon-Yates affair.

To a large extent, the public versus private power question as it relates to nuclear energy has been misrepresented. The whole development of nuclear energy in this country has depended on the coöperation of government and industry. The

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actual work on reactor development has been carried out entirely by industries and universities although largely in government laboratories and at government expense. All plants and laboratories have been constructed and operated by private industry under government contracts. Furthermore, it had been the tacit understanding of the Atomic Energy Commission that nuclear power plants would eventually be built by private companies on the same basis as ordinary coal-burning plants. Private companies had vociferously upheld this view and by the summer of 1954 had already begun to put substantial sums of their own money into research and planning for such construction.

Early in 1955, the Commission invited private companies to make proposals for the construction of full-scale nuclear power plants with varying degrees of financial support by the Government. Under this arrangement, quite a number of proposals have been made and accepted. Yet as of the summer of 1956, only one plant was actually under construction.

It is not possible to judge the motivation of the private companies, but clearly the genuine desire to keep abreast of technological progress is strengthened by eagerness to prove the company progressive and the wish to forestall government power plants. However, private industry must necessarily be concerned with immediate costs and with reliability. When a novel type of reactor is chosen for construction by private industry there may be a temptation to minimize risk by a long period of preliminary research. Probably as more and more reactors are built for the production of power by utility systems, the tendency will be to build reactors of a type already tested in practice. For example, in the proposals currently before the Commission there is a preponderance of pressurized light water reactors. Most experts would say that such reactors are not the reactors of the future.

During the past year private industry has expressed great concern over the limit of their public liability for the real or imagined injuries that might arise from reactor accidents or even from normal operation. This is understandable. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy recommended to the last Congress a government insurance bill to take care of this difficulty. The Committee also introduced a bill authorizing the Atomic Energy Commission to build several full-scale power reactors up to a total cost of $400,000,000. Neither bill passed.

In opposing the bill authorizing it to build full-scale power

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reactors, the Atomic Energy Commission expressed the view "that while it must take the lead and carry most of the burden of developing nuclear power reactor technology, industry should take the initiative and assume the major responsibility for full-scale prototype reactors." Such a policy might be reasonable if we were concerned only with the development of nuclear power for the United States, but we are not.

We cannot simultaneously make "atoms for peace" a major part of our foreign policy and atoms for private industry a controlling part of our domestic policy. However desirable it may be to get the Government out of the nuclear power business, it is more important to back our announced foreign policy with a vigorous and fast-moving program of reactor development and construction. If money can be saved by persuading private industry to finance some power plants, well and good, but the Government must determine the program and finance any parts of it that private industry is unwilling or unable to carry.

Clearly the decisions as to what to build, where and how fast must be made by the United States Government. Only the Government can balance the importance of progress versus cost in terms of national prestige, foreign policy and long-range needs. The principal responsibility rests with the five members of the Atomic Energy Commission. They must share it with Congress, which provides the money, and with other Executive departments such as State, Defense and Bureau of the Budget.

Similarly, the Atomic Energy Commission must determine our declassification policy. Information acquired is useless if it cannot be communicated. Secrecy is like a drug habit. Breaking away from it induces nervousness and hallucinations. Sticking to it maintains a false glow of security. We need a clear decision that information of direct and immediate military value should remain classified and that all other information should be declassified. Such a decision would release our work on the controlled thermonuclear reaction from the bonds of secrecy in which it is now entangled and would release other more prosaic data which our rivals can eventually get for themselves if they haven't already.

VI

The "atoms for peace" policy advocated by President Eisenhower is feasible and desirable regardless of some technical un-

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certainties. To make this policy effective demands a more ambitious approach to nuclear power than is required by our domestic needs. For this reason, the United States Government must play a leading rôle and must make expenditures that will be substantial although small compared to military budgets. The technical program must be kept flexible and must be accelerated in order to maintain the leadership implied by the policy.

The history of atomic energy in this country is an example of partnership between government and private industry. We cannot afford to weaken this partnership by a quarrel over public versus private power. The Government should continue research on both fission and fusion, and the construction of experimental reactors. It should not hesitate to build full-scale power-producing reactors of various types when they are technically justified. These full-scale power plants can supplement rather than duplicate those built by private companies, thus filling any gaps that might otherwise appear in the over-all program. While continuing as construction and operating contractors for the Government, private industry should be encouraged to invest its own money, both in research and development and in the construction of power reactors.

Every effort should be made to reduce secrecy and to simplify the transmittal of materials and knowledge to other countries through government and business channels. We must continually add to our knowledge and make this knowledge available to others.

Our objectives are technical progress and the use of such progress to strengthen our international position and to promote peace. Only by such a program can we fulfill the commitments of our foreign policy. We have an opportunity and an obligation to use the greatest discovery of our time for the benefit of all men of all nations.

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THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL: THE PASSPORT PROBLEM

By Louis L. Jaffe

ON April 15, 1820, the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, issued a passport to one Luther Bradish certifying that he was about to visit foreign countries "with the view of gratifying a commendable curiosity." In 1817 there had issued the first of the passport forms to bear at the top the American arms but, we are told, the eagle was portrayed "with the head turned in the wrong direction." In that brave new world there was a relaxed yet vigorous self-assurance. Today the Passport Division does not find curiosity commendable and the eagle's scream must issue from the right side of his beak. But it is not enough to take counsel of nostalgia or even of the righteous indignation aroused by ludicrous expressions of bureaucratic zeal.

We must begin by identifying our passport problem. The term "passport" in its earliest usage was applied to a permission given, it might be, to an enemy alien or a departing foreign ambassador, to pass safely through the territory of the issuing Power. But in its later and now current usage the passport is a document issued by a country to its nationals, its chief function to identify the bearer when passing into and out of foreign countries, and to insure his safe conduct. By the late nineteenth century when freedom of movement reached its apogee, only a few countries—Persia, Rumania, Russia, Serbia were among them—required the wayfaring alien to present a passport. Nor would the traveller, at least in time of peace, have needed a passport to *leave* his own country. That had always been true for an American citizen, and remained true until 1941. It had been true for centuries for an Englishman and is still true. The First World War shattered this bonhommie. It revived a fairly general control of entry and exit; some of these restrictions were relaxed in the inter-war period but were again given new life by the period of Perpetual Alert in which we feel ourselves to be living. A survey made in 1952 by the *Yale Law Journal* showed that of 37 countries giving information, only ten allowed their nationals to depart without passport and only five permitted the entry of aliens without passport. Since 1929 we have warned our nationals that travel abroad without a passport would be difficult or impossible. And

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in 1941 the President, exercising statutory "emergency" powers, proclaimed the existence of a "national emergency" and forbade exit without a passport. The "emergency" has since been maintained by all three of our Presidents (at least for passport purposes), and it is a crime to leave the country without one.

There are then two distinct facets of the passport problem. The more traditional one has to do with enabling the citizen to make his way abroad, with putting at his disposal an identifying document which in the past has been useful and which today may be indispensable. The latter-day problem has to do with the citizen's power to leave his country, however welcome he may be elsewhere. Quite different considerations may obtain. We might under the former refuse a passport lest the citizen become a nuisance, a persona non grata to a sister state. We might under the latter refuse a passport lest he work up among our sisters an assault on our bastion or our peace of mind. Somewhat different legal considerations, too, will be in play when the question concerns the "right" of the citizen who is being cribbed, cabined and confined. But in the last few years it has not been easy to keep disentangled the legal and political threads of these two situations. Surely the predominant motivation has been not the protection of our sister states nor the friendly course of our foreign relations as such. Nearly every passport denial has been a decision to keep the citizen here within the high walled fortress where he can be isolated, neutralized, kept, let us say, to his accustomed and observable routines of malefaction. It has been simply one facet of our tactic of domestic security, and only incidentally a matter of foreign policy. Legally, too, doctrine sidles from one track to the other: a denial of passport, though motivated essentially by a policy of security, is still justified on the ground that the passport is "really" (as indeed it once was) a kind of good "reference" to our sister states abroad and no one, the argument runs, has a "right" to be recommended whose character or intentions are questionable. From this the conclusion would follow that he can go, but without our blessing. But, of course, he can't go. Thus *the* passport problem centers around the power to forbid our citizens to leave the country for travel.

I say "for travel." It has been our policy since the beginning that a citizen is free to expatriate himself. Even those to whom this freedom is not a sacred principle will be heard to say, "If you don't like it here, go back where you came from." There

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have been minor indications that we might try to prevent the expatriation of persons who would be serviceable to our cold war enemies. Some years ago visiting Chinese students—among them geographers—were denied exit for that reason. But again that is not our major problem: it is those who wish to travel as American citizens with whom we are most concerned. What is their right as Americans to travel, what is the legitimate power of the United States to keep them home?

The passport, wrote Peuchet, a French revolutionary of 1791, is a police "disorder" so much the more odious that it employs all the arts of tyranny and deprives man of the first, the most well-founded of his rights, that of breathing the air which pleases him without asking the permission of one who can refuse it. And in the same year the Declaration of the Rights of Man guaranteed the natural right to wander at will. These declarations set, no doubt, the ideal which came finally to be very near the truth of the mature nineteenth century. But in less than a year in France itself these grand sentiments broke against the rocks of French revolutionary need and the ingrained habit of the *ancien régime*: the French restored a system of control even more thoroughgoing than that of the monarchy. But the Anglo-American can appeal to the original (1215) Magna Carta itself, which in its 42nd chapter grants that it shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom and to return safely and securely, saving allegiance to itself. When it is remembered that many of the "civil liberties" as we know them today—the "freedoms" of speech, worship and assembly—are not mentioned in Magna Carta, it is curious that it contains a chapter on freedom of travel. Was it, perhaps, a protest against the growing and incipient centralizing power of the King and State; the allegiance to Christendom? The earlier Constitutions of Clarendon (1166) had forbidden archbishops, bishops and parsons to leave England without the King's license. The 42nd chapter is not repeated in the Great Charter of Henry III which is the version of Magna Carta appearing actually in the statute book. It was one of the chapters omitted because they seemed "weighty and doubtful;" in this case, perhaps, an opening for the encroachment of Papal authority. Some would argue that Magna Carta did no more than codify preëxisting rights and that therefore the omission did not impair the previously explicit grant.

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But later statutes did set limits to travel. A statute of Richard II radically reversed the presumption in favor of travel, forbidding all travel except to Great Men of the Realm, "true and notable merchants, and the King's soldiers." In the time of Elizabeth statutes authorized forfeitures for unauthorized travel, forbade departure to attend any visitation, congregation or assembly for religion; under statutes of James I it was forbidden to send children to Catholic schools abroad and later to send them abroad for any purpose whatever. These statutes are, of course, the precise counterpart of our present day prohibitions. The Papacy to Englishmen of those days was no less the arch-enemy than the Communist International is now to us. But after these statutes we hear little or nothing of restrictions on foreign travel. In 1606 the statute of Richard II was repealed, and except in time of war the prerogative has not since been used to restrict travel "in the public interest." The issue was not one which warranted mention in the great revolutionary charters of the seventeenth century. Blackstone at the end of the eighteenth century says in a cautious, lawyer-like way, "At present everybody has, or at least assumes, the liberty of going abroad when he pleases. Yet undoubtedly if the king, by writ of *ne exeat regno* thinks proper to prohibit him from so doing .....and the subject disobeys, it is high contempt of the king's prerogative, for which the offender's lands shall be seized till he return, and then he is liable to fine and imprisonment."

Is free and unrestricted travel, then, a "right" of Englishmen? It is nowhere so stated nor granted by formal charter, nor was it ever an issue in revolutionary times. It has that powerful yet ambiguous confirmation which comes from a custom which is taken for granted and upon which so many of the "rights" and "freedoms" of Englishmen rest. Did this customary "right" of Englishmen become fixed as such in our Constitution as is the case with the right of speech, religion, association (the First Amendment) or as something comprehended in the concept of "due process of law" (the Fifth Amendment)? It is nowhere granted specific protection and though that is not conclusive, it suggests that the protection is something less absolute than that, let us say, of speech or religion, and that if there be any protection, it is against "arbitrary" or "unreasonable" restraint.

The constitutional position of this asserted freedom is still

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very uncertain. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has, in the last few years at least, rejected the extreme claim of the Government to an absolute and unreviewable power to deny a passport. The Government has argued that the passport was a "political" document, the issuance of which was within the complete (and thus arbitrary) discretion of the constitutional organ for conducting foreign affairs (the Presidency). The Court has flatly rejected this argument. It would perhaps be acceptable in a world in which one could travel without a passport. "The right to travel," declared Judge Fahy, "to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law." A restraint imposed by the Government of the United States upon this liberty, therefore, must conform with the provisions of the Fifth Amendment that "No person shall be...deprived of...liberty...without due process of law." It follows that if a passport is necessary to leave the United States or to go into another country, its issue may not depend on absolute Executive discretion. The constitutional mandate requires that one denied a passport be given a hearing: that he be confronted with evidence and told the reasons for denial. But the Government still insists that it may protect from disclosure "information affecting the national security or tending to disclose or compromise investigative sources or methods." And the Court of Appeals has as yet expressly refused to decide whether a denial resting on undisclosed information would violate the Fifth Amendment.

The constitutional mandate requires, in the second place, that the reasons given for denial be pursuant to some formulated policy and that that policy be "valid." There are as yet no decisions squarely determining the criteria of validity. The Court has hinted that the Executive discretion may be fairly broad. "World conditions...as to which the Executive has special information and on the basis of which he is especially qualified to make decisions, bear upon the question. For reasons thus suggested the issuance of passports throughout our history has been left to the judgment of the Secretary of State under Presidential regulation, and is subject only to constitutional safeguards. And even these must be defined with cautious regard for the responsibility of the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs." In a recent rather curious case one Kraus, who had been dis-

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charged from Hunter College in 1933, applied for a passport in order to go about the world to enlist support for a hearing of "the Kraus Case" by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Kraus, it seems, had embarrassed our consuls here and there, was impecunious and heedless of the usual prudential philosophy. He was denied a passport, possibly on the ground that he would not have funds to return, possibly because he was held to be a nuisance abroad. The majority of the Court held the action invalid partly because the denial rested on no clearly formulated policy, partly because it seemed to have a vague hint of a "means test" and such a test would raise "serious constitutional questions." This unrepresentative and unsatisfactory case is the closest we have come to a decision holding that some reasons for denial may be held invalid.

But the constitutional approach begs the paramount issue for a self-respecting, intelligent government. The question should be not how far we can go without reaching the bounds of outrage, but precisely what our policy should be.

II

First let us turn to what the present policy is. From the beginning the Department of State has had undefined discretion, first without and then under statute. In the nineteenth century passports were customarily issued if proof of citizenship was adequate. But as a heritage of the strict Civil War control of exit and entry, an oath of allegiance came to be required. Seward at this time opposed the issue of a passport to persons going abroad on "errands hostile and injurious to the peace of the country," referring in particular to "insurrectionary assemblages." In 1903 it was stated more broadly in a Departmental circular that the Secretary in his discretion might refuse a passport to anyone who he has reason to believe desires a passport "to further an unlawful or improper purpose." In an opinion of the Attorney General in the same year it is stated that there might be conceivable circumstances in which the issue of a passport would be "inexpedient for the public interests" as, for example, to "one of the criminal classes or an avowed anarchist." Bayard in 1879 opposed the issue of passports to Mormons bent on propagating polygamy abroad "inasmuch as polygamy is a statutory crime," though his circular gave expression to the prime difficulty in administering all such policies, namely, the

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problem of proof. A few years later a circumspect consul in Chefoo refused passports to two doubtful ladies who announced themselves as "tourists, stay in Port Arthur indefinite." But the Department took the view that the derelictions of the ladies, if any, should be dealt with by the law of the sojourning country. It should be remembered that at this time the citizen could travel without a passport. It was sometimes the thought of the United States that if it did issue the passport, it committed itself to "protect" the citizen abroad; thus it might refuse a passport to one whom it deemed not worthy of protection or likely to present it with a special problem. Yet it seems clear that the passport though possibly a moral commitment has no legal bearing on either the power or obligation to protect; at that point the single question is whether the unfortunate traveller is a citizen.

A statute of 1926 confirmed the long-standing discretionary powers of the President. In 1950 Congress did provide one criterion for passport denial. It forbade a passport to members of "Communist organizations" which had been ordered to register as such with the Attorney General. The registration provisions, however, have not yet become effective even against the Communist Party, and this law does no more than give moral support to policies otherwise derived. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 the President is authorized to proclaim the existence of a national emergency and thereupon impose such restrictions on exit and entry as "the interests of the United States require." Under these statutes the Department of State has issued regulations concerning the issuance of passports. A passport will not be granted to a person who is a Communist, or who engages in activities which support the Communist movement and warrant the conclusion that he acts under its direction, or is going to engage in activities which will advance the movement; or to one whose activities abroad would violate the laws of the United States, "prejudice the orderly conduct of foreign relations" or "otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

What have these policies meant in practice? As a matter of fact, it is nearly impossible to know in any case just what policy *is* being applied, since unless driven to it by a court order the Department ordinarily conceals the evidence (if any) upon which it has acted, and gives no more reason for the denial than "the interests of the United States." We can suppose that it

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is difficult if not impossible for a known Communist to receive a passport. It may be that denial of passports to Paul Robeson, Howard Fast or to persons who make a practice of attending "Peace Congresses" rests on the surmise (or secret evidence) that they are Communists. One suspects that the denials to Corliss Lamont, Rockwell Kent, Arthur Miller were based on a suspicion or information that they once were Communists; and that as a routine matter this may be decisive without further proof of the present status. In these cases there may, indeed, be no real conviction that the applicant is going abroad to further Communist ends. If the applicant puts up a fight, if he goes further and undertakes costly litigation, or if he can see his way clear to marry Marilyn Monroe, he may wring from the Department a six-month honeymoon abroad. A court order requiring the giving of a reason more circumstantial than "the interest of the United States" may force the grant of a passport because the Department may be unwilling or unable to be more explicit. Without a court order many persons may be forbidden to travel abroad as and when they purpose, for no more reason, as far as we know, than the routinized and obscure suspicions of a government bureau.

It would seem that the applicant need not be suspected even of Communism or subversion. Congressman Leo Isaacson was denied a passport because he was going abroad to attend a conference to aid Greek rebels, a purpose contrary to our policy; thus the grant of a passport would not be "in the interests of the Government of the United States." Reverend J. Henry Carpenter, a highly respected inter-faith leader, who had once urged "high level negotiations" between the United States and the Soviet Union, was denied a passport to visit Japan. Mrs. Shipley, at the time Chief of the Passport Division, said, "Dr. Carpenter knows the answer for our refusal of a passport. It is his political activities." Somewhat similar was the case of the Reverend Stephen N. Fritchman, who for the argument we will assume to be a "left winger." He was not permitted to attend and speak before the 100th anniversary of Unitarianism in Melbourne. He was told that he could appeal, but by then a grant might be too late. One receives a strong impression that a passport may be denied to any individual who at any time has held unorthodox political or moral views; if this impression is wrong, it is nevertheless warranted by the failure or refusal

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of the Department to explain or justify its administration. When an occasional reason is given for a denial, the reason implies that an applicant going abroad to "oppose" the policies of the United States or speak contrary to its interests (as the Government sees it) is guilty of *lèse majesté* warranting refusal.

III

What restrictions on the right to leave the country can be justified? It is no doubt clear that a person who is fleeing from his obligation to pay taxes, serve as a soldier or even to pay his just debts may be forcibly detained; and he may be stopped if departure is part of a scheme of crime or fraud. But even in these cases it is doubtful that an administrative process, particularly if it rests on a secret dossier, should justify more than provisional detention until such time as the underlying obligation can be determined by due process of law.

Can detention, then, ever be justified where no crime or evasion of obligation can be presently demonstrated? It is often asserted that travel abroad is as much a "natural" right as the right to move or speak freely within the country or to practise one's religion: that it cannot, therefore, be subjected to any different restrictions. Like these other rights, it nourishes the self-determining creative character of the individual not simply by the mere enlarging of his freedom of action, but by expanding the scope of his experience. Nor is the value limited to the individual. It attests to the community of nations; brings its peoples together; promotes familiarity and understanding; enriches and diversifies our science and culture. It is this movement of men and ideas on which our very culture rests. Even where the object of the visit is criticism, it promotes that continuous human dialogue whose aim is mutual adjustment and toleration. We must remember, too, that however we value the citizen's interest in travel, a passport denial based on vague suspicion impairs his reputation and leaves him worse off than had he never applied at all. Nevertheless, the right to travel *is* distinguished from the other great "rights" and interests, as they are indeed distinguished among themselves. All of them rely for their effective enforcement and their operative meaning on an organized society. If the society grants the right to move or speak freely *within* its territory, it is at the same time able to bring its force to bear against the improper uses of these

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freedoms. If movement becomes sabotage or speech conspiracy, it may set under way its criminal or civil procedures. Even the *legal* use of freedom of speech supposes as a premise the total complex of a society: one which is appealed to, which listens and which replies. This society is the "market place of ideas" which determines the worth of what is offered and so defends itself from error.

In the Civil War and again in World War I, the United States set up a rigid system of passport control. The criterion here is the defense of the country from external enemies. It is asserted that the precedents of "war" have no relevance to "peace." But the critical consideration is defense against an external enemy; and communication abroad between our citizens and the enemy cannot by its nature be controlled by the usual criminal process. The facts in a particular case as to the citizen's intention are inevitably speculative: all is to be done after the bird has flown. Now our Congress and the Administration have concluded that the Communist International is a foreign and domestic enemy. We deal with its domestic aspect by criminal process; we would seem justified in dealing with its external aspect by exit control. If an avowed Communist is going abroad, it may be assumed that he will take counsel there with his fellows, will arrange for the steady and dependable flow of cash and information, and do his bit to promote the purposes of the "conspiracy."

But the rub is that a great many of those denied passports stoutly protest that they are not Communists, and since the action rests on a secret dossier, its validity must be taken on faith. The dossier may purport to demonstrate that the applicant is a Communist or an instrument of the Communists, but as likely as not may show no more than an involvement in unpopular causes. Dean Acheson when Secretary of State justified the Department's policy both substantively and procedurally. He has since recanted. We should, perhaps, attach more weight to the action of the Secretary than to the *mea culpa* of the later-day critic. What one does or must do under the stress of responsibility and the urge to hold office expresses a profound political reality. But we should listen, too, to the voice of reasoned reflection. Mr. Acheson believes that the secret dossier which was intended for "serious, sensitive and rare" cases has become commonplace and routine. The deadly risk

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of the program has been "the compulsion toward conformity. Literally thousands of minor officials in millions of cases apply rules of thumb provided by handbooks to determine compliance with scores of security and loyalty programs." The risks of all government regulations, particularly where applicable to great numbers of cases, is the inexorable drift to routine, ultracautious standards and the reliance on narrow, frightened minor officials. These risks inherent in any passport program are among the most important considerations in determining what risks we are prepared to run in *not* controlling travel. For we must never forget that in our system of government, indeed in any system in which men are to be able to breathe and think freely, we must run some risks. "In our concern over the danger from the Communist conspiracy," says Dean Acheson, "we have been driven to a search for an illusion, the illusion of complete security."

But despite the heavy risks of maladministration, the United States is, in my opinion, justified in denying passports to persons whose journey abroad is presumptively in furtherance of the Communist "conspiracy." If such a policy is not clearly required, it is, I think, within the range of reasoned choice and not violative of fundamental principle. But can the same be said if the finding rests on a secret dossier? The secret dossier compounds the risks of maladministration: the license given to suspicion, malice and the anxiety of petty-minded bureaucrats. The evil of the secret dossier would, however, be somewhat mitigated if denials were limited to cases in which the Administration was prepared to make a specific finding of the Communist element. But should we condemn the secret dossier absolutely and without exception? Shall we deny the urgency of the Government's argument that if it must reveal its sources of information, its sources may dry up? Does it follow that if we recognize the country's interest in self-defense, we must recognize the secret dossier as a condition of effective action? Here, if we invoke Mr. Acheson's notion that some risk is unavoidable, we might with him conclude that the risk of unjust accusation is greater than that which we should suffer from the occasional miscreant who takes the field abroad against us. This is the choice, of course, we make in our criminal law: no conviction may depend upon a secret dossier. The state must choose between revealing its evidence or letting the criminal go scot-free. But this

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appeal to our "tradition of fair play" is inconclusive; there have been and continue to be a number of consequences visited upon individuals short of imprisonment for crime which rest upon unrevealed evidence, *e.g.* exclusion of aliens. The use of secret evidence then is not unknown to us. Yet we may feel that it is wrong, and that the risks we should run from abandoning the practice do not exceed those of the criminal law. Nevertheless, I do not feel a sufficient assurance on the point to urge upon the reader the absolute rejection of the secret dossier.

But it is at this point of demonstrable Communist involvement that I would draw the line. We may keep Communist "conspirators" at home because we have determined that the dangers are great and imminent. There may, of course, be other cases of a similar danger: the disclosure of top secrets suggests itself. But no lesser danger should suffice. No mere random anxiety that queer or "radical" persons may meet with others of their kind, may call current policies into question, or cause discomfiture to those at home or abroad, justifies the exercise of a power so likely, as the record shows, to be abused. It is intolerable, I think, that a bureau should thus trammel the individual on grounds no more palpable than "the interests of the United States." The right to go abroad may not be of so exalted a nature as the right to move about, to associate and to speak within one's country: thus to participate in the community's life is the paramount opportunity and duty of the citizen. But it is nevertheless a right of great moment; it is liberating for the individual and fructifying for his own community. It will be said that certain individuals misrepresent us abroad, that they may bring our policy, our culture or our humanity into disrepute. But what government, what courts, what bureaus are capable of judging who shall speak for us, what manners are comely, what culture is sound, what policies are sacrosanct? Who are the persons competent to make such judgments? What law can establish a standard for such action? To put these questions is to give the answer. It becomes clear how monstrous it is, into what perversity we have fallen, when a minister of the gospel cannot go abroad because some minor official disapproves of his "political activity." What began in an alarmed concern for the country's safety concludes in routines of unmitigated gall.

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ROOTS OF PHILIPPINE POLICY

By Ramon Magsaysay

IN shaping its foreign policy the Philippines is primarily moved by three considerations: first, national security; second, economic stability; and third, political and cultural relations with the free world. These considerations are equal to each other in importance and they receive varied attention only because of the difference in urgency and in the time, effort and financing required for their implementation.

Expressed in more detail, these three considerations provide the objectives and the methods of our policy: first, the strengthening of our national security by suppressing subversion from within and building strength against attacks from without through participation in collective security arrangements with other free nations; second, the utilization of the machinery of our foreign relations for the promotion of our foreign trade and economic coöperation in order to strengthen our domestic economy and to contribute our share to the economic development of a free world; and third, the development of our political and cultural relations with countries of the free world with particular emphasis on our relations with our Asian neighbors through our membership in the United Nations and by participation in regional conferences, such as the Manila Conference of 1954 (SEATO) and the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955).

In the pursuit of our objectives and in the choice of our methods our government finds itself closely associated with the United States of America. It is an association immediately dictated by our community of objectives, the most urgent of which is the defense of our freedom against Communist aggression. But our policy of close relations with the United States is not a mere artificial creation of government policy-makers and it is not dictated exclusively by the accident of common purposes. It is the product of experience in serving the national interest. More than that, it is a basic plank in the platform of the Nacionalista Party, the same political organization that under Quezon and Osmeña successfully led our country toward independence from America. And still more than that, it is in the will and the hearts of the Filipino people.

Our freedom is the fruit of the efforts, the sacrifices and the

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blood of our people. We won it by rising against Spain, by persuading America and by resisting the Japanese. That is why our people love our freedom so much. I disagree with those who declare that we were "given" our freedom, as if it were a gift and not a right.

But if our freedom is our own, it would be hard to deny that the character of our people and our Republic bears the indelible marks of our past association with other peoples. Our basic Malay traits have absorbed many of the qualities of the Chinese of the Ming invasion and of the quiet beauty of the cultures swept to our shores by the tides of several Southeast Asian empires. The culture of our people received its most permanent and most universal mark when Spain brought us the Catholic faith. And the architects of our independence so fashioned our political institutions that they are almost identical to those of the United States. If they did so, it was not only because they found the ready-made examples of the successful American experiment a convenient pattern for our future course, but also because our people would not have it otherwise. Their reasons for this are interesting.

Philippine-American relations began with a war—a war between Filipinos and Americans. The occupation of our country by American forces was never quite satisfactorily explained at the time. But looking at it from the historian's point of view, it is interesting to trace the development of these relations which started with the fact of conflict, bloodshed and the conquest of one people by the other. After 40 years, a very short period in the context of a nation's history, Philippine and American blood was shed again on Philippine soil, but this time on the same side and under the same command. Many books have been written to explain this phenomenon in international relations. There are indeed many possible explanations, but I am particularly partial to the one which begins by stating that America in all her greatness is not an infallible interpreter and implementer of international morality. Her leaders may have in some instances of history erred in their judgment from that point of view. But in every case the original spirit of America, the one conceived in the minds of the founding fathers and nurtured by the blood of the "minute men" and General Washington's soldiers, has always prevailed. And so, soon after the initial violence and fumbling at the turn of the century, our people began to feel this spirit. Frus-

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trated in our efforts to achieve independence by violence, we found available to us the more effective and less painful method of constitutional process which America, inexorably impelled by her own spirit and tradition, was forced to extend to our shores.

The American régime was not by any means a "perfect" government. There is no substitute for complete self-government. Furthermore, although political autonomy was extended to a degree unprecedented in colonial annals, although health and education were improved to an extent which might not have been within reach of a weak independent nation, no serious effort was made to lift the population up from its ancient agricultural economy. But the hand of America was relatively light. And so invigorating were the basic freedoms she guaranteed to the individual Filipino that when the Japanese invaders landed on our shores, the Filipinos, even though complete independence had not come, resisted as if their actual sovereign, the American people, were merely their allies in the struggle for their freedom. While in some countries of Asia the Japanese were being received either indifferently or as liberators, the Filipinos resisted as though complete national liberty was theirs.

That is the explanation for the Philippine-American story. The spirit of America asserted itself at the right time and at the right place. And all the charges real or imagined against American civil and military officials in peace and in war could easily be forgotten as that spirit asserted itself. To understand Philippine foreign policy, it is necessary to know these antecedents of Philippine-American relations. I can easily see how other Asian peoples, not fully informed of our story, will find it strange that we have not reacted towards our former masters the way they have to theirs.

Immediately after independence in 1946 our foreign and defense policies were caught in the international and internal spider webs of the Communist revolution. Internally, the Hukbalahap movement, which had started as a resistance organization during the Japanese Occupation, became the military arm of the Communist Party in the Philippines and began an intensive campaign of murder, pillage and robbery aimed at the weakening and eventual overthrow of the Republic. In 1949, this campaign bore ugly fruit in the murder of Mrs. Manuel Quezon, widow of our late great president, and some members of her family. Meanwhile international Communism was ringing down the Iron Cur-

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tain and threatening everywhere to subvert and topple governments that were caught unawares or were not strong enough to resist its subversion. It was immediately evident that the young Philippine Republic could not hope to last long unaided in the face of these external and internal developments.

In 1947 the Philippines, then under the administration of President Roxas and the Liberal Party, entered into a series of agreements with the United States designed to provide adequate external and internal security for our Republic. In agreeing to United States bases on Philippine territory, the Philippines was thinking not only of her security but also of contributing her own humble share to the defense of the free world.

As the Communist advance progressed in Asia, it became further evident that while bilateral treaties served their purpose it was necessary to supplement them with multilateral arrangements based on the principle of collective security in order to strengthen further the chain of resistance among free countries on a regional basis. In Asia this took the form of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty which resulted in the establishment of SEATO. Our policy of active preparation against external attack and internal subversion places us among those countries of the free world which believe in uniting with free nations, Asian or non-Asian, for the sake of achieving strength against aggression.

There are democratic countries in Asia, with whom we maintain the friendliest relations, who pursue a different approach to the present problems of international politics. We respect their opinions and we fully realize that there could be forces of history, population and internal politics at work in those countries which might differ from those of our own and might dictate the formulation and pursuit of policies different from our own.

Impelled by these forces, these countries prefer to view the present world tension as the result of competition between two power blocs—one headed by the United States of America and the other by the Soviet Union. Haunted by the spectre of old Western imperialism that once roamed their lands, these countries now choose to stand aside lest, it is alleged, they lose their independence and return to their old rôle of pawns in the struggle for world power.

We take a different view of the situation. We are perfectly aware that history is full of examples of struggles among dom-

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inant Powers that have brought disaster to smaller nations which allowed themselves to be dragged into such conflicts. But two things set our outlook apart from that of some of our neighbors.

First, we do not view Communism as just another world force to be satiated with territory and gold. We have learned from our own Communist Hukbalahap revolution that Communism is not just some distorted nationalist ambition, like Hitler's, to be satisfied with land or riches, but an unremitting universal campaign to rule the earth, to eradicate individual liberty, to destroy God and the souls of men.

The United States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, recently quoted the words of the Communists themselves proving that their goals have not changed and that their program is only temporarily delayed. He quoted the statement of Mr. Khrushchev on September 17, 1955: "But if anyone believes that our smiles involve abandoment of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for that must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle." Mr. Robertson then went on to quote the teachings of Lenin which Mr. Khrushchev so vigorously endorses.

"We are living," Lenin wrote, "not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."

Mr. Robertson noted that Lenin depicted the Communist Party as a man ascending a steep, unexplored mountain who reaches an obstacle barring forward progress. "The man then," said Lenin, "must turn back, descend, seek another path, longer perhaps, but one which will enable him to reach the summit."

Lenin's summit, said Mr. Robertson, was clearly defined. "First, we will take Eastern Europe," Lenin wrote, "then the masses of Asia, and then we'll surround America, that last citadel of capitalism. We won't have to attack; it will fall into our lap like an overripe fruit."

Second, our people frankly cannot bring themselves to view the forces now resisting Communism as a mere power bloc bent on perpetuating the imperialism of the West. To begin, with, there are many countries now actively opposing Communist

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pressures which have never been colonial countries, and many which were victims of Western colonialism themselves. Then there is the fact that the Communist conspiracy is international and is being waged perhaps with most vigor within those very countries whose governments subscribe to the view that the Soviet Union will respect their neutrality. Furthermore, we acknowledge the reality which the Communists would like us to forget—that in Asia Western colonialism is on its way out while Communist imperialism is on the march. Finally, our people simply cannot see the United States as the vicious head of the imperialists that Communist and others would paint it to be. Our people's experience under and with the United States prevents them in conscience from subscribing to such a view.

I have said that our differences in outlook with some of our neighbors in Asia could be due to the different circumstances that have surrounded our histories and experiences. I want to reiterate that we are aware of these historical and other differences and respect our neighbors' rights to their own approach to international questions, even if we disagree with them. We ask only that our own position be viewed with the same understanding. For example, we ask that our efforts at security through collective defense be fully understood before they are labelled as attempts to create tension, as SEATO was labelled even before its creation.

We do not wonder nor are we particularly grieved when Communist leaders censure our defense arrangements. On the contrary, such censure could be interpreted to mean that they have found our defenses effective and, therefore, we should be rather happy over it. But we do feel it when Communist attacks are indiscriminately echoed by non-Communist sources. The argument that SEATO or any other regional defense pact creates tension strikes me as a variation of the old hasty error of the cart before the horse. Let us say that several small children, minding their own business on some street corner, are approached by the neighborhood bully who starts pushing and otherwise maltreating them one by one. Tired of the bullying, the little children bunch themselves together so that the bully may no longer approach them without meeting an avalanche of little fists. Furthermore, they call upon some of their bigger friends to stand with them in order to discourage the bully. Faced with this situation, the bully stands there growling, complaining that

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they are ganging up on him. Thus a tension is created. Who is to blame for the tension—the little countries for getting together among themselves and with stronger friends in order to defend themselves against the aggressor? Or is it not obviously the aggressor himself whose attitudes and actions brought on the necessity for the union that now faces him? I ask those who have heretofore looked disapprovingly on our efforts to think this over, in fairness to us and for the sake of justice and freedom.

If Asian nations like ourselves are held suspect for our sincere efforts to maintain our security in this area, it is no wonder that similar efforts by countries outside this area, such as the United States, are regarded with even less sympathy. World freedom is, I believe, gaining strength. The genius and God-given resources of America have made her the main source of strength for that freedom. It is indeed a problem for America to distribute that strength without submitting herself to varied accusations. Until Communism is totally destroyed, Communist propaganda will always be there sniping, making mountains out of molehills, big disputes out of small incidents, crimes out of mistakes. But perhaps we of the free world could best build up our strength and forge our unity not by presuming that every criticism of our actions is a concoction of Communist propagandists, but, on the contrary, by assuming that since our relations are essentially those of fallible human beings, there will always be room for improvement and correction.

If there are those who still suspect American motives, it is perhaps because, influenced by their own history, they cannot bring themselves to credit any Western country with good intentions. Perhaps an increase in information about Philippine-American experience would help them to change this attitude. At every opportunity, we endeavor to tell our neighboring Asians the facts about our past and present relations with the United States. We intend to continue doing so and if possible to extend the knowledge of these relations in the interest of a better understanding of our position and that of America. In so doing we hope to strengthen and further unify the free peoples of Asia and the rest of the world.

But there may be those who, already in possession of the facts about Philippine-American relations, still do not see in them sufficient reason to erase the doubts they hold about the United States. If there be such people—and I see no reason to doubt that

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there are—then we have here the occasion to practise the theory that in human relations there is always room for improvement and correction. The solution would then be to keep on trying to improve our relations and to correct our mistakes so that those who may still be somewhat doubtful of our relations may finally find in them that long-sought reason to cast aside all doubts about the intentions of the greatest democracy in the world.

Recent events show that America is ready to pursue this course. As this is written, the Philippines and the United States are getting ready to enter into negotiations for the review and implementation of the bases agreement between our two countries. Recently several incidents have occurred between the personnel of the United States military bases here and Filipino civilians which have dramatized the need for the removal of certain points of friction occasioned by the existence of such bases on our soil. The Communist press abroad naturally overplayed the incidents. We have been concerned about them, but we are not unduly alarmed. If a country's military can have differences with its own civilians, it is not surprising that they should sometimes get into trouble with foreign civilians. But the United States, with its readiness to discuss corrective measures and to enter into formal negotiations for the improvement of our bases agreement, with mutual regard for national dignity, has demonstrated its own desire to make out of our relations a pattern for East-West coöperation in the cause of freedom.

Indeed, that should be our joint course—in all humility to admit the possibility of imperfection and with all good will to strive for perfection. Perfection may never be reached. But in striving for it we may yet fashion a model which will attract all free men to that unity without which godliness and liberty could never be fully secure.

Let the original, the true spirit of America always dominate her relations not only with our country but with all free nations. For a free world, which depends so much on the United States for strength, that is the best guarantee for understanding, security and freedom.

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REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

By Henry A. Kissinger

"POLICY," wrote Metternich, the Austrian minister who steered his country through 39 years of crisis by a tour de force perhaps never excelled, "is like a play in many acts which unfolds inevitably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the play will not go on is an absurdity. The play *will* go on either by means of the actors or by means of the spectators who mount the stage. . . . The crucial problem [of statesmanship], therefore, resides in the decision of whether to assemble the audience, whether the curtain is to be raised and above all in the intrinsic merit of the play."

There can be little doubt that the foreign policy of the United States has reached an impasse. For several years we have been groping for a concept to deal with the transformation of the cold war from an effort to build defensive barriers into a contest for the allegiance of humanity. But the new Soviet tactics, coupled with the equally unassimilated increase in the destructive potential of the new weapons technology, have led to a crisis in our system of alliances and to substantial Soviet gains among the uncommitted peoples of the world.

It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe our difficulties to this or that error of policy or to a particular administration, although the present Administration has not helped matters by its pretense of "normalcy." To return to Metternich's metaphor: It can be argued that our policy has reached an impasse because of our penchant for happy endings; the Soviet rulers have been able to use negotiations to their advantage because we insisted on reading from an old script. As in all tragedies, many of our problems have been produced in spite of our good intentions and have been caused, not by our worst qualities, but by our best. What is at issue, therefore, is not a policy but an attitude.

It is with this attitude and its consequences in the conduct of negotiations and our policy of alliances that this article seeks to deal.

II

It is understandable that a nation which for a century and a half had been preoccupied with its domestic affairs should seek

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to apply the pattern of these to international affairs. But the very success of the American experiment and the spontaneity of our social institutions have served to emphasize the dilemma faced at some stage by every country: how to reconcile its vision of itself with the vision of it as seen by others. To itself, a nation is an expression of justice, and the more spontaneous has been the growth of its social institutions the more this is true; for government functions effectively only when most citizens obey voluntarily and they will obey only to the extent that they consider the demands of their rulers just. But to other nations, a state is a force to be balanced. This is inevitable because national strategy must be planned on the basis of the other side's capabilities and not merely a calculation of its intentions. There exists a double standard, therefore, in all foreign policy: internally, foreign policy is justified like all other policy in terms of an absolute standard; but abroad, what is defined as justice domestically becomes a program to be compromised by negotiation. If the institutions and values of the states comprising the international order are sufficiently similar, this incommensurability may not become apparent. But in a revolutionary period like the present, it affects profoundly relationships among states.

Foremost among the attitudes affecting our foreign policy is American empiricism and its quest for methodological certainty: nothing is "true" unless it is "objective" and it is not "objective" unless it is part of experience. This makes for the absence of dogmatism and for the ease of social relations on the domestic scene. But in the conduct of foreign policy it has pernicious consequences. Foreign policy is the art of weighing probabilities; mastery of it lies in grasping the nuances of possibilities. To attempt to conduct it as a science must lead to rigidity. For only the risks are certain; the opportunities are conjectural. One cannot be "sure" about the implications of events until they have happened and when they have occurred it is too late to do anything about them. Empiricism in foreign policy leads to a penchant for *ad hoc* solutions; the rejection of dogmatism inclines our policy-makers to postpone committing themselves until all facts are in; but by the time the facts are in, a crisis has usually developed or an opportunity has passed. Our policy is therefore geared to dealing with emergencies; it finds difficulty in developing the long-range program that might forestall them.

A symptom of our need for methodological certainty is the

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vast number of committees charged with examining and developing policy. The very multiplicity of committees makes it difficult to arrive at decisions in time. It tends to give a disproportionate influence to subordinate officials who prepare the initial memoranda and it overwhelms our higher officials with trivia. Because of our cult of specialization, sovereign departments negotiate national policy among each other with no single authority able to take an over-all view or to apply decisions over a period of time.[1] This results in a hiatus between grand strategy and particular tactics, between the definition of general objectives so vague as to be truistic and the concern with immediate problems. The gap is bridged only when a crisis forces the bureaucratic machinery into accelerated action, and then the top leadership has little choice but to concur in the administrative proposals. In short, we are trying to cope with political problems by administrative means.

The temptation to formulate policy administratively is ever present in a government organized, as ours is, primarily for the conduct of domestic affairs. But the spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are fundamentally opposed. Profound policy thrives on creativeness; good administration thrives on routine—a procedure which can assimilate mediocrity. Policy involves an adjustment of risks; administration an avoidance of deviation. The attempt to formulate policy administratively leads to the acceptance of a standard which evaluates by mistakes avoided rather than by goals achieved. It is no accident that most great statesmen were opposed by the "experts" in their foreign offices, for the very greatness of the statesman's conception tends to make it inaccessible to those whose primary concern is with safety and minimum risk.

Our methodological doubt makes for vulnerability to Soviet manœuvres in two ways: on the one hand, every Soviet change of line is taken at least in part at face value, for we cannot be certain that the Soviets may not "mean" it this time until they have proved they do not; and they will try their best not to prove it until the tactic has served its purpose. On the other hand, we have found it difficult to adjust our tactics to new situations, so that we always tend to speak in the categories of the most recent

[1] This is true despite the National Security Council. Since the N.S.C. is composed mainly of department heads overwhelmed with administrative responsibilities, all the pressures make for a departmental outlook and a concern with immediate problems.

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threat but one. The paradoxical result is that we, the empiricists, appear to the world as rigid, unimaginative and even somewhat cynical, while the dogmatic Bolsheviks exhibit flexibility, daring and subtlety. This is because our empiricism dooms us to an essentially reactive policy that improvises a counter to every Soviet move, while the Soviet emphasis on theory gives them the certainty to act, to manœuvre and to run risks. The very fact of action forces us to assume the risks of countermoves and absorbs our energies in essentially defensive manœuvres.

The willingness to act need not derive from theory, of course. Indeed, an overemphasis on theory can lead to a loss of touch with reality. In many societies—in Great Britain, for example—policy developed from a firmly held tradition of a national strategy. Throughout the nineteenth century it was a tenet of British policy that Antwerp should not fall into the hands of a major Power. This was not backed by an elaborate metaphysics but simply by a tradition of British sea power whose requirements were so generally understood that they were never debated. It is the absence of a tradition of foreign policy which exaggerates the biases of our empiricism and makes it difficult to conduct our policy with a proper regard for the timing of measures. It causes us to overlook the fact that policy exists in time as well as in space, that a measure is correct only if it can be carried out at the proper moment. To be sure, our cumbersome administrative mechanism adds immeasurably to the problem. But in addition, our deliberations are conducted as if a course of action were eternally valid, as if a measure which might meet exactly the needs of a given moment could not backfire if adopted a year later. For this reason our policy lacks a feeling for nuance, the ability to come up with variations on the same theme, as the Soviets have done so effectively. We consider policy-making concluded when the National Security Council has come to a decision. And in fact, the process of arriving at a decision is so arduous and a reappraisal is necessarily so "agonizing" that we are reluctant to reëxamine policies after they have outlived their usefulness.

But a written statement of policy is likely to amount to a truism; the real difficulty arises in applying it to concrete situations. And while we have often come up with the proper measures, we have not found it easy to adapt our approach to the requirements of the situation over a period of time. The different

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uses made by the Soviets of the time interval between the "summit conference" and the Geneva conference of foreign ministers illustrates this point. The Soviets established diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic and thus placed themselves in position to deal directly with both German governments; they used the peace offensive to undermine the cohesiveness of NATO and concluded the arms deal with Egypt. By the time we returned to Geneva, we found ourselves confronted by a series of *faits accomplis* and the conference foredoomed.

Another factor shaping our attitude toward foreign affairs is our lack of tragic experience. Though we have known severe hardships, our history has been notably free of disaster. Indeed, the American domestic experience exhibits an unparalleled success, of great daring rewarded and of great obstacles overcome. It is no wonder, therefore, that to many of our most responsible men, particularly in the business community, the warnings of impending peril or of imminent disaster sound like the Cassandra cries of abstracted "egg-heads." For is not the attribute of the "egg-head" his lack of touch with reality, and does not American reality show an unparalleled wealth coupled with an unparalleled growth?

There has been much criticism of Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson for their defense economies. But in fairness the psychological background of their decisions should be understood; despite all the information at their disposal, they simply cannot believe that in the nuclear age the penalty for miscalculation may be national catastrophe. They may know in their heads, but they cannot accept in their hearts, that the society they helped to build could disappear as did Rome or Carthage or Byzantium, which probably seemed as eternal to their citizens. These characteristics make for an absence of a sense of urgency, a tendency to believe that everything can be tried once and that the worst consequence mistakes can have is that we may be forced to redouble our efforts later on. The irrevocable error is not yet part of the American experience.

Related to this problem is our reluctance to think in terms of power. To be sure, American expansion both economic and geographical was not accomplished without a judicious application of power. But our Calvinist heritage has required success to display the attribute of justice. Even our great fortunes, however ac-

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cumulated, were almost invariably held to impose a social obligation; the great foundation is after all a peculiarly American phenomenon. As a nation, we have used power almost shamefacedly as if it were inherently wicked. We have wanted to be liked for our own sakes and we have wished to succeed because of the persuasiveness of our principles rather than through our strength. Our feeling of guilt with respect to power has caused us to transform all wars into crusades, and then to apply our power in the most absolute terms. We have rarely found intermediary ways to apply our power and in those cases we have done so reluctantly.

But international relations cannot be conducted without an awareness of power relationships. To be sure, the contemporary revolution cannot be managed merely by an exercise of force. But unless we maintain at least an equilibrium of power between us and the Soviet bloc we will have no chance to undertake any positive measures. And maintaining this equilibrium may confront us with some very difficult choices. We are certain to be confronted with situations of extraordinary ambiguity such as civil wars or domestic coups. Every successful Soviet move makes our moral position that much more difficult: Indochina was more ambiguous than Korea; the Soviet arms deal with Egypt more ambiguous than Indochina; the Suez crisis more ambiguous than the arms deal. There can be no doubt that we should seek to prevent such occurrences. But once they have occurred, we must find the will to act and to run risks in a situation which permits only a choice among evils. While we should never give up our principles, we must also realize that we cannot maintain our principles unless we survive.

Consistent with our reluctance to think in terms of power has been our notion of the nature of peace. We assume that peace is the "normal" pattern of relations among states, that it is equivalent to a consciousness of harmony, that it can be aimed at directly as a goal of policy. These are truisms rarely challenged in our political debate. Both major political parties maintain that they work for a lasting peace, even if they differ about the best means of attaining it. Both make statements which imply that on a certain magic day, perhaps after a four-power conference, "peace will break out."

No idea could be more dangerous. To begin with, the polarization of power in the world would give international relations a degree of instability even if there were no ideological disagree-

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ment, and the present volatile state of technology is likely to compound this sense of insecurity. Moreover, whenever peace—conceived as the avoidance of war—has become the direct objective of a Power or a group of Powers, international relations have been at the mercy of the state willing to forego peace. No statesman can entrust the fate of his country entirely to the continued good will of another sovereign state, if only because the best guarantee for the will remaining good is not to tempt it by too great a disproportion of power. Peace, therefore, cannot be aimed at directly; it is the expression of certain conditions and power relationships. It is to these relationships—not to peace—that diplomacy must address itself.

It is obviously to the interest of the Soviet Union to equate peace with a state of good feeling unconnected with power relationships or past usurpations, for such an attitude ratifies all its gains since World War II. By the same token, it is to the interest of the United States to leave no doubt that the tension of the cold war was produced not only by the intransigence of the Soviet tone but also by the intransigence of their measures. As long as the Soviets can give the impression that conciliatory statements by themselves are a symptom of peaceful intentions, they can control the pace of negotiations and gain the benefits of the advocacy of peace without paying any price for its achievement. If the Soviets are given the privilege of initiating negotiations when it suits their purpose and of breaking them off without any penalty, diplomacy will become a tool of Soviet propaganda. And the variety of Soviet manœuvres will in time erode the cohesion of the free world.

III

With this we have reached one of the major problems confronting current American diplomacy: the changed nature of negotiations in a revolutionary political order. An international order, the basic arrangements of which are accepted by all the major Powers, may be called "legitimate;" a system which contains a Power or group of Powers which refuses to accept either the arrangements of the settlement or the domestic structure of the other states is "revolutionary." A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible; it limits their scope. Wars may arise, but they will be fought in *the name* of the existing system and the peace will be justified as a better expression of the agreed ar-

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rangements. In a revolutionary order, on the other hand, disputes do not concern adjustments within a given framework, but the framework itself.

There can be little doubt that we are living through a revolutionary period. On the physical plane, the power of weapons is out of balance with the objectives for which they might be employed; as a result, at a moment of unparalleled strength we find ourselves paralyzed by the implications of our own weapons technology. On the political plane, many of the newly independent Powers continue to inject into their international policies the revolutionary fervor that gained them independence. On the ideological plane, the contemporary ferment is fed by the newly awakened hopes and expectations of hitherto inarticulate peoples and by the rapidity with which ideas can be communicated. And the Soviet bloc, eager to exploit all dissatisfactions for its own ends, has given the present situation its revolutionary urgency.

This is true despite the conciliatory statements of the Twentieth Party Congress. For "peaceful coexistence" was not advanced as an acceptance of the *status quo*. On the contrary, it was justified as the most efficient offensive tactic, as a more effective means to subvert the existing order. The Soviet leaders gave up neither the class struggle with its postulate of irreconcilable conflict, nor the inevitable triumph of Communism with its corollary of the dictatorship of the proletariat. To be sure, war was held to be no longer inevitable, but only because soon the U.S.S.R. would possess preponderant strength. Should the policy of "peaceful coexistence" prove less fruitful than expected, we can look for other tactics. "In the world from now on," Mao has said, "neutrality is only a word for deceiving people."[2]

These have been hard lessons to come by. Lulled by a century and a half of comparative tranquillity and without experience with disaster, we have been reluctant to take at face value the often-repeated Soviet assertion that they mean to smash the existing framework. We have tended to treat Soviet protestations as if their intent were merely tactical—as if the U.S.S.R. overstated its case for bargaining purposes or were motivated by specific grievances to be assuaged by individual concessions. There is a measure of pathos in our effort to find "reasonable" motives for the Soviets to cease being Bolshevik: the opportun-

[2] Quoted in Richard Walker, "China Under Communism" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 272.

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ity to develop the resources of their own country, the unlimited possibilities of nuclear energy or of international trade. We reveal thereby a state of mind which cannot come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives. Our belief that an antagonist can be vanquished by the persuasiveness of argument, our trust in the efficacy of the process of negotiation, reflect the dominant rôle played in our diplomacy by the legal profession and their conception of diplomacy as a legal process.

But the legal method cannot be applied in a revolutionary situation, for it presupposes a framework of agreed rules within which negotiating skill is exercised. It is not the process of negotiation as such which accounts for the settlement of legal disputes, but a social environment which permits that process to operate. This explains why conciliatory American statements have so often missed their mark. To the Soviets, the key to their ultimate triumph resides in their superior understanding of "objective" forces and of the processes of history.[3] Even when they accept the "subjective" sincerity of American statesmen, they still believe them powerless to deal with the "objective" factors of American society which will ultimately produce a showdown. Conciliatory American statements will appear to the Soviet leaders either as hypocrisy or stupidity, ignorance or propaganda. It is therefore futile to seek to sway Soviet leaders through logical persuasion or by invocations of abstract justice. Soviet statesmen consider conferences a means to confirm an "objective" situation. A Soviet diplomat who wishes to make concessions can justify them at home only if he can demonstrate that they resulted from a proper balancing of risks.

In short, diplomacy has a different function in a revolutionary international order. In a legitimate order, diplomacy seeks to compromise disagreements in order to perpetuate the international system. Adjustments occur because agreement is itself a desirable goal, because of a tacit agreement to come to an agreement. In a revolutionary order, on the other hand, adjustments have primarily a tactical significance: to prepare positions for the next test of strength. Negotiations in a legitimate order have three functions: to formulate by expressing agreements or dis-

[3] There is no little exasperation in the Soviet replies to our repeated assertion that a change of tactics on their part implies a surrender of Marxism. Khrushchev has said (September 17, 1955), "If anyone believes that our smiles involve abandonment of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for that must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle."

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cords in a manner that does not open unbridgeable schisms; to perpetuate by providing a forum for making concessions; to persuade by stating a plausible reason for settlement. But in a revolutionary period, most of these functions have changed their purpose: diplomats can still meet, but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same language. Instead, diplomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to attach the uncommitted to one or the other of the contenders.

Nothing is more futile, therefore, than to attempt to deal with a revolutionary power by ordinary diplomatic methods. In a legitimate order, demands once made are negotiable; they are put forward with the intention of being compromised. But in a revolutionary order, they are programmatic; they represent a claim for allegiance. In a legitimate order, it is good negotiating tactics to formulate maximum demands because this facilitates compromise without loss of essential objectives. In a revolutionary order, it is good negotiating tactics to formulate minimum demands in order to gain the advantage of advocating moderation. In a legitimate order, proposals are addressed to the opposite number at the conference table. They must, therefore, be drafted with great attention to their substantive content and with sufficient ambiguity so that they do not appear as invitations to surrender. But in a revolutionary order the protagonists at the conference table address not so much one another as the world at large. Proposals here must be framed with a maximum of clarity and even simplicity, for their major utility is their symbolic content. In short, in a legitimate order, a conference represents a struggle to find formulae to achieve agreement; in a revolutionary order, it is a struggle to capture the symbols which move humanity.

The major weakness of U.S. diplomacy has been the insufficient attention given to the symbolic aspect of foreign policy. Our positions have usually been worked out with great attention to their legal content, with special emphasis on the step-by-step approach of traditional diplomacy. But while we have been addressing the Soviets, they have been speaking to the people of the world. With a few exceptions we have not succeeded in dramatizing our position, in reducing a complex negotiation to its symbolic terms. In major areas of the world the Soviets have captured the "peace offensive" by dint of the endless repetition of slogans that seemed preposterous when first advanced, but which have be-

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come common currency through usage. The Power which has added 150 million people to its orbit by force has become the champion of anti-colonialism; the state which has developed slave labor as an integral part of its economic system has emerged in many parts of the world as the champion of human dignity. Neither regarding German unity nor Korea nor the satellite orbit have we succeeded in mobilizing world opinion. But Formosa has become a symbol of American intransigence and our overseas air bases a token of American aggressiveness. We have replied to every Soviet thrust like a pedantic professor sure of his righteousness; but the world is not moved by legalistic phrases, at least in a revolutionary period. This is not to say that negotiation should be conceived as mere propaganda; only that by failing to cope adequately with their psychological aspect we have given the Soviets unnecessary opportunities.

As a result, the international debate is carried on almost entirely in the categories and at the pace established by the Soviets; the world's attention is directed toward the horror of nuclear weapons but not toward the fact of aggression which would unleash them. The Soviets negotiate when a relaxation of tension serves their purpose and they break off negotiations when it is to their advantage, without being forced to shoulder the onus for the failure. We were right to agree to the summit conference and the subsequent meeting of the foreign ministers. But it was not necessary to permit the Four-Power meetings to become an effort to turn the Soviets respectable; or for the President to give the Soviet Union a certificate of good conduct by assuring Bulganin he believed in his peaceful intentions. Nor was it wise to let the Soviet leaders build up a distinction between the President and the rest of the United States Government, so that any increase in tensions will be ascribed to the fact that the President succumbed to the pressures of his advisors or to the operation of the "objective" factors of the U.S. economy or to a change of administration. Because of our inability to raise the negotiations above the commonplace, they were conducted in a never-never land where a Soviet smile was considered to outweigh the fact of the perpetuated division of Germany and where problems were evaded simply by denying that they existed.

IV

But could we have carried our allies and the uncommitted

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along on a different policy? Perhaps the best way to approach a discussion of our system of alliances is to analyze the historic rôle of coalitions. In the past, coalitions have generally been held together by a combination of three motivations: (1) To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces and to discourage aggression by assembling superior power—this in effect is the doctrine of collective security. (2) To provide an obligation for assistance. Were the national interest unambiguous and unchangeable, each Power would know its obligations without any formal pact. But the national interest fluctuates within limits; it must be adapted to changing circumstances. An alliance is a form of insurance against contingencies, an additional weight when considering whether to go to war. (3) To legitimize the assistance of foreign troops or intervention in a foreign country.

An alliance is effective, then, to the extent that its power appears formidable and its purpose unambiguous. If an alliance is composed of too many disparate elements or if its members pursue too varying aims it will not survive a real test. The legal obligation by itself will not suffice if the coalition has no common purpose or is incapable of giving its purpose a military expression. The French system of alliances between the two wars, however imposing on paper, could not survive the conflicting interests of its components and its lack of a unifying military doctrine. It is not the fact of alliance which deters aggression but the application it can be given in any concrete case.

If we examine the structure of the present system of alliances created by the United States we discover that most of the historic conditions for coalitions no longer apply, or apply in a different sense. From the point of view of power relationships none of our alliances, save NATO, adds to our effective strength. And NATO is in difficulty because we cannot give it a military doctrine which makes sense to our NATO partners. Our interest in the alliance is twofold: *a,* to prevent Eurasia from being controlled by a hostile Power, because if the United States were confined to the Western Hemisphere it could survive, if at all, only through an effort inconsistent with what is now considered the American way of life; *b,* to add to our over-all strength vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. by obtaining overseas facilities, particularly air bases. Our empiricist bias has, however, caused us to place these objectives in the framework of a specific threat—that of overt Soviet military aggression—and to look at this threat only in

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terms of the total strategic relationship between us and the Soviet bloc. In these terms, Eurasia is protected not by our capability for local defense, but by our strategic superiority in an all-out war, and we have therefore tended to justify our alliances because of the overseas air bases they afford us.

An alliance is useless, however, unless it expresses a mutuality of interest between the partners. Our military policy is increasingly based on a strategy of "revenge," the objective of which is to retaliate with greater destruction than we suffer. But in all situations short of all-out war (and perhaps even then) deterrence is produced not by a capability to inflict *disproportionate* losses, but a capability to inflict losses *unacceptable* in relation to specific objectives in dispute. The Soviet successes in the postwar period demonstrate that in certain circumstances even an inferior retaliatory capability can produce deterrence. Despite our strategic superiority we refused to intervene in Indochina or expand the war in Korea, because Korea and Indochina did not seem "worth" an all-out war and because we had inadequate alternative capabilities to make the Soviet calculus of risks seem unattractive. An all-out strategy, moreover, not only increases our own inhibitions but runs counter to a coalition policy. Our allies realize that in all-out war they will add to our effective strength only by supplying facilities; they see no significance in a military contribution of their own. As long as our military doctrine threatens to transform every war into an all-out war, our system of alliances will be in jeopardy.

Our policies have, moreover, been inhibited by the notion of collective security drawn from the lessons of the 1930s, when a united front might well have deterred Hitler, and by our historical bias in favor of federal structures. We base our coalitions on the assumption that unless all allies resist any aggression anywhere no effective resistance is possible at all. But this notion of collective security has the paradoxical result of paralyzing the partner capable of resisting alone. For governments hard pressed to act in areas of direct concern to them cannot be brought to run risks outside that area, so that the effort to obtain NATO support in Asia tends to undermine the cohesiveness of NATO in Europe. Even within the purely regional alliances the combinations of purposes are extremely various. Pakistan desires arms more for their effect on India than for the protection they afford against the U.S.S.R. or China; Iraq is interested in the Baghdad

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Pact primarily for the military advantages it gives over Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And in neither SEATO nor the Baghdad Pact are we associated with partners with whom we share the degree of common purpose conferred by the cultural heritage that we share with our European allies.

The problems of our system of alliances can be summed up under two headings: either the alliances add little to our effective strength or they do not reflect a common purpose, or both. In such circumstances a system of collective security leads in fact to a dilution of purpose and to an air of unreality in which the existence of an alliance, and not the resolution behind it, is considered the guarantee of security. Thus, we speak of plugging gaps in defenses as if a treaty instrument were itself a defense. We will not be able to overcome these difficulties until we develop a new approach to our coalition policy, above all until we set less ambitious goals. We must confine our alliances to the purposes we and our allies share.

But can such a coalition policy be developed? The implications of the growing Soviet nuclear capability would seem to impose a measure of harmony between the interest of the United States in an over-all strategy and our allies' concern with local defense. For with the end of our immunity from nuclear attack the nature of deterrence has altered. A deterrent is effective only to the degree that it is plausible and as the Soviet nuclear stockpile grows our willingness to run the risk of an all-out war for any objective save a direct attack on the continental United States will diminish. In such a situation, deterrence with respect to the issues most likely to be in dispute is above all achieved by a capability for local defense.[4] In the face of the horrors of thermonuclear war, it is in our interest to seek to defend Eurasia by means other than all-out war: to devise a strategy which will allow us to inflict the minimum amount of damage consistent with deterrence. The justification for our alliances, therefore, is less that they add to our over-all strength than that they give us an opportunity to apply our power subtly and with less fearful risks.

From the military point of view, our alliances should be conceived as devices to organize local defense and our assistance as a means to make local defense possible. We should make clear to our allies that their best chance of avoiding thermonuclear war resides in our ability to make local aggression too costly.

[4] See the author's "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1956.

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They should understand that they cannot avoid their dilemma by neutrality or surrender, for if we are pushed out of Eurasia they will bring on what they fear most. Confined to the Western Hemisphere, we would have no choice but to fight an all-out war. To be sure, the Soviets have skillfully fomented neutralism by giving the impression that local resistance must inevitably lead to all-out war. But the Soviets can be no more interested than we in total war; the fear of thermonuclear extinction would provide a powerful sanction against expanding a conflict.

The corollary to a regional system of alliances, however, is willingness on our part to act alone if the over-all strategic balance is imperiled. None of our allies, with the exception of Great Britain, has the capability or the willingness to act outside its own geographical area. To ask them to do so will only undermine the domestic position of already weak governments and demoralize them further. It will lead to subterfuges and to the dilution of common action behind the form of joint communiqués. We have to face the fact that only the United States is strong enough domestically and economically to assume worldwide responsibilities and that the attempt to obtain the prior approval by all our allies of our every step will lead not to common action but to inaction. To be sure, whenever there exists a community of purpose, as for example with Great Britain in the Middle East and perhaps in Southeast Asia, we should concert our efforts. But we must reserve the right to act alone, or with a regional grouping of Powers, if our strategic interest so dictates. We cannot permit the Soviets to overturn the balance of power for the sake of allied unity, for whatever the disagreement of our allies on specific measures their survival depends on our unimpaired strength.

The military point of view must not supply the sole motivation for our system of alliances, however. In fact, in many areas, particularly those newly independent, our emphasis on the military factor is the cause of our failure to develop a sense of common purpose. We are undoubtedly right in our belief in the Soviet menace. But revolutions are not logical and the Asian revolution is interested more in internal development than in foreign affairs. Our insistence that they focus some of their energies outward appears to them as an irritating interruption of their primary concern and lends color to Soviet peace offensives. Moreover, the military contribution of both the Baghdad Pact and SEATO

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does not compensate for the decision of Egypt and India to stand apart and for the domestic pressures these instruments generated in some of the signatory countries.

The primary function of these pacts is to draw a line across which the U.S.S.R. cannot move without the risk of war, and to legitimize intervention by the United States should war break out. But the line could have been better drawn by a unilateral declaration. Behind this shield we could then have concentrated on the primary problem of creating a sense of common purpose by emphasizing shared objectives, primarily by striving for the grouping of Powers to assist in economic development. Had we emphasized these nonmilitary functions of SEATO, it would have been much more difficult for India or Indonesia to stay aloof. As these political groupings gain in economic strength, their own interest would dictate a more active concern for common defense; at least it would provide the economic base for a meaningful defense. A powerful grouping of states on the Russian borders is against the interests of the Soviet Union regardless of whether the purpose of this grouping is primarily military. And by the same token, such a grouping is desirable from the American point of view even if it does not go along with our every policy.

The problem of the uncommitted states cannot be solved, however, merely by an economic grouping of Powers. It is related to the whole U.S. posture. Anti-Americanism is fashionable today in many parts of the globe. As the richest and most powerful nation, we are the natural target for all frustrations. As the Power which bears the primary responsibility for the defense of the free world, we are unpopular with all who are so preoccupied with the development of their own countries that they are unwilling to pay sufficient attention to foreign threats. We should, of course, seek to allay legitimate grievances, but we would be wrong to take every criticism at face value. Many of our most voluble critics in Southeast Asia would be terrified were our military protection suddenly withdrawn. Nehru's neutrality is possible, after all, only as long as the United States remains strong. A great deal of anti-Americanism hides a feeling of insecurity both material and spiritual. Popularity is a hopeless mirage in a situation which is revolutionary precisely because old values are disintegrating and millions are groping for a new orientation. For this reason, it is impossible to base policy solely on an inquiry into what people desire; a revolutionary situation is distinguished by its dissatisfac-

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tions, which join in protest against the existing order but can propose no clear substitute. This is the reason why most revolutions have been captured by a small minority which could give a sense of direction to popular resentments. In the uncommitted areas popularity may therefore be less important than respect.

In its relations with the uncommitted, the United States must develop not only a greater compassion but also a greater majesty. The picture of high American officials scurrying to all quarters of the globe to inform themselves on each crisis as it develops cannot but make an impression of uncertainty. The nervousness exhibited in our reactions to Soviet moves must contrast unfavorably with what appears to be the deliberate purposefulness of the Soviets. Moreover, for understandable reasons, many of the uncommitted nations are eager to preserve the peace at almost any price. Because of what appears to them as vacillation and uncertainty, they choose in every crisis to direct pressure against us as the more malleable of the two super-Powers. To the degree that we can project a greater sense of purpose, some of these pressures may be deflected on the Soviet bloc. A revolution like Egypt's or even India's cannot be managed by understanding alone; it also requires a readiness on our part to bear the psychological burden of difficult decisions.

V

We thus return to our original problem: the adequacy of American attitudes for dealing with the present crisis. This is above all a problem of leadership. For nations learn only by experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act. But statesmen must act *as if* their intuition were already experience, as if their aspiration were truth. The statesman is, therefore, like one of the heroes of classical tragedy who has had an intuition of the future, but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellowmen and who cannot validate its "truth." This is why statesmen often share the fate of prophets, that they are without honor in their own country and that their greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience. The statesman must be an educator; he must bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision, between its tradition and its future. In this task his possibilities are limited. A statesman who too far outruns the experience of his people will not be able to sell his program at home; witness Wilson. A statesman who limits

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his policy to the experience of his people will doom himself to sterility; witness French policy since World War I.

One of the crucial challenges confronting a society is therefore the capacity to produce a leadership group capable of transcending the experience of that society. And here our sudden emergence as the major Power in the free world presents particular difficulties. The qualities of our leadership groups were formed during the period when our primary concerns were domestic. Politics was considered a necessary evil and the primary function of the state was the exercise of police powers. Neither education nor incentives existed for our leadership groups to think in political or strategic terms. This was compounded by our empiricism with its cult of the expert and its premium on specialization. The two groups which are most dominant in the higher levels of government, industry and the law, can serve as an illustration. The rewards in industry, particularly large-scale industry, are for administrative competence; they therefore produce a tendency to deal with conceptual problems by administrative means, by turning them over to committees of experts. And the legal profession, trained to think in terms of discrete individual cases, produces a penchant for *ad hoc* decisions and a resistance to the "hypothetical cases" inherent in long-range planning. Our leadership groups are therefore better prepared to deal with technical than with conceptual problems, with economic than with political issues. Projected on the Washington scene, they often lack the background to cope with a developing political and strategic situation: each problem is dealt with "on its merits," a procedure which emphasizes the particular at the expense of the general and bogs down planning in a mass of detail. The absence of a conceptual framework makes it difficult for them even to identify our problems or to choose effectively among the proposals and interpretations with which our governmental machinery is overloaded.

This explains many postwar Soviet successes. Whatever the qualities of Soviet leadership, its training is eminently political and conceptual. Reading Lenin or Mao or Stalin, one is struck by the emphasis on the relationship between political, military, psychological and economic factors, the insistence on finding a conceptual basis for political action and on the need for dominating a situation by flexible tactics and inflexible purpose. And the internal struggles in the Kremlin ensure that only the most iron-

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nerved reach the top. Against the Politbureau, trained to think in general terms and freed of problems of day-to-day administration, we have pitted leaders overwhelmed with departmental duties and trained to think that it was a cardinal sin to transgress on another's field of specialization. To our leaders, policy is as a series of discrete problems; to the Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing political process. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviets has had many of the attributes of any contest between a professional and an amateur: even a mediocre professional will usually defeat an excellent amateur, not because the amateur does not know what to do, but because he cannot react sufficiently quickly or consistently. Our leaders have not lacked ability, but they have had to learn while doing and this has imposed too great a handicap.

To be sure, many of the shortcomings of our leadership groups reflect the very qualities which have made for the ease of relationships in American society. The condition for our limited government has been the absence of basic social schisms, the regulation of many concerns not by government fiat but by "what is taken for granted." A society can operate in this fashion only if disputes are not pushed to their logical conclusions, and if disagreements are blunted by the absence of dogmatism. And in fact the fear of seeming dogmatic permeates our social scene. Most opinions are introduced with a disclaimer which indicates that the proponent is aware of their contingency and also that he claims no superior validity for his own conclusions. This produces a preference for decisions by committee, because the process of conversation permits disagreements to be discovered most easily and adjustments made before positions have hardened. Our decision-making process is therefore geared to the pace of conversation; even departmental memoranda on which policy decisions are ultimately based are written with an eye to eventual compromise and not with the expectation that any one of them will be accepted in its entirety.

It would be wrong to be too pessimistic. No one would have believed when World War II ended that the United States would assume commitments on such a world-wide scale. Our shortcomings are imposing only because of the magnitude of the threat confronting us. Moreover, the performance of the United States, for all its failings, compares favorably with that of the other nations of the non-Soviet world. Our difficulties in foreign policy

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are therefore only a symptom—and by no means the most obvious—of an inward uncertainty in the free world. To be sure, democracies by the nature of their institutions cannot conduct policy as deviously, change course as rapidly or prepare their moves as secretly as dictatorships. But the crisis of the non-Soviet world is deeper. The tragic element in foreign policy is the impossibility of escaping conjecture; after the "objective" analysis of fact there remains a residue of uncertainty about the meaning of events or the opportunities they offer. A statesman can often escape his dilemmas by lowering his sights; he always has the option to ignore the other side's capabilities by assuming it has peaceful intentions. Many of the difficulties of the non-Soviet world have been the result of an attempt to use the element of uncertainty as an excuse for inaction. But certainty in foreign policy is conferred at least as much by philosophy as by fact; it derives from the imposition of purpose on events.

This is not to say that we should imitate Soviet dogmatism. A society can survive only by the genius that made it great. But we should be able to leaven our empiricism with a sense of urgency. And while our history may leave us not well enough prepared to deal with tragedy, it can teach us that great achievement does not result from a quest for safety. Even so, our task will remain psychologically more complex than that of the Soviets. As the strongest and perhaps the most vital Power of the free world we face the challenge of demonstrating that democracy is able to find the moral certainty to act without the support of fanaticism and to run risks without a guarantee of success.

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NEUTRALITY: VARYING TUNES

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

"NEUTRALITY" means different things in different places and at different times. It can even mean different things in the same place and at approximately the same time. In a press conference on June 6, President Eisenhower defended the right of nations to be neutral and remarked that a decision to keep clear of military alliances could be accepted as natural and even prudent; on June 9, his Secretary of State said that neutrality is "an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and shortsighted conception." Within three days, that is, the United States Government issued two descriptions of what it thinks about neutrality, one of which surprised and annoyed our allies, the other of which annoyed the uncommitted states even though it did not surprise them. The explanations, restatements and revisions that followed did not matter except as ex post facto self-discipline; second thoughts seldom catch up with the first headlines.

Something more than a failure to compare and reconcile viewpoints was responsible. The President and Mr. Dulles were talking about different things. The President was speaking from his heart and, knowing more about human psychology than international law, was expressing his instinctive feelings about the relations between peoples, and especially weak and powerful peoples, in very general terms. Mr. Dulles, preoccupied with the conflicts of interest involved in specific problems of those relations as they lie today on his desk, was speaking within the practical confines of policy regarding them as it has been developed thus far.

That is not very far. The State Department is in a quandary, poised on a historic divide. Behind lie the broad trails of the past ten years, with markers recording the bold decisions that saved the world from imminent catastrophe—Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin, NATO, Korea. These measures of succor or defense were very largely American in initiative and execution, and even if some of the beneficiaries received them with mixed feelings and even if other nations thought some of them reckless and provocative, they accomplished what we had to accomplish in that period—they checked the Communist advance and, in

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effect, won the first phase of the long holding operation called the cold war.

The tactics (even if no more) of our adversaries having shifted in acknowledgment of that fact, shall ours remain the same? And not just the tactics. The State Department is coming to understand, as the President felt in his bones, that we cannot rely as a matter of course on assumptions that were valid when the initiative was mainly one-sided and our atomic superiority gave us time to make the most of the fact. The Communists have named the new phase of American-Soviet relations "competitive coexistence." The new terms of reference mean that we shall have to manœuvre more subtly and in some cases, perhaps, from different assumptions. However, as Mr. Dulles disclosed, he is finding difficulty in cutting himself free as a practical matter from the old ones and devising substitutes that will hold the Communists in check and still maintain our initiative in the free world.

One assumption that evidently needs rethinking concerns the nature of neutrality. Our program of foreign aid established new relationships between the United States and a large number of underdeveloped countries. We always tried to make plain that our economic and financial help to these countries aimed to strengthen their internal stability and their ability to maintain their independence. Similarly with our military aid programs. Political and military instruments of war are inseparable in Communist doctrine. We looked on military assistance to weak states as necessary to enable them to deal with internal subversion and the infiltration of armed bands.

Our calculation that it was not too risky to try to build up independent strength all over the non-Communist world even without commitments of reciprocal support was based on a double premise. We hoped that since we were not going to pursue an aggressive policy our stand in a great international crisis would have the general approval of any state in a position to think and act for itself. And since our stand would presumably be in harmony with the U.N. Charter we hoped that U.N. members not caught in the Soviet orbit would incline to our side. We mapped this course partly because general economic stability increases American prosperity, partly out of good will for new and struggling states, but mainly because we thought it the natural and direct and peaceable way to counter Communist imperialism and explode the pretensions of Marxism.

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Now, however, when Moscow undertakes a vast program of foreign aid in competition with ours many Americans are filled with misgivings. They wonder why the beneficiaries, actual and prospective, do not have misgivings too. Are not Soviet objectives perfectly plain and do they not threaten the independence of any state accepting Moscow's deceptively easy terms? Anyone not agreeing with our diagnosis and suggested reaction must certainly be unfriendly to us at heart, indeed "unneutral."

On the other hand, some of the underdeveloped states that solicit our economic and financial help feel that our policy of trying to build positions of military as well as economic strength may bring on the general war they want above everything to avoid. Not the threatened action but the threatened reaction seems to them the peril. They are new countries; they have not had the experiences with isolationism which Americans have had. They value freedom to make their own mistakes more highly than the possible benefits and accompanying constrictions of any plan of mutual defense. They desire our economic assistance; in fact, some of their leaders speak as though it were due them as a right. They of course claim the privilege of also seeking aid elsewhere, specifically in the Soviet bloc. And by implication they deny that we are entitled to give military support to states in their own neighborhood which feel in need of it and request it.

Replies to American criticisms of this position take a variety of forms. Nehru denies that he is a neutral but immediately undoes the statement by defining India's position as "non-alignment." Nasser even during the crisis of his relations with the West has continued to call Egypt's policy "positive neutralism." Tito's description of the Jugoslav independent position is "active coexistence." Prime Minister Daud speaks of Afghanistan's policy of "equal friendship." And so on down the list.

The character and aims of these leaders are as varied as their phraseology. Nehru is a Socialist, struggling to bring the teeming millions of his countrymen into the current of modern life, to give them a decent living, education and a sense of political unity. For him, the objective that eclipses all others is peace—peace everywhere; war anywhere could spread and ruin India's belated chance of developing a healthy society; to avoid that he would sacrifice many things which he certainly values. He is worldly-wise enough to know that if he lined up definitely in either camp he would lose his influence. He throws that influence into main-

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taining the international status quo as long as possible and at almost any cost, trusting that the evolution in Russia is not merely tactical and that, even if it is, the new tactics will eventually commit the Soviet rulers to a real shift in basic policy. Nasser is a military dictator. No more than Nehru can he limit himself to a passive rôle among the active giants. His strength is derived from the Egyptian Army and he must find arms for it somewhere, anywhere, to ensure that its honor can never again be smirched by defeat by Israel. He also is a revolutionary, and he must somehow find the means to make good on his promise to enlarge Egypt's fertile area and give the unfortunate *fellahin* something to live for. Tito is a Communist, but he has won his greatest renown by successfully fighting Moscow's attempt to dominate him and exploit his country. In his eyes neutral means the same as independent, with the added attraction that in this rôle he can exercise the greatest influence over the Russian satellites in Eastern Europe and perhaps even shape them some day into a third force under his sway. These and other leaders exploit with varying degrees of audacity and urgency their ability to manœuvre freely in the world arena, securing what assistance they can in one quarter before turning to another "to hold the balance even." The best description of this neutrality is the one given of women in the old song, "You never see two alike in any one place, you never see one alike twice."

Variations on the theme occur almost everywhere. In Japan neutralism is popular in the guise of "wait-and-see-ism." In West Germany the second party in numbers and influence, the Social Democrats, voted against rearmament and partnership in NATO and promise to reverse those decisions if they come to power. They argue that this would induce the Russians to permit German reunification; and then Germany, reunited, unarmed and uncommitted, could serve as a bridge to bring the Soviets and the Western democracies together. They ignore the risks of this gamble for Germany and for the West as a whole. In France, on the other hand, most of the politicians and publicists who have opposed alliances do not favor disarmament; they want France to regain power, freedom of action and influence as an armed "third force."

All in all, then, the term neutrality as it is being used in political discussion today (and as the President almost certainly was using it) is something quite different from what it has meant

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traditionally in the textbooks of international law and thus probably from what was in the mind of Secretary Dulles, himself a lawyer. To the Belgians when the Great Powers guaranteed the permanent neutrality of their country in 1839 neutrality meant a protective legal shell, valid so long as they were careful to uphold their side of the bargain; when President Wilson invoked it against high-handed British and German actions in the First World War it meant a legal basis for protest and argument; it was what Congress relied on when it passed the Neutrality Act of 1937, imagining, quite mistakenly of course, that a country can legislate itself out of the risk of war.

To the wide-ranging leaders today who proclaim their independence, neutrality is not a declaration in advance of a fixed position to be taken in case of war, or a claim to rights against belligerent encroachment. It is a political expedient. It is not passive but active. It asserts that each state is determined to go its own independent way in accordance with its own current estimate of its own interests; and it expresses the hope of getting along with both sides and doing business with both sides and perhaps of influencing both sides and even of serving as a bridge to bring them closer together. In other words, it is a jumble of wishful, hopeful, opportunistic but not necessarily unfriendly propositions, quite dissimilar from any set of orderly, let alone binding, concepts. As President Eisenhower indicated, they represent very natural human emotions and reactions.

II

When foreign embassies began telephoning on June 7 to find out the practical meaning of the President's press conference of the previous day, the White House issued a "clarifying statement." It aimed especially to reassure nations which have defense treaties with the United States. It said that such treaties, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, are not a risk to anyone but on the contrary are "the modern and enlightened way of obtaining security." And it repeated and emphasized the President's words that political neutrality does not include the privilege of being "neutral as between right and wrong or decency or indecency." It added a homily on the merits of collective security, with which the President must heartily agree but which unfortunately had not come into his mind while he was speaking impromptu.

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The confusion would have been at an end (for two days, that is) if it had not been for those words "right" and "wrong." They are meaningless words in the absence of definition and without an accepted standard for measuring conduct. They are words that drive foreign offices crazy. In discussions of international affairs in particular they get everyone off to a false start. Each nation considers its own policies (and prejudices) moral and contrary ones immoral. It is dangerous to encourage the idea that this really is often the case, at any rate in terms of black and white. In foreign relations, the problem is not how to awaken indignation but how to define the actions which awaken it justifiably and to agree on measures to discourage, defeat and punish actions defined as unjustifiable.

This is the crux of the "peace problem," though it is so tough to solve that often the most sincere lovers of peace instinctively evade it. It confronted those who wrote the old League of Nations Covenant in 1918 and again those who assembled at San Francisco in 1945 to negotiate the Charter of the United Nations. Before this second effort to draft a precise document there had been a sobering experiment with one that was attractively imprecise. The Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 outlawed war by a form of words, somewhat as current Soviet proposals would outlaw atomic weapons by appending everybody's signature to a simple promise not to use them. I remember walking out of the great hall at the Quai d'Orsay where the Pact had been signed and having Secretary of State Kellogg say to me exultingly, with tears in his eyes: "Now there will be no more war!" Actually, as I wrote at that time, the Pact was a soporific. The declaration of universal innocent intentions, taken by the public at face value, became an easy cover under which nations like Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany could manœuvre to find propitious moments to begin hostilities.

At San Francisco, a simple formula was adopted to establish the fact of aggression. A procedure was outlined for handling international disputes by peaceful means and it was agreed that any U.N. member which failed to follow it as promised would ipso facto be considered an aggressor and would be dealt with as such by other members. In other words, the Charter bound member states both to take specified steps for the conciliation, arbitration and adjudication of disputes and to refrain from steps that would lead to war; and it established a corresponding right and duty of

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other members to take retaliatory measures against a party to a dispute which broke its promise.

The fact is, of course, that some such objective standards for indentifying international "right" and "wrong" are an indispensable frame of reference for any effective collective system; and it is this fact that American spokesmen should stress whenever they feel called upon to speak about aggression, neutrality or any other aspect of the basic security problem. Only so can they avoid giving legitimate offense when they issue warnings to neutralist leaders against entering into relationships with states which by refusing to implement the Charter have left themselves the same loopholes for aggression that were open to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

In his speech of June 9, Mr. Dulles did in fact try to develop an American attitude toward neutrality that other governments could understand and some might accept. The sentence labeling neutrality as "obsolete," "immoral" and "shortsighted" seemed almost an afterthought, injected to please Americans who are short-memoried. His point of substance was that the United Nations Charter and the subsidiary defense treaties "abolish, as between the parties, the principle of neutrality."

The trouble with this proposition as a cure for our worsening relations with a large number of U.N. members is that they have already repudiated it, explicitly or tacitly. They find no room in it for the development of President Eisenhower's idea that neutrality is permissible for nations which have certain geographical, ideological or other reasons against taking sides in any military line-up. From Scandinavia to Southeast Asia a number of countries which signed the Charter have now rationalized their obligation to help operate its military provisions to the point where, at least for themselves, it no longer has practical significance. The vast majority of U.N. members voted for the action against the Communist aggression in Korea, and in theory at least most of them supported it. But it would be optimistic to believe that they all would behave in the same way in another test. The British Foreign Office itself seemed to have come to the view three years ago that the U.N. function of working for peaceful settlements is more important than the U.N. enforcement function; and it apparently felt that the destruction of the latter will not cripple the former. This does not mean, of course, that Britain would refuse to join in enforcement measures, but simply

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that the Foreign Office knows that several members of the Commonwealth would refuse; indeed, some of them, India in the van, would probably end the Commonwealth tie rather than recognize any binding obligation to support another great military effort.[1]

If we are realistic, then, must we not conclude that President Eisenhower's exemption does in fact cover states which no longer acknowledge that membership in the United Nations "abolishes neutrality"?

To this Secretary Dulles said no, and doubtless his position has a strong legal basis. International compacts have vitality, however, only so long as both parties accept them as binding and they lose it when one ceases to do so. The other party may of course attempt to exact compliance by legal or forceful means; but anything of the sort is out of the question in the present instance. It is part of the dilemma, not of our own creating, in which we find ourselves. We must not be led into accepting for ourselves the standard of performance set by the neutralist members of the U.N., and we must use every argument of enlightened self-interest to convince our leading associates not to lag in devotion to collective responsibility and collective action. As for the dissenters, we achieve nothing, whatever the facts, by labeling them immoral.

Vice-President Nixon demonstrated this once again in his speech at Manila on July 4—a date which disposes speakers to oratory more than careful formulations of policy. He made it a condition for commanding American sympathy that foreign nations make a "moral distinction between the Communist world and the free world." He asked: "How can we feel toward those who treat alike nations that believe in God and honor, religion and morality, and nations that boast of atheism and the rule of force and terror alone?" And he warned against the dangers of "friendly neutrality toward the Kremlin and Peiping." Mr. Nehru replied with restraint but evident feeling that Mr. Nixon, like Mr. Dulles, was not preaching a democratic approach to international relations. Entirely aside from the question whether subjective moral judgments are valid, sermonizing is a bad diplomatic tactic. It pushes dissenters to reiterate their opposition and commits them more stubbornly than ever to the course we trust they will not, in the end, follow. For among those who are

[1] See "The Free World and the United Nations," by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, *Foreign Affairs,* April 1953. When he wrote this article Sir Gladwyn was Permanent British Representative to the United Nations. For comment on his argument see "Locarno Again," by Byron Dexter, *Foreign Affairs,* October 1953.

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hoping against hope to be able to stand aside even where the Charter says plainly who is "right" and who is "wrong," some may find, face to face with the great decision, that to abstain involves graver risks and losses than to side with the forces of international order. At that moment considerations of principle and expediency may be seen to coincide. Why make a possible conversion then harder?

Secretary Dulles restated his position in a press conference held on July 12. He admitted that there were, after all, "very few, if any" neutrals of the immoral sort; and he narrowed his definition by saying that "countries which denounce security pacts are seeking to promote a somewhat wrong view of neutrality." Pressed to name one immoral neutral, he said of Switzerland (which refused to join the United Nations for fear that this might be incompatible with her traditional neutrality), "I would not want even there to say that the neutrality of Switzerland was immoral." Observers were left wondering why all those adjectives had been used in the first place.

III

The concern and resentment shown in Washington about the "flight to neutralism" of so many U.N. members may be partly explained by the fact that they have also been outspokenly opposed to the system of regional defense pacts—and for similar reasons. And the State Department has become more and more accustomed in the last few years to think of the regional system as a cornerstone of its policy.

When Soviet opposition defeated efforts to forearm the Security Council to deal with illegal violence, two general lines of action were open to U.N. members that still believed in the collective principle and recognized their duty to support it. One was for them to plan to counteract the Soviet veto by transferring the scene of action from the Security Council to the General Assembly. Provision for this was made in the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, adopted by the General Assembly November 3, 1950.[2]

[2] The Resolution provided: 1, that if the Security Council is prevented (by the veto) from acting upon a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall be called into session within 24 hours; 2, that there shall be a Peace Observation Commission to report on any area where existing international tension is likely to endanger international peace and security; 3, that member states maintain elements of their national forces especially trained, organized and equipped for prompt service in a U.N. unit or units. For the background of this action see the author's "Coalition for Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1948, and "The Calculated Risk" (New York: Macmillan, 1950).

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The other method was to form regional defense pacts, as plainly permitted under Article 51 of the Charter.

Although the effort to strengthen collective security region by region was legitimate, the emphasis placed on a piecemeal procedure inevitably lessened emphasis on the general U.N. approach. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, if not dead, has been left sleeping. A vote to bring it into effect against a Communist aggressor would be harder to obtain from the General Assembly today than in 1950; for the Soviet bloc has been enlarged, and if the neutralist countries of Asia and the Middle East vote with it, plus perhaps a scattering of other states, it will have enough votes (one-third plus one) to hold up action. Moreover, the Collective Measures Committee, intended to undertake the military planning which the original Military Staff Committee had been unable to accomplish, has been allowed to lapse into desuetude. There is still validity in the concept, however, that there will always exist within U.N. an embryo "coalition for peace" consisting of nations faithful to their Charter obligations both by principle and self-interest. That the United States, unlike in 1914 and 1939, will be found in the group favoring action against aggression is a good assumption. There would seem definite advantages, then, in keeping alive the principles of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, as a rallying point in a military crisis transcending a single area. Nowhere in the Charter, it should be noted, is there any geographical limitation on the rights and duties of members. Nor does our increased emphasis on the hydrogen bomb indicate that the wars which would principally concern us will be limited to any one area. Regional security, in other words, is an insufficient foundation for the foreign policy of a nation with world-wide responsibilities.

This is all the more true because of the deep antagonism which regional pacts arouse among states which have refused to join. They do not believe that the pact system increases world security or that membership in a pact would increase their own national security. The former proposition we certainly are at liberty to contradict; the latter we may disbelieve, but must admit that the decision is not ours but theirs.

Both sides are wrong, perhaps, in thinking the subject one to generalize about. The Pan American organization, which has clearly limited scope and seems to be serving its purpose, is not in question. NATO's proper range of action and its geographical

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scope have always been in debate. The changes in NATO now being suggested come from its own members, stimulated by the belief that the Soviet military threat has diminished, partly due to NATO's success in building strength in Western Europe, and that the time has come to supplement its concern with armaments by increased activity in common economic and social matters. SEATO and the Baghdad Pact are different, however, as regards the nature and relationship of their members and the environment in which they operate. Neither area has sufficient indigenous strength, nor is such strength in sight. The security of each will continue to depend on strength injected from afar. It might be considered whether a main emphasis on economic rather than military sinews would not have served our interests better, and might not do so still. Economic aid could be given either through a regional system like the Colombo Plan or through U.N. agencies. This policy would disarm some of the criticism heard from neighbors of the pact states and make them anxious to share in the benefits. It might not have persuaded them to resist the attractions of free-wheeling; but it would have given them less excuse to pretend that we left them no other course.

All through Asia, even in countries allied to us in defense pacts, one finds how effective Soviet propaganda has been in raising the bogy of white military domination. And now the Moscow radio and press are predicting a new pact for Africa linking the United States with the so-called colonial Powers in defense of the status quo. Everywhere the suspicion has been planted that pacts are a new cover for Western colonialism and imperialism. What seem to us plain manifestations of Russian colonialism and imperialism are either ignored or minimized.

In speaking with me recently in New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru showed his well-known distaste for Western mixing in Asian affairs. He avoided criticizing NATO. He seemed to recognize that it deserved credit for saving Western Europe from possible Communist encroachment at a critical moment. But Europe was not Asia. Further, the West European countries in most cases had a common background and possessed intrinsic strength which needed only encouragement and material help from the United States to become effective. NATO united them. The Baghdad Pact and SEATO, however, divide the countries of the Middle East and Asia and upset the military balance within each of the areas in question. In Kabul as well as in New Delhi

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one finds a universal suspicion that Pakistan is not interested in American military aid because it could conceivably enable her to stand up to a Soviet invasion but because it increases her leverage against her neighbors (a suspicion increased by references to the Kashmir and Pushtunistan questions in the SEATO communiqué issued in March in Karachi). When Americans argue that the only way to counter the Soviet threat to weak states is to warn that aggression against them would involve their great allies too, the straight-faced rejoinder is that regional alliances therefore seem to insure that what might have been a small war will be a large one; further, that the dependence of weak Asian countries on larger partners deprives them of freedom to decide and act for themselves. Always one is led back to the premise that freedom to make mistakes is more desired at this start of so many new national careers than a cramping partnership in any fixed security system.

The truth is that none of these countries dares pin its attention on the fact that it may itself be the specific object of an attack; and for all the Asian emphasis on spiritual as against materialistic values, each of them is too engrossed with its own desperate social and economic problems to venture accepting a share of responsibility for the safety of its neighbors. How much this attitude would alter when a foreign threat came really close home might depend on how much freedom of choice was left to its government at that time. Will it meanwhile have mortgaged its national economy by accepting lopsided loans and credits and will it have welcomed technicians and advisers who turn out to be fifth columnists? It is entirely in order for Vice-President Nixon and Secretary Dulles to warn that the mere assertion of impartiality between the Communist and free worlds, no matter how sincere, is not a sufficient protection against this danger; self-restraint, caution and above all foresight in dealing with both sides are necessary. Our economic aid can help the underdeveloped nations hold the necessary balance. Our cue is to show that we offer it not to win an ally but because what we really seek, and all that we seek, is for each of them to establish and maintain independence.

IV

As we pass from the cold war into what the Soviets are calling competitive coexistence, with strong propaganda emphasis on

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the economic and cultural contributions each side can make to the underdeveloped areas of the world, we must scrutinize the guiding principles of our foreign policy to see whether they fit the times. What do we mean when we use the word neutrality and how are we going to react to those who have other definitions? If our interest is not in making any country dependent on us but in helping it avoid becoming dependent on our opponents, does it make sense to imply that everyone who is not with us is against us? Is it good tactics to suggest that those who do not accept our interpretation of neutrality must, because of that fact, think of themselves as belonging in another camp?

To raise these questions does not mean that there is no limit to our acquiescence in policies of expediency whatever the formula—"non-alignment," "active neutrality," "active coexistence," "equal friendship" or anything else. The limit is reached when independent self-interest becomes, whether through calculation or miscalculation, "neutrality on the other side." Our decision to cease treating an underdeveloped country as a needy neutral, bound to shop around for assistance, may be based simply on an estimate that the amounts being accepted from Moscow mortgage its future so heavily that it no longer can have satisfactory relations with a third party: it will not be able to trade in other markets or repay by this means credits made to other countries. At that point our help should cease. It is important for us not to oppose Soviet help as such; that would defeat our purposes, indeed show they are not what we claim them to be. Our objection is not to Soviet help, freely accepted on a competitive basis, but to help which evidently is intended by bulk and timing and terms to create a new Soviet satellite. We would have done well to make our policy in this respect absolutely clear from the start. The cancellation of our offer to help build the Aswan High Dam would not then have taken the Egyptians so much by surprise and (assuming that our manner of cancelling had also been different, aiming to wound Egyptian pride as little instead of as much as possible) might not have produced such a violent response.

When the State Department reviews its present definition (or definitions) of neutrality it will take into account, undoubtedly, the effect on the uncommitted states of the tendency to create geographical zones of security even at the expense of the overall authority of U.N. But whatever may be our feeling about regional

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pacts in this regard, or the relative attention they should give to military and economic assistance, our decisions will have to be based primarily on what we think are our own interests and the interests of our partners in those pacts. We have been advised by eminent Asian spokesmen that we are interfering undemocratically in Asian affairs when we warn Asian states of the Communist danger and offer to support them in a common front against it. If so, it is at least as undemocratic for these critics to warn their smaller brethren against accepting our help and joining a security pact. They are free to take as isolationist a position as they think their duties as U.N. members permit and as they believe they can maintain. They are not free to impose the same isolationism on others, large or small. The United States has its own security to defend, and it lies on two fronts, East and West. Various Asian and Middle Eastern states need not consider themselves involved in that security. But they cannot define our interests or dictate our alliances.

A factor to be considered is whether if a military crisis comes we will receive support from any of the neutralist states to which we have been giving a helping hand. We cannot count on it, evidently, but we can hope for it in some cases, depending on where the aggression occurs and the prospects for defeating it. Our persuasiveness at that moment will depend largely, therefore, on whether we have maintained our military strength and show ourselves able and ready to use it. But it will also depend on the picture that foreign peoples have formed in their own minds about us—their feeling about our fitness to lead. Our enemies try to distort the picture; but we ourselves paint it stroke by stroke, day by day, by word and by action. The old saying that "actions speak louder than words" is not always true—unfortunately, in our case, because our spokesmen have been talking so much in recent years that some of their words must almost necessarily be ill-considered or, less excusable, not considered at all. Among so many speeches, press conferences, press releases to catch the morning paper, offhand remarks on airfields and "leaks" of inside information, individual "boners" might, one would have hoped, pass almost unnoticed; this is never so, however, and on top of the mischief done by even minor slips is the injury done our reputation by the general higgledy-piggledy effect produced. Expressions used, attitudes taken, almost offhand as it were, have wounded susceptibilities and raised alarm from

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Athens to New Delhi. They have obscured the broad consistency of American aims over the last decade and in some cases have wasted assets of good will built up by years of effort and great sums of money.

In contrast to the lightness in speech, the machinery for grinding out decisions of policy has become so cumbersome that once made they are almost too durable. Anything so hard to attain as a consensus of many government agencies seems as though it must indeed be gospel; and where there is gospel there will soon be dogma. But no moral precept or dogma can take the place in political life of the wearisome business of continually appraising and reappraising, planning and replanning. We are engaged in a political contest that will not in our time reach an easy equilibrium. Our own standards of morality may be inflexible, but our policies must take account of the fact not only that others may have no standards at all but that still others may simply have different standards. Let us leave these others to develop their own ideas of their own self-interest, not without quiet warnings that their actions may limit our willingness and indeed ability to help them, now or in the future, but without placing a moral stigma on peoples that are proud of their own moral teachings. We should not resent that they profit from our carrying responsibilities which they will not share. Mr. Nehru has always emphasized that he is not neutral between right and wrong; and it is fair to note that though sometimes he seems carried away by flattery or the pleasures of dialectics into drawing parallels between us and our opponents that are not justified by the record, still he has not as yet taken any specific action which contradicts the belief that his over-riding desire is to maintain peace. His ways are not our ways. But we were not always thus. We have had our experiences with attempted isolation and think we have learnt something from them. At least the isolationist governments of the present day are still free, if a crisis comes where they believe evil truly confronts good, to join what they esteem to be the right. Or they may be provoked by the arrogance of a foe, as we were, into abandoning neutrality willy-nilly. That course and that possibility should be kept open.

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RUSSIA REVISITED

Moscow Dialogues, 1956

By Philip E. Mosely

MANY of the American tourists who are pouring into the Soviet Union this year are surprised by the evidences on every hand of economic vigor and large-scale construction. "From our papers," said one, "I thought everything would be in a mess. Things look pretty good here; they have built a lot." Another tourist: "People are very free here. I took as many pictures as I wanted in the Kremlin and no one stopped me."

The new rulers are obviously gaining credit with the people at large through making one minor adjustment or accommodation after another. Many Soviet people commented favorably to me on the shortening of the sixth day of work, on Saturdays and on the eve of holidays, from eight to six hours. "This will be a great help in my weekly shopping." Many individuals mentioned this change with pleasure and then asked whether people in the United States work six or eight hours on Saturday. They were amazed to learn of the normal five-day work-week in America and in many other Western countries.

Much satisfaction was expressed over the recent restoration of free tuition for students in high schools and universities, a reversion to the pre-1940 arrangement. Since education is the major channel for social advancement, this is an especially welcome improvement. Again, no one I spoke with had any realization that in the United States tuition in high schools has long been free and also includes free books and school supplies. On the other hand, the multifarious system of free, partly free and paid tuition and scholarships in our colleges and universities was much too complicated for most listeners to grasp.

There was much favorable comment on the improved pension system, which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet in July. Many people remarked that the raising of the minimum pension would now make it possible for older people actually to give up work without becoming a direct burden on their grown-up children. Through these and other measures the new rulers appear to be paying closer attention to raising the living conditions of their people and have won much credit and a great extension of

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patience. The assertions of the régime that only the rapid growth of the economy has made it possible to provide these alleviations seem to be accepted in good faith. If there were people who questioned whether these beneficent actions could not have been taken earlier, their comments did not come to the ears of a foreign visitor. As one casual acquaintance said, "We had an evil-hearted ruler; now our rulers are closer to the needs of the people."

Another general impression was one of relief following the slackening of obvious and active forms of terror. On every hand people seem to feel that the political police are now less active, but that they are continuing to observe and to note down actions and attitudes which might be "interesting." In general, people over 35, having lived through previous periods of "relaxation" and then of revived terrorism, do not believe today in the permanent abandonment of these methods of rule. Perhaps those under 30, who have grown up since the tightening of the screws after the end of the war, will be more inclined to believe that the "bad old days" are gone, never to return.

Perhaps just because of the great impact of the Stalin apparatus of unpredictable terror, the new rulers can now relax the pressure somewhat and still receive the same or even better obedience to their commands. The effects of "Stalinization," which has left a firm imprint of caution and conformity, make it possible for Stalin's successors to carry through a small percentage of "de-Stalinization."

When offered opportunities to comment on Stalin and his posthumous demotion, ordinary citizens were not inclined to blame Stalin for more than "excesses" and "mistakes." Perhaps their caution was due to the realization that it is not possible to go far in criticizing Stalin without seeming to question some of the basic policies of the régime, such as forced industrialization, drastic collectivization, intellectual conformity to a line determined from above, and other continuing features of the régime. It may also be due to the feeling that the criticism so far leveled at Stalin deals only with his ruthless handling of the upper ranks of the Communist Party, and the ordinary Soviet citizen is reluctant to mention, much less discuss, people in these lofty positions of power.

In any case, while attacking Stalin's methods more and more openly, the new rulers are, in other respects, applying procedures and pursuing aims which were characteristic of Stalin's program.

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For example, this summer the Kremlin decided that the raising of private livestock, often by the use of purchased bread, was distorting the economy and creating too large a private sector. New decrees, issued in July, promptly put a stop to this revival of the bad old capitalistic Adam of private profit. However, it is typical of the new methods of rule that, instead of simply confiscating the excess of private livestock, particularly marked in suburban areas, the government offered to buy it back from its owners at rates pretty close to the market price. The reduction in the size of the private plots of the collective farm members is also proceeding apace. This is in line with Stalin's dictum of October 1952 that the private sector in agricultural production must eventually be eliminated completely. The vigorous campaign for the establishment of boarding schools on a widespread, ultimately universal basis marks a revival of the doctrinaire Communist belief that the education of children must be taken away from the parents and concentrated in the hands of the government and Party.

Because of the wide range of abuses and discomforts which have been suffered by the Soviet population, the opportunities for the new rulers to provide one alleviation after another are extensive. Each new removal of pressure or discomfort is greeted with genuine gratitude. It would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of the régime to provide more and more of its members with a genuine stake in its expanding economy without slackening the build-up of heavy industry and military power.

A minor part of the de-Stalinization program has been to reopen intellectual and scientific contacts with non-Soviet countries. During the past year several hundreds of Soviet delegations have attended congresses abroad, or have paid visits to associations and other bodies with professional interests similar to their own. Very few Soviet tourists travel abroad alone, but during the past summer at least two cruises of Soviet tourists have followed the route from the Black Sea to the Baltic or the reverse, with brief trips to major cities in Western Europe.

The Soviet Government has admitted large numbers of foreign travelers, in a drastic reversal of Stalin's policy of careful political screening of all visitors. In addition to delegations from European satellites, North Korea and Communist China, visits were paid this summer by delegations of social security workers from Sweden, 300 Finnish partisans of peace, former Italian partisans,

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English experts in metallurgy, Italian political leaders, a parliamentary delegation from Pakistan, and two boat-loads of French tourists. It was reported that some 2,500 visas had been issued to American tourists. During one period of four weeks, the Soviet Union received extended visits from the Shah of Iran, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, as well as a brief visit from Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary General of the United Nations. All this, of course, in addition to the visits by the leaders of the Communist Parties of France, Italy, Belgium and Great Britain, following the publication of the Soviet Party decree of June 30 on de-Stalinization. In general, the Soviet authorities prefer to receive organized delegations, which enjoy well-planned hospitality and follow tightly packed programs. However, individual tourists are also admitted readily and find it relatively easy to secure interviews with people in the fields of science and letters.

Contacts of Soviet citizens with foreign visitors are not unrestricted or unsupervised. A foreign visitor is informed politely but firmly that he is not permitted to consult a Moscow telephone directory, although any numbers required are furnished to him at his request. When a visitor approaches the building of the United States Embassy, for example, to collect mail, he is greeted by the piercing stares of one, two or three security officers; when they are addressed in English, their gaze softens and turns away. Certain other unwritten limitations are discovered only by accident. On returning to their hotel on foot from the theatre one evening, two recent tourists lost their way and, seeing a lighted and open doorway, entered a dormitory to ask for directions. Their appearance aroused great interest and, through the use of French, they had a lively exchange of information and opinions for about two hours. On leaving, they were urged to return the next evening. On the second occasion, having arranged to take along an Intourist interpreter, they found the entrance to the building guarded by several firm characters in leather jackets; some of the same people with whom they had chatted innocently and vivaciously the evening before passed in or out of the door without a sign of recognition. In some cities away from the capital, the supervision of foreigners is more obvious and more easily detected than in Moscow.

When Westerners think about the Soviet Union, they often forget that the régime has been in power for nearly 40 years and

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that a very detailed system of supervision and direction of thought has been enforced for more than 25 years, despite periodic shifts in the details of the "line." Over this period of time the present generation of "leading intellectuals" has had ample opportunity and incentive to become adjusted to the concept that "truth," though it may vary in content from time to time or may even be reversed, is a definite doctrine to be ascertained and applied but not to be questioned except at grave risk. Since all intellectual activities are organized from above and regulated by the Party doctrines, there is obviously a large number of "officials for science" who can now be "licensed" to meet with foreign visitors and can be fully relied upon to exchange permitted information and to state with conviction and apparent spontaneity the official and Party view. Persons who do not feel secure and at ease within the system or in their loyalty to its dogmas are likely to avoid contacts with foreigners. Experience has shown them that no good can come to them from such meetings, whether casual or planned. In addition, most contacts with non-Communist foreign visitors are carried on in groups, an arrangement which provides the protection of witnesses.

In Moscow, certain standard questions about Soviet-American relations, based on the flow of information which Soviet thought-control transmits to its own people, were brought up with great regularity and with apparent sincerity. "Why does the American press tell lies about the Soviet Union?" To this, the obvious answer was that under our cherished freedom of the press a wide variety of facts and opinions are presented. Certainly, serious newspapers and periodicals make strenuous efforts to provide well-rounded information, but many parts of the press are likely to publish only news stories which have a vivid, sometimes a sensational, news interest. In any case, the difficulties which the Soviet Government places in the way of securing accurate information concerning the Soviet Union are a major handicap. For example, I pointed to the failure, from 1939 until April 1956, to publish such a simple fact as the total size of the Soviet population. "Why doesn't the American Government punish those who spread false information?" My interlocutors seemed baffled by the notion that the government should reflect the basic desires of its people, based on freedom of information and discussion, rather than imposing selected information and its own views on the people.

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"Why does the American Government subject Soviet visa applicants to fingerprinting, which is the mark of a criminal?" Some Soviet interlocutors assumed that fingerprinting was required only of Soviet applicants, and were surprised to learn that it is required of all foreign visitors except those bearing diplomatic or official passports. They found it hard to understand that, being a government of laws and not of individuals, the United States Government could not make exceptions without appropriate Congressional action. It was easy to point out that Americans coming to the Soviet Union accept Soviet requirements as a matter of course, including internal passports and numerous permits equipped with photographs, as well as registration with the police at each change of address. Soviet listeners found it incredible that none of these requirements exist in the United States; once they had absorbed this concept, some were ready to understand that fingerprinting, in American practice, is a partial substitute for the much larger number of Soviet identification papers.

The question of "Why does the United States not have a social security system?" was answered readily by taking my social security card from my wallet and passing it around. Soviet people were amazed to learn that despite the greater size of the Soviet population a larger number of persons are covered by the United States social security system, and a far larger proportion are currently receiving benefits under it.

Soviet journalists, in particular, were informed in detail, and were indignant, about the demonstrations by former displaced persons against the seven Soviet journalists who toured the United States a year ago. To the comment that "No such demonstrators or pickets would be allowed to annoy a visitor to the Soviet Union," I could only reply that this was a great pity, for I would welcome demonstrations for and against myself. They found it hard to understand that private citizens can freely picket the President of the United States or anyone else so long as they refrain from physical violence. My quoting of the American saying that "Words do not kill" left them shaken but unconvinced.

To the complaint that "The Soviet Union is cutting down its troops by 1,840,000 men, and why doesn't America cut back too?" I gave the easy rejoinder that we had cut back our forces very completely at the end of World War II and had rearmed only as a result of Soviet aggressions and threats. Furthermore,

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we do not know how many troops the Soviet Government is maintaining today, nor how many it will have after it has carried through the cutback. Soviet interlocutors admitted freely that they also had no idea how large the Soviet forces were. It was my turn to be somewhat embarrassed when pressed to explain why the United States, having proposed a ratio of fixed ceilings for conventional forces, was now attaching new conditions to its own proposal after it had been accepted by the Soviet Government in July. It was easier to explain why the Soviet proposals for setting aside limited and fixed areas for inspection of troop and material movements would not remove the uncertainty over actual Soviet strength and therefore would not eliminate the distrust of the West concerning Soviet armaments.

My Soviet interlocutors were well informed about statements by individual Americans concerning the possible use of the hydrogen bomb in case of war. It was not easy to get across to them that not only individual citizens and journalists but even Congressmen and high military officials are accustomed, according to American tradition, to state their individual views, even when they are at variance with the policy of the government. They could only shake their heads over this in incredulity.

Soviet people frequently asked: "Why don't you Americans trust the Soviet Union?" To this my reply was that for ten years —in Greece, Iran, Czechoslovakia, Berlin and Korea—Soviet policy had been beating us over the head with a crowbar and our head was naturally still aching. I suggested that if they showed a genuine willingness over the next ten years to resolve many unsettled questions, including the acceptance of free elections in divided countries, they would gradually restore the level of confidence which they had enjoyed in America in 1945.

From these and many other conversations one thing which stood out was a sense of "unrequited love" toward America: the tendency to measure each of their own achievements against American achievements and a sometimes pathetic desire to receive some favorable recognition from Americans. "Isn't there anything we do that you admire?" If Americans wish to promote greater receptivity to fuller cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union, they must be prepared to speak favorably of Soviet achievements, wherever they exist, in order to overcome this deep-seated feeling among Soviet intellectuals that Americans look down upon them and talk down to them.

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Another factor which the American cultural approach must take into account is that the Soviet picture of the United States has been carefully shaped over many, many years by the information which is pumped through Soviet channels. True, a very few "intellectual workers" have access to a wider range of information. In general, however, the Soviet citizens' picture of America is that given by Soviet printed sources. In order to broaden and correct this picture, one must start from it. If the information given is too sharply in contrast with what is known and accepted by the Soviet citizenry, it meets with incredulity, alarm and rejection. The higher people rise in the Soviet system, the more information they generally have available—though selected and organized according to the Soviet pattern—and the more confidence they have in it. If the picture painted for them is too directly in contrast to what they have been taught, this makes them uncomfortable and fearful of losing their grip on the pattern which has been set for them, and thus of coming into political conflict, even though unspoken, with the Soviet "line."

The strength of American culture is that it is, aside from a basic acceptance and enthusiasm for freedom, "unpolitical," whereas Soviet information and science are based on a rigid political "line." American information and cultural policy should turn this "unpolitical" factor to advantage by appealing to the professional, cultural and scientific interests of specific Soviet audiences. Physicians, musicians, writers, architects, farm experts and others can be reached through their intellectual interests, provided political differences are not thrust into the foreground.

In the early 1930s a large majority of Soviet intellectuals were well aware of the inner meaning of a free and democratic system, either through their knowledge of the West or through their memories of the earlier struggles for freedom within Russia. Opposing them stood a fanatical minority of Communist party liners on whom the régime relied in its ruthless campaign to shape all intellectual life to a pattern of conformity. By now this struggle of 25 years ago has ended. Several generations of intellectuals have been recruited, indoctrinated and promoted to positions of responsibility under the pressures and ruthless vigilance of the Party controls. Today intellectual life is staffed from top to bottom by Communist-trained intellectuals, but since the struggle for domination is over, the latter have much less reason to be fanatical than had their "Red Professor" prototypes of 25

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years ago. They have gone through so many changes of line within the basic dogma that they now seem to be "bureaucrats of culture," eager to satisfy the régime, proud of Soviet strength and Soviet achievements, alert to detect forthcoming changes in Party policy, and, in Western eyes, distressingly at ease within the rigid system of Soviet ideology.

Today it is second nature for Soviet-trained intellectuals to accept the assumption that all questions should be and are decided by the dicta of political authority, sometimes handed down in a flash of lightning from on high, rather than being settled or left unsettled through a continuing clash of free opinions. In one group in which I raised the question of how Soviet scholars set about analyzing the desirable balance between the production of consumer goods and capital goods within the Soviet economy, the reply, presented with great earnestness, was: "Some months ago a few isolated individuals set forth an incorrect position to the effect that, with the maturing of the economy, a larger share of production would be devoted to consumer goods, but their mistakes have been corrected." With that dictum, the "discussion" came to an end.

In general, a visit to Moscow leaves the impression that people over 35 are not going to forget the rigidity and ruthlessness with which the Party line, in its changing aspects, has been enforced upon several generations of intellectuals. They accept gratefully the present relaxation of the direct pressure of doctrine upon their minds, but they do not assume that the present relaxation will necessarily be either extensive or permanent. The steel helmet has been pulled back a quarter-inch, to their great relief; but it is still there.

While at the Twentieth Party Congress of last February the Soviet leadership criticized its scholars for their "mania for quotations" from Marx and Lenin, there has been no change in the basic assumption that there is a single "truth," and that that truth is defined ultimately by the Party leadership. There is taking place a slight broadening of access to evidence and facts. Scholars are being urged to exercise some independence in their analysis, but they will remain timid about using it, for sharp reprimands are still being issued from on high whenever the findings of research conflict with Party policy or prejudice. Sometimes one has the impression that the Party leadership is exhorting its scientists to display more initiative, whereas the scholars remain

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reluctant to abandon their comfortable reliance on established and familiar doctrines. Whether younger scholars, who have reached intellectual activity during the most recent period of stringent control since 1946, will come to believe in a permanent relaxation and will endeavor to stretch somewhat the realm of permitted analysis and speculation is too subtle and difficult a question to be answered after a brief visit.

Unrest among writers and critics, which has been manifested sporadically since Stalin's death, suggests that literature and the theatre may prove the first fields of creative activity to feel the benefits of a partial broadening of the limits of what is permitted. The recent and posthumous rehabilitation of the famous theatrical innovator, Meyerhold, may be merely a belated gesture of contrition, or it may foreshadow a renewal of the search for new forms of creativity in the dramatic arts. Last spring architects and engineers were severely criticized for the "wedding cake" style of architecture which has monopolized the Soviet scene since 1937. How far architecture will now enjoy a wider freedom of experimentation remains uncertain. Will the "line" in architecture merely shift its course, or will it be broadened to accommodate several varying schools of thought? There may be some significance in the remark that "If the buildings of the new Moscow University were being planned today, they would be executed in a different style."

What does the incipient "intellectual thaw" denote for Soviet Russia's relations with the West? To weigh its significance with care, we must keep certain basic facts in perspective. First, it is being carried out by a régime which is supremely confident, even arrogant. The Soviet leaders and Soviet intellectuals of today emphasize with great pride the fact that the Soviet system is the dominant force for one-third of the world's population, that it has built up the second largest economy in the world and that it is one of the two greatest military Powers. Second, despite the criticisms of Stalin's "excesses," this amazing development is attributed to the Soviet leadership and its "correct" doctrine. Third, by now several generations of intellectuals have been trained to implement the canons of Soviet dogma. Today there is almost no trace left of the former Russian deference for the science and culture of the West; it has given way to self-confidence, boasting and arrogance. Soviet intellectuals now desire to acquire useful facts from the West, not to borrow basic values,

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and they are pleased that the leadership has opened the door a crack. They want to improve their professional equipment, but to do so within the over-all structure of dogma. Within this new attitude of intense pride and intellectual self-sufficiency, the Soviet leadership can now permit a wider range of contacts with the West with relatively slight risk that Western cultural values will be understood, much less accepted, by the thin layer of intellectuals "licensed" to carry on cultural relations.

A somewhat widened intercourse with the West is also welcomed, with caution, by many Soviet intellectuals. Among them there is a real curiosity about the West, which is partly due to their having been denied direct access to it for many years. There is also a desire to receive from the West recognition of their achievements. Even more important is their belief that the current partial relaxation of tension, which they see reflected in the exchanges of cultural visits, means, to them, stronger prospects for a continuing improvement in the conditions of intellectual work and in material conditions within the Soviet system.

For Soviet people, the status of intellectual relations with the West is also a barometer of general prospects of peace. As many commented, "A year ago we could not have sat down at the same table; it is good that we can talk now." Until recently the order was: "Turn your back on the West." The instruction has now gone out: "Face the West." If the order should go out tomorrow again to ignore and attack the West, the order will be obeyed, even though at the cost of some silent resentment and loss of élan, and especially of a revived fear of war. The relaxation has been decreed by the Soviet leadership as a means to reinforce its claim to be seeking a relaxation of tensions in all fields. It gratifies a deep-seated aspiration of many Soviet intellectuals, but it is not due to "pressure" or "demand" on their part.

Is the present relaxation of intellectual barriers going to be an interlude, or is it the beginning of a continuing process, a movement toward ever wider freedom? Some analysts feel that the movement of "liberalization" is reaching or will reach a "point of no return." Others regard it as an effort to remove certain abuses and to improve the workings of the system, a strictly controlled development and one that can be reversed whenever the leadership decides to do so. In any case, the relaxation has been greeted with considerable caution by the Soviet intellectuals, ever mindful of the possibility of new reversals of line from above.

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Whether or not the relaxation turns out to be long continued, the West should respond with sincerity. It should be prepared to meet with and coöperate with Soviet intellectuals on their own grounds of professional, scholarly and technical competence, without putting political questions directly in the foreground. Closer acquaintance with the cultural and scientific achievements of the West may help to demonstrate pragmatically the advantages of gradually broadened areas of intellectual freedom. We cannot require Soviet-trained people of today to subscribe to the abstract principle of intellectual freedom as a precondition for developing intellectual contacts and exchanges. The West does have an opportunity, a better one than at any time in the past two decades, to demonstrate empirically the soundness and vitality of its tradition of freedom of the mind, freedom of inquiry. It should grasp the opportunity.

The Soviet leadership is confidently challenging the West to compete with it for the future allegiance of the awakening peoples of Asia and Africa. One important aspect of the challenge is in the intellectual field. If free Western thought is to maintain and develop its great advantages in this competition, it must also be prepared to enter into closer if probably not intimate relations with Soviet scientists and scholars. An ounce of example will count more than a balloonful of exhortation.

Any sign of Western shrinking from the new Soviet challenge resounds throughout the Soviet-controlled world and also has unfavorable consequences among the intellectual leaders in Asia and Africa. The slight and somewhat tentative swing of Soviet policy toward the limited development of intellectual and scientific relations with the West is a challenge and an opportunity which cannot be brushed aside. It must be faced by the West, with confidence in the vitality of free science and free culture.

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ARGENTINE INTERREGNUM

By José Santos Gollan

AFTER ten years, the dictatorship of Juan D. Perón was overthrown by the last of three military uprisings. It had seemed a great monolithic pyramid with deep and solid foundations; but it was toppled in a matter of days—almost hours—like some gigantic clay idol. Once it fell, the imposing structure was discovered to have been rotten from top to bottom. That was why no great military effort was required to overthrow it. In fact, only four centers of military rebellion were involved in actual fighting: two in the Army (in the central and western provinces of Córdoba and Mendoza and the eastern provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes) and two in the Navy. Four simultaneous explosions were enough to put an end to a régime which had seemed unshakable.

Before the revolution it was predicted that any attempt to end the dictatorship would unquestionably involve a civil war and that it might be a long one; indeed, many of Perón's bitterest enemies shared this opinion. Nevertheless, the struggle was so brief that the leaders of the armed uprising were themselves surprised; they calculated that they would have to fight for several weeks at least, perhaps months. The fact that the entire Navy was in rebellion and that the city of Córdoba was in rebel hands was enough to make the dictator acknowledge defeat and ask asylum in the Paraguayan Embassy.

The omnipotent leader's decision not to fight served in turn as an unmistakable signal to his astonished and confused followers. The man who had been everything fled, and his rule collapsed as though there had been no one around him except his enemies who were now resolved to fight. It was therefore not so much a question of a triumphant revolution as of a régime which acknowledged itself beaten. The strength of the rebels was more moral than military; and it was that very moral strength which was lacking in the dictatorship, with all its outer impressiveness and inner weakness. This is the only explanation of why exactly three months after the failure of a rebellion by officers and chiefs of the Navy (June 16, 1955) a rebellion headed by officers and chiefs of the Army (September 16 of the same year) succeeded so easily. In the interval, the Catholic forces had aligned them-

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selves wholly against Perón; indeed his violation of their shrines was a preponderant factor in the weakening of the government and the strengthening of its enemies. Régimes which are really strong do not promiscuously resort to violence; if they do, they reveal that they are afraid or that their power is waning. The flames from ruined churches were a sign that the Perón régime had a foreboding of the mortal danger in which it stood. The Catholics had been against him before the burning of the churches, but this incident strengthened their will to fight.

What was called and is still known as the "Liberating Revolution" did not have a written platform or a previously chosen leader. There was no methodically worked out conspiracy with a detailed blueprint and a vast organization. The revolutionary proclamation broadcast from Córdoba by General Eduardo Lonardi at the start of the uprising stated only that the Army had come out of its barracks to put an end to despotism. The essential lines of action which the revolution was to follow were made known one week later when General Lonardi proceeded to Buenos Aires and became President. To the throng gathered in the Plaza de Mayo he said, "The program of my provisional presidency—which will last only as long as circumstances require—can be summed up in two words: the reign of law."

The real difficulties arose after General Lonardi had taken office. The anxieties of the few days of fighting were quickly forgotten. Now it was the staggering disorganization of the country that constituted the main problem, and the situation grew hourly more perilous. The new President had taken the oath of office without having formed his cabinet. He had made his triumphant flight from Córdoba with a briefcase, the text of a speech to be delivered and a secretary to countersign the first documents. His emergency cabinet was made up of men who did not belong to the traditional parties, and several of them were very far to the right of center. Thus from the start the government contained within itself the germs of political divergencies. But there was no time to be lost and the two most pressing needs had to be taken care of: to insure and consolidate the military front, and to sound out the attitude of the labor unions, all of which were directed by Peronists and affiliated under the General Confederation of Labor, the strong right arm of the dictatorship. Many of the military garrisons had maintained an equivocal attitude toward the revolution, but the Confederation (C.G.T.) had not

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gone forth to defend its "lord and master." If the Peronist elements in the Army and the disciplined hosts of the C.G.T. did not come into the streets to fight for their leader and his régime in those first perilous and still uncertain hours, it is hard to believe that a year later they would have much chance of success. The failure of the recent Peronist attempt (June 9), and the notable lack of popular enthusiasm which it aroused, proves that any vestiges of life remaining to the unseated dictatorship exist only among a scattered if resolute few who once enjoyed power and wealth. They do not dare now to reveal their fidelity to the ousted leader, yet cannot find a way to join the predominant elements supporting the revolutionary régime.

The danger, however, is not that these clandestine units may engage in subversive activities. Paradoxically, the greatest difficulties are created by the very elements which helped overthrow the dictatorship. The desire to unseat Perón was an obvious and simple bond. Political elements with widely differing ideologies had one common enemy. Each for its own reasons, the most divergent elements joined to combat the dictatorship: Catholics and Marxists; men of unquestionably democratic faith and groups which earlier had justified Fascism and Nazism and had come together in Argentina under the banner of "nationalism," collaborating with Perón in the early stages of his régime; men from parties which had been rivals for decades in the past. Perón achieved the political miracle of bringing the most contradictory forces together against him. In spite of himself he created a real "national union" without precedent in Argentina's history. Once the dictatorship had been overthrown, the cohesive element began to lose some of its initial strength. As time goes by Perón's enemies tend to fall back into their natural places in the political spectrum. With the removal of the common enemy, traditional rivalries inevitably appear.

Before the revolutionary government had been in power two months the first internal crisis occurred. The excessive rightist leaning of the emergency cabinet provoked mistrust among the more truly democratic parties. The latter could not accept the dominance in Lonardi's cabinet of political figures who, even though they had collaborated actively in the revolution, had once belonged to groups that had helped Perón seize power and had broken with the dictatorship very late in the game. The orthodox anti-Peronists, opposed to all forms of dictatorship,

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saw a twofold danger: first, the possibility of a régime without Perón but totalitarian in its sympathies; second, that the interim government would not be brief and might renege on its promise to hold free elections.

The rapid consolidation of the revolutionary movement was demonstrated by the way in which Lonardi and his ministers were displaced just 50 days after he had formed his first and only cabinet. Such a delicate manœuvre might well have turned back the revolution or provoked a new and dangerous upheaval. But this reef, too, was safely negotiated, because the purpose of the revolution was not yet fulfilled; nothing must be allowed to stand in the way of the absolute elimination of whatever might favor Perón. Along with Lonardi, certain groups were alienated, but the dominant revolutionary elements gained in strength. The blow was aimed not at Lonardi personally but at those who surrounded him. Very soon thereafter it became apparent that Lonardi was mortally ill, so that his removal from office anticipated fate by only a few weeks.

The substitution of General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu for General Lonardi on November 13 of last year not only was the first test of strength of the revolution, but also served to set it on a definite course. The objectives were to establish a provisional government independent of any political partisanship, and to hold office as briefly as possible; and to reaffirm that the democratic spirit of the revolution was in harmony with the spirit of the National Constitution of 1853, which had been distorted—rather than reformed—in the Constitution sanctioned by Peronism in 1949.

The promoters of the November 13 purge were mainly naval officers headed by Rear Admiral Isaac Rojas, who was Vice President under Lonardi from the moment the revolution triumphed and who retained this position under Aramburu; an important nucleus of Army officers who had participated in earlier revolutionary attempts and had returned from exile; and political figures belonging to the parties recognized as democratic, that is, all parties except Peronists, Communists and the right-wing nationalists.

The democratic parties which shared responsibility for the replacement of Lonardi by Aramburu are now represented in a Consultative Junta. This political creation, though it has no precedent in Argentine history, has been very useful to the revo-

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lutionary government. The Junta's advice is sought on fundamental matters and its members, almost all of whom have had long political experience, serve as a medium for conveying the opinions of the public to the government. Issues are not brought to a vote and the judgment of members may or may not be taken into consideration by the government. More than anything else, the existence of the Junta signifies that the democratic parties support the provisional government and have confidence that it is adhering to democratic principles. The Consultative Junta was planned and set up during the final hours of the Lonardi government. On the day it was formed—November 10—the cabinet crisis occurred and the Junta unanimously sided with the forces which three days later were to eliminate Lonardi and the original revolutionary cabinet. Thus, as soon as it was born, the Junta joined the rebellion against the man who might be said to have been its parent. At the first meeting of the Junta on November 10, Vice President Rojas, who is its chairman, delivered a speech which revealed the divergencies arising within the government. He paid homage to the spirit of the battle of Caseros (which overthrew the tyranny of Juan Manuel Rosas on February 3, 1852) and declared that the Consultative Junta was a vindication of the Argentine democratic parties persecuted by Perón. Rojas on that day, in the presence of Lonardi, interpreted the revolution and gave it the new meaning which was already apparent in the street but was not reflected in the government. Thus the Junta began its labors by taking a firm stand in favor of democracy and supplying the first decisive support for the second stage of the revolutionary government, the presidency of Aramburu.

In the Junta are the representatives of five parties, some of them by no means united. Thus there are four factions within the Radical Civic Union, a party more than 60 years old which was ousted from the government in the uprising of 1930 led by General José F. Uriburu against President Hipólito Irigoyen. Also present in the Junta are the National Democrats, heirs to the conservative elements which governed the country longest; the Socialists, who are politically powerful in Buenos Aires and the industrial centers; the Progressive Democrats, a party founded by Lisandro de la Torre 40 years ago and whose strength is in the littoral provinces; and the Christian Democrats who founded their party last year and in a short time have attained

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an important position, although they have not yet had the opportunity to participate in an election.

Barring unexpected contingencies, the future president of the nation will be chosen from among the political parties represented in the Consultative Junta. There are no others well organized and in a position to compete successfully in the forthcoming general elections. According to General Aramburu, these should take place toward the end of next year. For the present, the parties represented are united by the need to strengthen the military government; but for the future each has its own aspirations.

It should be noted that the Nationalist groups ousted from the revolutionary government are still active and are seeking to put up a presidential candidate. As things stand today, it appears that their most likely candidate is General León Justo Bengoa, who was imprisoned under Perón and served as Minister of the Army in the Lonardi cabinet. The Nationalists still declare their anti-Peronism; but they cannot forgive the present government for ousting Lonardi and they accuse it of being secretly leftist. Both civilians and military men belonging to this Nationalist group—including General Bengoa—have been subjected to close surveillance and even arrest under the Aramburu government. Unquestionably the most conspicuous opponents of the present régime are concentrated among the Nationalists—except, of course, for the Peronists, whose party has been dissolved and deprived of its property, and the Communists.

After the 1930 revolution, in the elections held early in 1932, there was also a military candidate, General Agustín P. Justo, in opposition to a civilian, Dr. Lisandro de la Torre. General Justo, who at first appeared to be very far removed from the provisional government, won the election. Is it possible that something similar might happen this time? Will there be a military candidate counting on the support of the armed forces? The evidence suggests a negative answer. But history is an endless catalogue of surprises.

Among the democratic parties no candidate for the presidency has as yet been proclaimed. In the so-called "intransigent" faction of the Radical group—its left wing, which is popular and extremely active—circumstances appear to favor Dr. Arturo Frondizi, who was candidate for Vice President in the 1952 elections. At that time the Radicals' candidate for President was

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Dr. Ricardo Balbín. He recently resigned from the Party's board of directors in protest against the drive to name Dr. Frondizi as the Radical candidate for President. If the four Radical factions could agree on a candidate, their prospects would seem very favorable. Ousted from the government by the armed forces more than a quarter of a century ago, the Radical party could well make a comeback next year, thanks to the new opportunity provided by those same forces.

There is no talk as yet of a coalition of parties with a single presidential candidate. Indeed, other concerns are more immediate than the identity of the future candidates, and among these is the possible reform of the National Constitution. By proclamation of April 27, 1956, the provisional government declared the Constitution of 1853 to be in force, including the subsequent amendments. Specifically excluded were the revisions sanctioned by the Perón régime in 1949, among which was a provision allowing the President to succeed himself. Under the Constitution of 1853, Perón could not have been reëlected; the reason for the amendment was his desire to extend his own term of office.

The parties and the government agree on the desirability of making certain reforms in the 1853 Constitution but opinions differ as to the best time to convoke a new constitutional convention. The "intransigent" faction among the Radicals holds that it should be convoked after the elections, by a popularly chosen government; the other parties incline toward earlier reform. The present government appears somewhat undecided, although it is considered probable that it will favor a compromise solution: the holding of general elections for national, provincial and municipal offices, together with the election of members of the convention to reform the Constitution.

Another question of special concern to the parties is that of the electoral law and the form of representation. At present, Argentine legislation allows for a majority and a minority, but a decree of the national government would permit the system of proportional representation to be applied in the first post-revolutionary elections. All the parties are now in favor of the proportional vote with the exception of the Radical faction led by Dr. Frondizi, which wants to postpone any change until after an elected government takes office. These divergent opinions are, of course, directly related to the electoral prospects. Thus the political future is already beginning to weigh upon the present.

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The ten years of the Peronist dictatorship constituted the most extensive experiment in totalitarian government ever witnessed in America, alike in duration, scope and intensity. It was, moreover, an example of the almost limitless hypertrophy which in a short time overtakes a police state when it tries to hide its real nature under the trappings of democratic government. The fall of the régime confirms, in turn, the opinion that the more excessive a dictatorship becomes, the closer it comes to its own downfall, and that the apparent majorities which shout (or are forced to shout) in favor of the leader are fooling themselves at the same time that, unconsciously too, they are fooling the dictator. The gagged minorities, on the other hand, work quietly and ceaselessly. A year or two ago it would have been impossible to judge from a distance the strength which the Argentine rebellion was silently gathering.

The Perón government was in reality a de facto government which had no legal foundations and observed no legal restrictions, but which operated behind numerous pretenses of legality. In contrast, the present government which sprang from the revolution represented itself as a de facto government; it does not and cannot try to conceal its origin. In practice it limits its own powers. Dictatorship is permanent disregard for the bounds of authority; law is recognition of them. The Argentine government abides by the latter concept and avowedly shuns the former.

The present Argentine government is striving to demonstrate its loyalty to the fundamental rules which it has imposed upon itself: to remain in office a limited time; to be equally independent of all political parties; to hold the fairest elections possible; and to guarantee democratic principles, adhering to the Constitution of 1853 in so far as it is compatible with an emergency government. So far, there has been no reason to doubt that these rules are being and will continue to be observed. Much of the strength enjoyed by the present government lies in the obvious conformity between its promises and its deeds.

About a month after it came to power, the Aramburu government made known its "basic directives," proclaiming the essential principles which it was striving to uphold. These "directives," which form part of the statute of the revolutionary government, consist of affirmations such as these:

To eliminate all vestiges of totalitarianism in order to restore the reign of morality, justice, law, freedom and democracy. Once this objective has

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been attained and conditions have been established which will permit the citizenry to express its real will, it shall decide its own destiny. And it will be left to the constitutional governments succeeding this provisional government to solve the major problems which do not come within the scope of the revolutionary objectives themselves.

This government is a provisional government and its members have no intention of remaining in power. Consequently, we repeat our formal undertaking that none of its members will accept any elective office for which they might be proposed as candidates in the forthcoming elections.

In the final hours of the Lonardi government the office of Minister of the Army was assumed by General Arturo Ossorio Arana, who still occupies this post. On December 6, 1955, General Ossorio Arana summoned the military chiefs and delivered a speech which attracted wide attention and is regarded as forming part of the "basic directives" of the present government. In this military document the following concepts are to be found:

It is not a new thing in our country, and it seems to be a Latin American evil, that military personalities seek to make themselves dictators through recourse to the arms which the people themselves pay for as a guarantee of their security. . . .

We shall so conduct ourselves that the Army, in a democratic spirit, as in other countries (the United States, England, France, etc.) may remain aloof from partisan political strife, confident that the citizenry will learn to live democracy and will in no case need to resort to force to impose its programs or correct supposed or real mistakes of its governors.

The elections are to be held in about 14 months; it remains only to set the exact date and to resolve the questions discussed above. If the government continues its present line of conduct, the Liberating Revolution will have fulfilled its professed aims and the "Argentine Interregnum" which opened on September 16, 1955, will have come to a fitting close. The rest will be up to the parties and the people.

In the meantime, the Aramburu government is proceeding with caution. All resolutions of major importance, in addition to being subjected to Cabinet approval and the advice of the Consultative Junta, must be screened by the Military Junta, made up of the President and Vice President of the nation and the Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other juntas and advisory bodies collaborate in the work of a government which is noted for its deliberations and consultations. Although it is a de facto government of revolutionary origin, it acts as though it were exactly the opposite. Its partisans themselves

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criticize it for excessive slowness and mildness in its decisions; but this criticism could hardly be applied to the way in which it suppressed the seditious attempt of last June 9 and 10, when it ordered dozens of executions of military men and civilians.

The present situation in Argentina affords an opportunity to observe how hard it is for a people to pass from a prolonged period of oppression to the free exercise of its essential liberties. Released from inhibitions imposed by force, the public is like someone paralyzed by excessive inactivity. It is slow to recover the use of its faculties. There persists the deep-rooted obsession that little or nothing is permitted. The fear to criticize, for example, exists even among those who fought for freedom. Nevertheless, Argentina's progress in the right direction is not being halted; the press, the radio and the political forum are recovering their rights.

The government realizes that the economic situation has direct bearing on the nation's capacity to maintain order. During the past ten years the population of the country has increased by three million, or about 15 percent of the total, while agricultural and livestock production has suffered a serious decline. Total grain production, for example (wheat, corn, barley, rye, oats, rice, flax and sunflower seeds), was 90 million tons in the four-year period 1939–1944, 65 million in the next four years, and only 57 million in the period 1950–1955. In 1948 there were 52 million acres under cultivation, and in 1955 only 42 million. Over the last ten years per capita production increased only 3.5 percent, which is equal to the increase registered in only one year by Colombia, Brazil, Mexico and other countries. Dr. Raúl Prebisch points this out in his technical study, "The Argentine Economic Situation," and adds that per capita exports during the past five years have been scarcely half what they were in the five years prior to the Second World War.

During its brief incumbency the provisional government cannot make up for all those lost years. It can only try to guide the nation's economy as it is trying to guide the reëstablishment of democratic institutions—by providing the initial impulse. To raise its production levels the country needs a national program of work and must increase and modernize the machinery used in industry, agriculture and transportation. It is estimated that the machinery, equipment and other capital goods which Argentina must import within the next three or four years will cost 1.2

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billion dollars. Even were this figure cut in half, the effort called for would still be extraordinary. For this reason foreign aid is being sought, and it will be granted in the measure that Argentina and its present government succeed in inspiring confidence. If it stays on the right track politically and reëstablishes democratic institutions, other countries will have confidence in its economic reliability.

The "Argentine Interregnum" between the dictatorship and democratic normalcy will last—judging by the plans being made—about 26 or 27 months. It would be difficult to shorten this period by more than a few weeks. Perón fell just a year ago. The work accomplished is enormous, but the task remaining to be completed is just as great. If the "interregnum" closes with the transfer of the reins of government from the military to civilians freely and constitutionally elected, the Argentine example of "democratic resurrection" will be of incalculable benefit to all of Latin America, which continues to be a spawning ground for dictators. If its promise is thus fulfilled, there is no exaggeration in saying that it will constitute the most important achievement of a South American army since the time when the continent won its independence. In the meantime, a definitive evaluation of the Argentine revolution awaits the day when a duly elected government takes office.

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BRITAIN'S DRIVE FOR ATOMIC POWER

By Sir George Thomson

ENERGY is one of the fundamental concepts of the physicist—perhaps *the* fundamental concept. Power, which is the rate at which energy is supplied, is almost equally important to the statesman. In the modern world, power is a need hardly less vital than food and water.

A nation's per capita consumption of energy is a very good indication of its economic standing. Strictly speaking, consumption is the wrong word, for energy cannot be consumed, it can only be transformed. But it is often changed from a readily available form to one which is useless, as when the power supplied to the engines of an airplane is transformed, as it all ultimately is, into heating the air through which the plane flies. This illustrates an important feature of the use of energy. In most cases (though there are exceptions), what men want is not actually energy but some change which occurs as a kind of by-product of its transformation; in the case of an airplane this is the rapid carriage of people or goods from one place to another. For this reason it is difficult to say categorically just how much power a nation must have at its disposal to achieve a particular standard of living. One can use power wisely or wastefully. While the amount of food necessary to live in health is measurable, one can hardly say the same for power.

However, the history of the last century shows a steady increase in per capita power for the leading nations and there is good reason to suppose that this increase will continue at a rate close to 3 percent per annum.[1] Any country which cannot achieve this increase must expect to be severely pinched, to have its development retarded, and probably to face a declining standard of living.

In the United States the required increase in power is easily come by, at least for a time. Coal is plentiful and easy to extract. There are still substantial reserves of oil. But Britain has negligible oil and, though the actual amount of coal is substantial, it is in thin seams far below the surface. It is not that the coal is near exhaustion—there is enough at present rates to last for a couple of centuries; but it is difficult to increase the rate of

[1] Palmer C. Putnam, "Energy in the Future." New York: Van Nostrand, 1953.

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production. This is partly a matter of sociology, of the dislike of men for working below ground and of their willingness to accept a certain standard of living, so that increased wages are apt merely to mean fewer hours of work. Whatever the causes, the nationalized coal industry in Britain seems unable, in spite of great efforts, to produce more than about 200,000,000 tons per annum, and has stuck near this figure now for several years.

What, then, is Britain to do? The use of oil is increasing and some comes from British companies in the Middle East and elsewhere; but this is limited and not always sure. To import more oil requires hard currency, mostly dollars. Anyhow, oil is a useful export and Britain is short of exports. The discovery of nuclear energy and its application to power on a large scale has come like the answer to prayer. It is an answer for which Britain has indeed worked very hard through her Atomic Energy Authority.

II

At the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy last year in Geneva, the representatives of the United States presented elaborate calculations of the cost per unit of the electricity produced by various kinds of projected reactors, making clear that the success or failure of these reactors could depend on their ability to compete economically with coal-burning plants. They might be competitive only in areas where coal was dear, and not in others, but they had to be competitive at a given time and place. To the British representatives (and I think to those of quite a few of the underdeveloped nations) this was not the main consideration. Though much of our power is cheaply produced, our *marginal* power is expensive and in effect represents the cost of importing coal from the United States. What is even worse, large imports would gravely upset our balance of payments. Britain needs power that can be produced by our own effort. Hence our eagerness for nuclear power.

In February 1955 an official White Paper set out a plan according to which the development of nuclear power will save the equivalent of 40,000,000 tons of coal per annum by 1975. At that time it is expected that 40 percent of the total electric power of the country will be produced atomically.

The plan is flexible in that in its later stages great latitude

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has been left in the design of the reactors. The earlier ones will be modified from those that have been working in Britain to make plutonium for military purposes. This is not merely a matter of convenience. Besides providing power, these early models will produce additional quantities of plutonium needed for later, more ambitious types of reactor. The early ones will use natural uranium containing only about one part in 140 of the active U-235. By increasing the proportion of U-235, or adding plutonium, which for this purpose is roughly equivalent, an "enriched" fuel is obtained. This considerably simplifies the work of the designer of reactors and gives him more flexibility. Likewise, thorium can be used as an alternative fuel to produce U-233, whose properties are similar to U-235. Although this process also requires enriched material to start with, it has considerable merit as a "breeder," that is, a reactor in which the total amount of actively fissile material is increased during operation while heat for power is produced at the same time. For fast reactors, which may ultimately turn out to be the best, enriched fuel is essential. An experimental fast reactor is being built in the north of Scotland, at Dounreay.

The production of U-235 requires a very expensive separation plant consuming vast amounts of power. The one at Oak Ridge is said to use enough power to run the activities of an important nation. Our own plant at Capenhurst is on a much smaller scale, and the use of plutonium as an enriched fuel is therefore very attractive. But the manufacture of plutonium is necessarily a slow process. The first reactors will have to make the plutonium that may be needed for later ones of more advanced design, and there is of course a danger that this may slow the program down. I doubt that this will be allowed to happen even if we have to go on building reactors of the present type longer than we should otherwise wish.

The first pair of reactors is expected to deliver power in October of this year. The station is situated at Calder Hall near the coast of Cumberland in the northwest of England, and will have a net electricity output of "over 55 megawatts" or 55,000 kilowatts. This station belongs to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, and some of the plutonium will be used for military purposes. Later stations will be owned by the Central Electricity Authority and are expected to produce close to 200 megawatts from a pair of reactors.

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A nuclear reactor, of course, produces heat; it is in fact a furnace, and to get electricity this heat must be used as the heat from coal is used in a conventional power station.[2] The conversion of nuclear heat into mechanical power is actually less efficient than in a coal-burning station, because at present a reactor cannot be run at as high a temperature as a conventional furnace. The heat from a reactor cannot be used directly on any large scale for the heating of houses or factories because the reactor would have to be near them, and for the present at any rate this is too risky. Of course this would not prevent waste heat being used locally as has been done for some years in the research establishment at Harwell.

The White Paper gave an estimated cost of .6 penny per kilowatt hour, or 7 mills, after allowing for the value of the plutonium produced. This was roughly level with the cost from the newer coal-burning stations, but since the price of pit-head coal went up by 18 percent a few months after the Paper was published, there ought actually to be a slight advantage for the nuclear plant. In any case, it is reasonable to suppose that a new art like that of the nuclear reactor will advance faster than the old-established one of the conventional station, so the advantage should grow.

Five and a half years must elapse between the start of a design of a reactor and the time when it becomes operative. If one hopes to make rapid progress, one cannot wait for experience with an early design before starting on a new one. This makes nuclear engineering a tense and exciting job requiring high qualities of scientific imagination and willingness to take certain risks. Serious mistakes have fortunately been few.

A little more can be added about probable future developments. After the initial prototype at Calder Hall, the first set of reactors should come into operation in 1960–61. They are being designed by four groups of industrial firms for the nationally-owned Central Electricity Authority, with help from the Atomic Energy Authority. Like Calder Hall they will be carbon-dioxide cooled and graphite moderated. Stage two should come

[2] It may be of passing interest to note that the supply of electric power in Britain is nationalized and is transported largely by means of a "grid," a network of high tension cables covering most of the country and allowing supply to be fitted to demand by shunting power from one place to another. The grid is especially suitable for nuclear power, since it will allow the new stations to be run to capacity nearly all the time irrespective of fluctuations in the demand, thus saving the maximum amount of coal.

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into operation about 1965. It is possible that in these reactors ordinary water under pressure will be used as coolant and moderator, with the water itself possibly forming steam for the turbine or more probably remaining in a closed cycle under pressure and handing on its heat through a "heat exchanger." It is more likely, however, that they will be of the sodium-graphite type in which molten metallic sodium is used as coolant and graphite as moderator. This system allows the temperature to be higher, thereby increasing efficiency at the turbine end. Both these systems require enriched fuel, and the enrichment will come initially from the plutonium produced in stage one; later they will provide their own. True breeding will come in stage three, which will be reached in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Four systems, all operating on enriched fuel, are being investigated for this stage.

I have mentioned these rather detailed technical matters chiefly to show how seriously the whole matter is being taken in Britain and what efforts we are making to ensure that nuclear energy is available as soon as possible and on as large a scale as possible. Whatever we do, there is likely to be for some years a growing gap that will have to be filled by imported oil or possibly coal. How large this gap will be is difficult to estimate, for it represents the difference between the two much larger quantities of demand and supply, each of which is difficult to assess accurately. But one would have to be very optimistic to assume that a gap will not exist, and even if by some series of miracles we had a small surplus of coal we could easily sell it abroad.

The British view of atomic energy, then, is governed by our need for supplies of power in the near future. This, more than military requirements, is what counts, especially as we seem likely soon to have a hydrogen bomb to test. Once that is achieved we shall, as it were, have made the team and can relax a bit.

III

The international aspect of nuclear energy is twofold. There are, first, the negotiations based on the rather pathetic hope that somehow or other a disarmament agreement can be reached which will remove the fear of a bombing war; and second, the projects designed to assist nations in obtaining the benefits of

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peaceful atomic energy, or to help them to help themselves. These two matters are to some extent interlocking.

On the face of it, the existence of important nuclear power stations in many countries makes the international control of atomic weapons even harder than it otherwise would be. Inevitably there will be substantial amounts of fissile (bomb) material in each country, some in storage, some in use in reactors and some in separation plants which extract the plutonium from uranium that has been used in reactors. It would require very careful inspection to make sure that small amounts were not kept back for military use. But is this really the point? The three principal nations—the United States, Soviet Russia and Britain—have had unrestricted and uninspected use of fissile material for so long that even if an inspection were accepted now no one would ever be able to prove that they were not holding back undisclosed stores. What was feasible enough in 1946, when the Baruch plan for atomic control was discussed in the United Nations, is feasible no longer.

The situation is made worse by the invention of the hydrogen bomb, which (in principle) escapes the need for fissile material, and so the controls of the Baruch plan. True, the hydrogen bomb probably needs something like an ordinary uranium-plutonium bomb to start it, and apparently natural uranium is used around it. But natural uranium is impossible to control in the relatively small amounts needed; at most it is an amount that could be carried by an airplane. As for the atomic bomb which serves as the fuse, what hopes has one of accounting accurately for small quantities of fissile material? Yet even two or three unsuspected hydrogen bombs could make an enormous difference in a war. The mere threat might well be enough to enable an aggressor to get his way, for though the threat might be a pure bluff, no one could prove that it was not. The only safeguard against such action is the fear of reprisal, which means that the other side not only has hydrogen bombs but is known to have them.

Since it would be impossible, even after inspection, to prove that any of the three Powers was not in secret possession of the wherewithal to make a few hydrogen bombs, is it worth attempting a paper disarmament and subsequent inspection with the irritation and waste of efficiency which such an inspection would inevitably produce? No control or inspection

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can prevent bombs of either kind being made after the war has started, since there will be plenty of plutonium in the reactors. By apparent disarmament one would lessen the important deterrent effect which hydrogen bombs now offer, there would be a very strong temptation to cheat, and the nation which did so would gain an enormous advantage.

Since, as I believe, it is impossible to have effective interdiction of atomic bombs, it seems to me better to have none at all. From the standpoint of the Big Three Powers, I think this is true whether nuclear power spreads to the rest of the world or not. In fact it will spread and the danger of its misuse will thereby increase. This is not to assume that the rest of the world is less trustworthy than Britain, Russia and the United States, but simply that the number of chances for suicidal recklessness is multiplied. Here inspection might do some good because there could be inspection from the start. But again, nothing can prevent bombs being made after war has started, if the method of making them is known. For some time, perhaps, the technology can be kept secret, but not, one would think, for decades. This is the least satisfactory aspect of the spread of nuclear power among the peoples of the world, but it seems to be a risk which cannot be avoided. It is not, perhaps, a very large one.

IV

There are three main proposals for assisting nations to acquire atomic power. They are based respectively on the United Nations, on O.E.E.C. (Organization for European Economic Coöperation) and on the group of six nations in Western Europe which form the European Iron and Steel Community (France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and Italy).

The United Nations scheme is due to President Eisenhower, who nearly three years ago offered the loan of a considerable amount of fissile material to promote the use of atomic energy by nations that are without it. Britain and the Soviet Union have since offered to contribute smaller amounts. All these contributions were offered subject to restrictions to prevent their misuse. Last April the U.N. published a draft statute for an International Atomic Energy Agency designed to further the peaceful uses of atomic energy. As approved by a 12-nation committee, including Britain, the United States and Russia,

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the Agency would encourage research and development; act as an intermediary for the supply of materials, equipment and services by one member to another; make provision for such materials and services, and acquire plant and facilities where necessary; arrange for the exchange of scientists and information; formulate standards of health and safety; and establish safeguards to ensure that materials, equipment, services and information made available shall not be used for military purposes. An international inspectorate is to be established with the right to enter the territories of any member state. The inspectors will have "access at all times to all places, persons and data necessary to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied, and fissionable products" to determine whether there is compliance with the measures against military use and hazards to health. The inspection does not cover all atomic energy stations but only those which use material supplied by the Agency. Provision is made for preventing unilateral seizure of material from which a bomb could be made, but it is hard to see how this can be effective in the case of an all-out war between major Powers. It might conceivably act as some kind of check if two small Powers quarreled; at least it would provide a justification for external interference.

This proposal will shortly be discussed in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is very interesting that Russia is apparently prepared to accept this amount of inspection, even though it is probably less than the United States would have liked. From the British point of view, these proposals are welcome, since they would leave us free to develop our own scheme from our own resources. The Agency might well be very helpful to smaller nations who wish, as many do, to set up reactors, either to overcome an all-round shortage of power, or to obtain power in inaccessible places where the cost of transporting conventional fuels is prohibitive. The Agency is a genuine attempt to help the smaller or less developed countries, and is certainly to be encouraged.

Next in extent of international coverage come the proposals of O.E.E.C. These would establish jointly an isotope separation plant to produce U-235, a chemical separation plant for irradiated fuels, a heavy-water plant and prototype and testing reactors. That is to say, the O.E.E.C. countries propose to establish those facilities which would be of value to a nation planning

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its own atomic energy industry; apparently the project does not include the actual working reactors intended for the large-scale production of power. Some of these facilities, notably the isotope separation plant, are very costly and therefore suitable objects of joint effort. However, the details of the construction of an isotope separating plant are still secret, and it is not clear whether either the United States or Britain is prepared to make the necessary disclosure.

There may also be some doubt as to whether a large-scale separation plant is economic even for a group of nations. In the long run, the necessary enrichment of natural uranium will be accomplished by adding plutonium, made by breeding from uranium, or uranium-233, made by breeding from thorium. Reactors containing enriched fuel can undoubtedly "breed," but if only a small amount of enriched fuel is available to start with the process will be slow in producing results. It is a delicate exercise in nuclear engineering and in economic prediction to decide whether such a plant is worthwhile as an interim measure. While it is too early to say whether the O.E.E.C. plan will in fact be helpful to the progress of nuclear energy in Europe, its members will apparently be allowed plenty of freedom. The worst it is likely to do is to spend some money rather unwisely.

The third proposal, though it covers fewer nations, is much more drastic. "Euratom," as it is called, involves setting up a commission with considerable executive power. It would have first claim on nuclear fuels produced by the six member countries and their possessions (*e.g.* the Belgian Congo) and these materials would remain under its ownership and control. Euratom would have the duty of ensuring equal access to these materials and, in case of scarcity, of distributing them in proportion to needs. In fine, it would have monopolistic control over nuclear materials and so over the production of nuclear energy in the six nations, and in any others which chose to join the organization.

Associated with this plan is a proposal for the removal of all customs barriers between the six countries and the creation of a common tariff, with related provisions to prevent the fixing of prices, arrangements to divide the market or similar practices. It is significant that these two proposals are being considered together. The degree of control which Euratom would exert represents an infringement of sovereignty comparable to that implied by a common customs union. Both are indeed sub-

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stantial steps toward political federation. From the British point of view, Euratom has few attractions, except perhaps as a unit within the O.E.E.C. group. We are likely to be more dependent on nuclear power during the next generation than the six Powers, both because our needs are greater and because by our own efforts we are much more advanced in technical knowledge and in actual construction. We are reasonably well off for raw materials, although the sources—Canada, South Africa and Australia—are not under British control. There would be no advantage for us in buying through Euratom. On the other hand, the control which Euratom might exert could easily be disastrous to the advance of British industry, as, for example, if the Continental countries wished to expand rapidly at a time when supplies were scarce.

We have adequate technical, engineering and economic strength to develop our own industry, and indeed even to export to other nations. The only possible advantage to us in Euratom would be to share in a large isotope separation plant. Even this is extremely doubtful, both because it is uncertain whether such a plant will ever really pay for itself, and because, if it does, we might better enlarge our existing installation at Capenhurst.

The Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva a year ago shed a flood of light on the technical problems of nuclear power development; the need for associations of nations is markedly less than it was before. As knowledge increases, it will be found that the construction of reactors is not quite such a formidable proposition as it had appeared. A chemical separation plant may be harder, but even here the difference between originating and copying is enormous.

We come back to where this article began. An adequate supply of power is the life blood of a nation and, unless one is prepared for a true federation with a complete merging of sovereignty, it is one of those few vital things which cannot be dealt with internationally.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES

By Matthew J. Kust

AMONG many pressing contemporary problems are two which receive much attention but without adequate recognition of the possibility that they may be related. These problems are, one, the insufficient economic growth of the underdeveloped countries of the free world, and, two, the agricultural surpluses of the free world, primarily those in the United States. Approached separately, they have remained insoluble; but a new coördinated approach might help to solve both. Aid to underdeveloped countries in the form of agricultural surpluses might enable them to progress economically at an even faster rate than would be possible under the forced-draft methods of the Russians and Chinese; and at the same time the crisis of agricultural surpluses in America and other countries of the free world would be alleviated.

II

In the early stages of economic development large expenditures are necessary to provide basic public facilities and services such as roads, bridges, docks, power, water supply, irrigation, housing, health and education without which there can be no satisfactory agricultural and industrial development. The creation of this essential substructure, accounting for more than half the cost of initial economic development, requires largely domestic manpower and materials and relatively small amounts of capital goods and technical assistance from abroad. The basic deficiency in our present aid program, which emphasizes capital goods and technical assistance, is that it does not sufficiently concern itself with the financing of this substructure of public facilities and services without which the assistance offered cannot be effectively absorbed.

In most underdeveloped countries at least 70 percent of the people derive their livelihood from agriculture. Perhaps 25 percent or more constitute a manpower surplus, unemployed or underemployed a good part of the year. The recent All-India Agricultural Labour Enquiry revealed that the country's 35 million landless laborers were employed only six months each year.

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This lack of full employment of the country's manpower prevents maximum production of goods and services and keeps the people poor, depriving many of even the minimum requirements for a healthy and satisfactory existence.

Agricultural development, though vital to economic growth, cannot alone solve the problem. Greater employment outside agriculture is essential. That is one reason why the people of underdeveloped countries are so intent on industrialization. Yet the development of basic industries like iron and steel, minerals, chemicals, electrical goods and heavy machinery, while requiring large amounts of capital, provides comparatively little employment. Moreover, such investment produces no consumer goods in the first instance although it is essential to sound economic growth. The development of basic industries must therefore be balanced with projects requiring a large labor force, thereby utilizing the idle manpower of the country. Here the economic plans of underdeveloped countries usually falter for lack of domestic finance, inducing them to undertake programs much too modest for a satisfactory rate of economic growth.

Perhaps no more than 20 percent of the cost of development plans is for capital goods and technical assistance from outside the country. In spite of the heavy emphasis on industrialization in India's Second Five-Year Plan, it is estimated that only $2.8 billions out of a total outlay of $15 billions will be required for machinery and equipment from outside the country.

The limits to the type of foreign aid we are now providing are indicated by the fact that Asian countries have expended only about 50 percent of the economic and technical assistance made available to them since 1950. India is carrying about $200,000,000 of unexpended foreign aid, mostly American, from the First to the Second Five-Year Plan. There are several reasons for this, but certainly one is an inability to absorb the proffered aid in its present form. The large amounts of obligated but unexpended foreign aid funds are an annual source of acridity between the foreign aid administrators and Congress.

Since building and construction require primarily unskilled or semi-skilled labor and indigenous building materials it seems paradoxical that underdeveloped countries are unable to utilize their surplus manpower and domestic materials to do the job. Yet it is the inability to utilize these abundantly available resources which constitutes the main barrier to economic develop-

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ment. The problem exists because neither of the available methods of achieving full employment is feasible from both the political and economic standpoints.

The underdeveloped country could resort to deficit financing of the construction required for economic development. In most countries this would result in uncontrolled inflation. The newly employed worker would spend most of his wages on food and cloth and, since these commodities are not generally available in sufficient quantities in underdeveloped countries, prices would soar. This can be illustrated by the situation in India.

There are at least 25 million man-years of surplus manpower in India today. It would require about $1.5 billions in wages to employ fully this manpower for the economic development of the country.[1] The recent All-India Agricultural Labour Enquiry found that agricultural labor families spend 85 percent of their incomes on food. According to the National Sample Surveys, over 60 percent of all consumption expenditures in India are on food. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that two-thirds of the newly created wage incomes would be spent on food and cloth—about 50 percent or more on food and about 15 percent on cloth. India could not safely attempt full employment through deficit financing unless she was assured of at least 13.5 million tons of additional food annually.[2] As for cloth, India is already importing raw cotton for her present needs.

Her own agricultural production cannot be counted on for an increase of such magnitude. India's food production rose by 11 million tons during the First Five-Year Plan, but half or more is attributable to a series of unusually good monsoons. The Second Five-Year Plan calls for an increase of 10 million tons, most of which is required merely to keep pace with the population growth. Moreover, the level of consumption of a large segment of the agricultural population is presently so low that much of any increase in production will be absorbed within the agricultural economy and will not be available to meet the demand of the new wage earners. Thus it is apparent that in India, for example, deficit financing of economic development designed to bring about rapid full employment is not economically feasible unless a sufficient supply of food and cloth is assured from outside.

[1] Based on a wage of a rupee (or 21 cents) per day, the average pay of unskilled labor in India, and a 300-day work year.

[2] Computation based on wheat at $2.00 per bushel and reckoned in long tons. Since wheat sells for less than $2.00 per bushel in India, the 13.5 million tons estimate is probably low.

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The alternative method is heavy taxation of the agricultural economy. Russia and Japan have demonstrated, in differing contexts, that this method will permit rapid economic development. China is emulating this pattern. Unfortunately, neither Japan, Russia nor China has employed this method within a democratic framework. That it is economically feasible is perhaps not in doubt. Through effective taxation it is possible to deny the farmer freedom of consumption of his own agricultural production in order to provide the food and fibre supply to meet the demand of the new wage earners. What is in doubt is whether this is politically practicable in a democracy, especially where the electorate consists primarily of farmers.

The limitations thus imposed on the underdeveloped democracies are disturbing. India produces only 65 million tons of food grains for a population of 375 million people.[3] China is allegedly producing 175 million tons of food grains for about 580 million people. During her first few Five-Year Plans Russia was producing 70 to 100 million tons of food grains and had a population less than half that of India. Yet both Russia and China have found it necessary to use harsh measures to hold back consumption in agriculture and appropriate the surpluses for purposes of economic development. Thus India not only finds herself at an initial economic disadvantage but is trying to achieve economic development within a democratic framework in which it is not politically acceptable to resort to similar measures. Whether due to economic or political factors the result is that India today is taxing only about 1 percent of her agricultural output for economic development whereas China is appropriating over 25 percent of her agricultural output for this purpose.

The less advanced countries seeking economic development within a democratic framework are thus faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, heavy taxation of agriculture for purposes of economic development is not politically feasible; on the other, deficit financing is economically unsound because of insufficient resources of food and cloth.

III

If, as I believe, the principal barrier to economic development of most underdeveloped countries is insufficient supplies of food

[3] The comparative figures for India and China include coarse grains, gram, pulses, tubers, and other human food crops. The figures for Russia include only cereals.

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and cloth, the economic prosperity of many other countries of the free world is imperiled by quite a different hazard—the problem of agricultural surpluses. The situation in the United States is perhaps the most serious and intractable. Many people fear that our depressed agricultural economy could well pull us into another depression, with dire consequences for the political fortunes of the free world. Attempts to move these surpluses into world markets have merely tended to exacerbate foreign relations between countries possessing surpluses in the same commodity.

If the analysis to this point is sound it reveals a bitter irony. Pursuing independent solutions, one area of the free world has been unable to solve the peril to economic prosperity presented by agricultural surpluses and another part of the free world has been unable to solve the problem of inadequate economic development because of insufficient agricultural production. Yet if the two problems are placed side by side they reveal an opportunity for mutual solution and economic coöperation. The advanced countries of the world are already committed to a policy of long-range economic support to underdeveloped areas. The situation therefore appears to call for a new type of foreign aid which would first of all assure underdeveloped countries a sufficient supply of food and cloth essential to domestic finance of their economic development, and then concern itself with the capital goods and technical assistance also needed from abroad. The two types of assistance—the basic consumer goods required for full employment of the country's manpower and the capital goods and technical assistance to facilitate industrialization of the country—should, however, proceed *pari passu* for a balanced development effort. Both are essential but the former appears to be the more critical in most underdeveloped countries.

Efforts by the United States to utilize farm surpluses in the underdeveloped countries have not so far been of this nature. Existing legislation[4] does not aim primarily to lift levels of economic development in the recipient countries, but is designed chiefly to enable the United States to sell surpluses against payment in foreign currencies. In cases where the proceeds are devoted to economic development, ill-advised and enervating restrictions are imposed, such as deposit of the proceeds to the account of the United States Treasury for controlled release. More-

[4] Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

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over, these practices have frequently operated to displace sales by other countries with agricultural surpluses, thereby creating political problems both for us and the recipient country. Agricultural surpluses have also been used, of course, to alleviate food shortages due to famine, floods and other adversities, but these emergency measures add little to the positive economic development of the country.

The objective of foreign aid with agricultural surpluses should be to supply the underdeveloped country with the food and cloth needed to achieve full employment of its idle manpower as fast as this can be organized administratively. Such an aid program would be possible only under a long-range commitment after the pattern of the Marshall Plan. It would be unfair and probably impossible to ask the underdeveloped countries to launch a program of deficit financing which would be ruinous without an assured supply of food and cloth for a period of years. A minimum commitment of five years, the usual planning period, would be desirable, with a policy statement in the legislation that the program would be continued thereafter if the underdeveloped countries had demonstrated the success of the program.

Ideally, a plan of foreign aid based on agricultural surpluses would embrace all the countries of the free world. The advanced countries would be expected to transfer their agricultural surpluses to the underdeveloped countries on a grant basis, while the underdeveloped countries with agricultural surpluses would have to be offered a *quid pro quo*. Burma and Egypt, for example, could not be expected to join such a program unless they were assured that the use of their present rice and cotton surpluses would redound to their benefit. The countries of the free world might establish a Commodity Exchange Union which would operate to absorb and reallocate the agricultural surpluses of the underdeveloped countries for their mutual economic development. American wheat could be exchanged for Egyptian cotton and the cotton delivered to India for her enhanced economic development effort. In this manner Egypt would receive a greater supply of wheat, which she must normally import, and India a greater supply of cotton.

An industrialized country such as Japan could also be included in the operation of the Commodity Exchange Union. Many countries in Asia do not yet possess a sufficiently developed textile industry to meet their cloth requirements. Burma is such a coun-

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try; she imports finished cloth. In this case raw cotton could be supplied to Japan for manufacture into cloth for Burma. Japan could take Burma's rice in payment for her manufacturing services. The raw cotton would be furnished free of cost to Burma under the foreign aid program. Triangular arrangements of this nature could form the basis of the Commodity Exchange Union. In fact, such triangular arrangements are already beginning to evolve spontaneously in Asia to meet the problem. The recent barter agreement among the Philippines, Burma and Japan involving sugar, rice and manufactured goods is an example.

It is not possible to determine the precise magnitude of the proposed aid without a comprehensive country-by-country study of the food and cloth requirements for full employment and the agricultural productive capacities of the countries with surpluses. The free world could well absorb its existing agricultural surpluses and find production insufficient to give full support to all the underdeveloped countries wanting to participate in the program. Rice might create such a problem because of the consumption habits of many people in Asia and other underdeveloped areas. It is also possible that the supply of cotton might become tight. Consumption habits may change quickly to better food grains and more cloth as the underemployed earn larger incomes. Even on the basis of existing consumption patterns, India would theoretically require a billion dollars worth of food and cloth from abroad annually to permit full employment of her surplus manpower through sound deficit financing.

Assuring an adequate supply of food and cloth would not eliminate the need for capital goods and technical assistance. In fact, the need for these forms of aid might be expected to increase as the tempo of economic development increased. It might not, however, be necessary to meet this increased need for capital goods and technical assistance through foreign aid. Once the underdeveloped country demonstrated the vigorous economic growth that is possible with an assured supply of food and cloth it would be in a stronger economic position to borrow from the World Bank and other international financial institutions.[5] In fact, these institutions might for the first time be able to operate

[5] In the international discussions involving the financing of the Aswan Dam, the World Bank was disturbed about the inflationary propensities of Egypt's development plans which might make it difficult to service the loan. Concern on this point would have been greatly relieved under a foreign aid program which could alleviate the dangers of inflation and assure Egypt a market for her vital cotton crop.

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on the scale they were intended to function. It is not unreasonable to expect that the capital goods and technical assistance required could be obtained without recourse to grants.

Private investment and technical assistance would also be expected to flow more freely into the underdeveloped countries. At present there are three important deterrents to this form of aid: (a) inadequate development of public services, (b) lack of a broad market for manufactured goods, and (c) the uncertainty of the survival of democratic political institutions. All three deterrents would be substantially diminished by rapid internal economic growth made possible by foreign aid with agricultural surpluses. Although we should not assume that no additional aid would be needed to provide capital goods and technical assistance, these can be provided primarily in the form of easily serviceable loans rather than grants.

A salutary effect of such foreign aid would be its tendency to broaden the market for manufactured goods within the underdeveloped country. As we have seen, approximately one-third of the new wages would be spent on commodities other than food and cloth. With their increased earnings from full employment, workers would soon diversify their consumption toward bicycles, sewing machines, plastic products and other machine-made goods. In the beginning there might be great unfulfilled demand for these goods and prices would rise, but this kind of inflation should be welcome because it would be a powerful stimulant to domestic and foreign private investment. As long as inflation can be controlled with respect to basic consumer goods like food and cloth the underdeveloped country need not be unduly concerned about inflation involving manufactured goods.

The countries which export capital goods, such as Japan, Germany and England, whose prosperity and political stability depend upon foreign markets for their manufactures, would also benefit as demand increased and foreign exchange became more available. The anticipated economic growth of the underdeveloped countries under a foreign aid program based on agricultural surpluses would provide the best assurance of export markets for the capital goods of the industrialized countries. It cannot be overemphasized that the aim of the suggested aid program is to increase sharply the tempo of economic growth in underdeveloped areas; and this in turn will increase the demand for both agricultural and manufactured commodities from abroad.

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How long may an aid program based on agricultural surpluses be expected to last? The objective of such foreign aid may be considered fulfilled when the underdeveloped country has created full and permanent employment outside agriculture for the majority of its labor force and has developed agricultural production adequate to supply the food and fibre requirements of that labor force. In some countries this objective may never be fulfilled. In others the achievement of this goal may be made more difficult by tremendous population growth. Nevertheless it would seem reasonable to expect these conditions to be achieved within a generation or so, say 25 years, in most underdeveloped countries. During the latter part of the period it could be expected that the need of food and fibre supplies from abroad would decrease steadily as development of land and water resources and agricultural techniques give rise to greater agricultural production.

IV

Many objections will be found to a program of foreign aid with agricultural surpluses. Among them may be these:

(1) Underdeveloped countries would hesitate to accept such foreign aid even under a five-year commitment for fear of becoming economically subservient to foreign countries. They would fear that once they became dependent on large supplies of agricultural commodities from abroad they would be vulnerable to pressures for political and military alliances.

These are serious problems from the standpoint of the recipient country. A partial solution might be to accumulate at the outset a stockpile of agricultural commodities within the underdeveloped country. This would give the recipient country a measure of security in the event of delays in delivery or termination of the agreement by either party. The availability of adequate storage facilities might present a problem. Although projects are under way in many countries for construction of storage facilities, they will require time for completion and may not be sufficient for this purpose. As an interim measure the United States Government could lease to the underdeveloped countries the Liberty and Victory Ships in which some of our agricultural surpluses are stored to serve as temporary granaries in their ports. Further, many of the fears of the underdeveloped countries might be allayed if the program were genuinely international.

(2) The organizational and administrative capacity of under-

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developed countries is not adequate to step up the tempo of economic development by utilizing large quantities of agricultural surpluses.

It is difficult to estimate how quickly the underdeveloped countries could organize for such foreign aid. Different results would doubtless obtain in different countries. In the case of India, it would not appear unreasonable to expect 10 million of her idle manpower to be brought into full employment by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in March 1961. Perhaps she could surpass this goal. Such increased employment would achieve a very satisfactory rate of economic growth. In contrast, India's present Five-Year Plan, for which finance is not yet assured, is expected to create only about eight million jobs outside agriculture, which will barely absorb the additions to the labor force due to population growth during the period. To deny that underdeveloped countries are capable of increasing the tempo of economic development is unacceptable without admitting defeat from the start. If China can organize for such increased economic activity, so can India once the financial obstacles are mitigated or removed, and providing technical assistance is available.

(3) The problem of agricultural surpluses would merely be postponed and, perhaps, even aggravated.

It would probably be inadvisable to permit American agriculture to exceed its present level of production merely for the sake of the aid program. But it could be reasonably expected that domestic requirements for food and cloth will increase over the next 25 years as our population increases, thereby absorbing today's excess production or reducing it to manageable proportions. Moreover, the increased economic activity in the underdeveloped areas stimulated by the aid program should create permanent markets for some of the present surplus agricultural production. In the world as a whole, agricultural production must obviously be increased substantially in the years ahead.

(4) The existing markets for agricultural commodities would be disturbed and undermined by such an aid program.

This objection assumes that national surpluses represent overproduction in the world at large. This cannot, however, be the case when so many people of the world are undernourished. The Russians have been quick to exploit the irony of our policy of retrenchment in agricultural production while much of Asia lives on the verge of starvation.

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The people of the underdeveloped areas are undernourished because they are not employed productively enough to be able to purchase adequate quantities of food. The surpluses are, therefore, the result of a low level of economic activity in large parts of the world. A foreign aid program designed to increase consumption of food and cloth would augment rather than undermine the markets for agricultural commodities. This stepped-up level of consumption could create new, permanent markets for the free world's agricultural production.

(5) Underdeveloped countries would be encouraged to place undue emphasis on industrial rather than agricultural development and thus become dangerously dependent on food and fibres from abroad.

The objective of foreign aid with agricultural surpluses is to fill a temporary need due to inability of an underdeveloped country to increase its agricultural production rapidly enough. There is no reason to assume that agricultural development would be ignored. It must be remembered that agricultural development is vitally dependent upon such facilities as roads, irrigation, health and education which the suggested aid program is designed to make possible. Ultimately, therefore, it would assist the underdeveloped country toward greater self-sufficiency in food and fibres.

Although the political, administrative and international obstacles may be formidable, a substantial program of foreign aid with agricultural surpluses appears to be sound and eminently desirable. But the validity of the argument should not be impugned merely because the scale of the program may seem too large. It is possible that the agricultural surpluses available may prove to be less than expected or that the problems involved in a large-scale program are more substantial than they appear. But the approach that has been outlined has the advantage that it can, if necessary, be undertaken on a more modest scale and can be terminated, given due notice, if it proves unworkable. The important point to be recognized is that agricultural surpluses can be used to stimulate a sounder and more rapid economic development than is now taking place in the less advanced countries of the free world.

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FRANCE LOOKS AT HER ALLIANCES

By Jacques Soustelle

BETWEEN phases of armed conflict and phases of relaxation the cold war actually has never ceased since the end of World War II. The tension between the two great blocs takes a great variety of forms depending on the place and the time; but all feed the central fire. From the Berlin blockade to the tension between Egypt and Israel, or from the fall of North Vietnam to the riots in Algeria, events with no common denominator have joined to produce the same result.

France, a European country anchored on the Atlantic, facing the United States and Britain and neighbor to Germany, but also with interests and responsibilities in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean and in Africa, has been in a most dangerous position ever since 1945. In Europe, the tough logic of the cold war led her allies to force her to accept the rearmament of her recent enemy. In Asia, she endured the shock of Communist expansion for eight years only to find herself, in the end, driven not simply from the territories conquered by the Communists but from others also. Finally, in North Africa she is fighting at this very moment. In fact, she is the only one of the former warring nations which has almost never stopped fighting since V-J Day.

Without exaggeration one can say that France has been the vanguard of the Western world since 1945, not because she has sought to play an aggressive rôle but because strategic and political facts have placed her in eruptive positions. As is often the case with vanguards, she has received the hardest blows, and sometimes she feels that her sacrifices are not duly appreciated by her partners. Like a patrol in an advanced line she feels isolated and abandoned.

I should like to conduct the following analysis on this double level, the level of facts and the level of collective psychology.

II. RETREAT IN THE FAR EAST

After eight years of bloody and ruinous war the Geneva agreements authorized the division of the Indochinese peninsula into two separate states: the Communist state of Viet Minh in the north and the "democratic" state—if this word can be applied to the dictatorship of Ngo Dinh Diem—of Vietnam in the south.

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It should be noted that since 1945 this division had figured in agreements made, against the wishes of General de Gaulle's government, between the United States, Great Britain and the China of Chiang Kai-shek. Disregarding French warnings, Washington and London agreed to divide Indochina into two parts. The British, who were to control the south, allowed the French forces to take over again in this area without too much delay; but the north, which President Roosevelt had entrusted to the Chinese army, was able for many months to evade the re-establishment of French authority. Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Party profited from these months to organize their power. In this way, at the very moment when the Japanese collapse brought peace, there were created the conditions of a new war which was to end in 1954 in the division of the peninsula.

Be that as it may, the Geneva agreements signed by Premier Mendès-France recorded more or less the situation as it existed after the fall of Dienbienphu. They recognized Communist control of the north; while in the south, France retained the duty of guaranteeing order and democratic freedom in the part of the territory which, in theory or in fact, was under the control of a régime still headed by the Emperor Bao Dai.

A firm policy might have been based on these agreements. Since Viet Minh had been recognized as a sovereign state in the north, France could (and, it seems, should) have established as normal relations as possible with it, particularly in economic and cultural matters, so as to safeguard the maximum of her interests and investments there and provide for the future. In the south, France was to supervise the consolidation of a truly democratic régime, to contribute to its political and economic development and to make agreements with it for honest coöperation on an equal state-to-state footing.

By an odd paradox, the Mendès-France government which had signed the Geneva agreements showed itself almost entirely uninterested in putting them into effect. From the beginning a grave misunderstanding developed. It seemed to be assumed that the agreements had left France with no rights at all in South Vietnam. At the same time, nothing was done to extract from the agreements their potential benefits regarding relations with Viet Minh. Each time an attempt was made—notably by the Sainteny mission at Hanoi—to make the most of the Geneva text and to establish correct relations with Ho Chi Minh, a storm of recrimi-

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nation arose. In Saigon, France was bitterly accused of inclining to support the Communist régime; and these suspicions were echoed in Washington. In Paris, meanwhile, right-wing opinion became worried. Soon the attempt was practically abandoned.

Even though it was not in line with the agreements of 1954, this policy of reserve toward Viet Minh—indeed, almost of rupture of relations with it—could have been justified if it had been balanced by a reinforcement of relations with the southern state. But the opposite happened. One might even say that, on the whole, France since Geneva has been worse treated at Saigon than at Hanoi. The Diem government has carried out a series of hostile acts toward France, her interests and persons under her jurisdiction. Soldiers and officers whose sacrifices had, after all, made possible the very existence of this state have been spared no insult. Vietnam quit the franc area. In both the economic and the cultural sphere President Diem's attitude has been entirely uncoöperative. In the political sphere he has established a dictatorship, violating the pledges which France gave the people when she recognized Vietnam's independence.

The grave part of this is that on the basis of the information available in Paris the South Vietnamese seem to have adopted this attitude at the instigation and with the support, if not of the Government of the United States, at least of certain of its officials. It almost seems as if these had conceived the project, once France had been weakened by a long war, of driving her from Vietnam. This impression is strengthened when one studies the new orientation of commercial and investment policy in Vietnam.

It would be absurd and dangerous to deny that these facts have had serious effects on French opinion. The Communists drove France from Tonkin, it is thought, in open war; she was faced with declared enemies with whom it was possible to make peace and find limited bases of coöperation in a realistic spirit. In turn, she was chased from the south by people with whom she had been fighting shoulder to shoulder and on whose behalf she had made very heavy human and financial sacrifices; they drove France out in an unelegant way with the help of her Western allies. This explains the strange phenomenon that many Frenchmen feel more bitterness toward South Vietnam and the United States than toward North Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.

I am describing here the psychological facts as they exist. Political reality is interwoven with ideas and sentiments. How-

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ever, without being emotional one must say that the Western alliance has not proved favorable to France in the Far East. It is not surprising that many Frenchmen question the value of a relationship which leads to such results and that they ask themselves whether France in her capacity of vanguard is not being considered by her allies as expendable.

III. STRUGGLE IN NORTH AFRICA

After M. Mendès-France came into power the situation in North Africa began to evolve rapidly. He faced two urgent pieces of business there: Tunisia and Morocco. Obviously he was not responsible for the policy applied by previous governments and had to make the best of things as he found them. It would be unjust to blame him for this. His policy, or rather what one might call his basic guiding idea, was to replace the French protectorate over these two states by a contractual régime to be established by negotiations with their qualified representatives.

True to the slightly dramatic style which he favors, M. Mendès-France immediately set off for Tunisia by plane, delivered a speech at Carthage on July 31, 1954, and announced that Tunisia was to make ready for "internal autonomy" within the framework of agreements to be reached with France. He presided personally over the negotiation of these agreements, which lasted over six months and besides being extremely tedious was often bitter and emotional. In detailed and very precise terms these agreements divided Franco-Tunisian relations into three sectors: a purely Tunisian domain where local sovereignty would prevail fully, with no other limitation than the popular will; a French domain, in which France would have charge of external representation and defense; and a mixed domain, including supervision of internal order and particularly the police. In this latter field Tunisia would gain full independence by stages and according to a fixed schedule in proportion as she gradually took over French institutions and services.

This treaty was debated freely and on an equal footing between France and Tunisia, and was duly signed and ratified by both sides. It rubbed out every trace of "colonialism" in Franco-Tunisian relations. It opened an era and set an example. Similar agreements were bound to be concluded with Morocco. Having been unjustly criticized for her so-called rigidity toward problems of overseas territories, France now was able to give, to the con-

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trary, proof of her imagination and liberalism. It is disconcerting that the Franco-Tunisian agreements should have been so little noticed by those who are in the habit of assailing French "colonialism." All men of good will ought to recognize that it was the spirit of these agreements that made it possible to solve peacefully and in the best interest of all the irritating problems brought to a head by the need to transform old colonial structures. Unfortunately the main concern of certain persons seems to be to discredit systematically everything France does in this field.

The profound value of the Franco-Tunisian agreements makes it the more regrettable that they have not been applied in practice; instead they were stripped down and taken to pieces without ever having been tried. This was due to three reasons:

Outside Pressure. The Arab League and those who manipulate it from Cairo could not let an Arab and Moslem state conclude a serious and lasting agreement with the West. Hence the outbreak of the troubles in Morocco, the armed riots in Algeria and the violent campaign of nationalist demagoguery conducted against Habib Bourguiba by his rival, Salah ben Youssef.

Weakness of the Tunisian Government. Prior to this campaign, Bourguiba had hardly proved his qualities as a statesman but had conducted himself rather as a politician during an election campaign. His position is weak, between a dynasty which distrusts him and anarchistic forces which he has unleashed without any certainty of being able to control them. I must point out the important part played here by the trade unions, supported by the American Federation of Labor, which contributed heavily to maintaining Tunisia in a state of near chaos.

Weakness of the French Government. When Mendès-France was overthrown in February 1955 the coalition cabinet of M. Edgar Faure was unable to cope with the problems of North Africa. In the political confusion decisions were made which led to grave consequences, including the restoration of Sultan Mohammed V to the throne in Morocco. After dissolving the National Assembly, the Faure government called general elections and lost them. The new cabinet presided over by M. Guy Mollet endorsed the de facto independence of Morocco and Tunisia, but without settling the remaining problems: the status and indeed the very existence of French residents there (approximately 800,000) and the question of diplomatic and strategic guarantees.

Between the time the Franco-Tunisian negotiations opened in

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August 1954 and the present, the situation in North Africa has gravely deteriorated. Tunisia and Morocco have fallen prey to incessant agitation and have entered a grave economic crisis. Investments have stopped; capital has fled. Insecurity and discrimination have driven French economic and technical groups to leave. The small state of Tunisia, which had been united for a long time, remains relatively well-controlled; but the same cannot be said about Morocco, where the central government owed its authority and even its existence to the French Protectorate. Moreover, the tribes in the interior have stopped paying taxes and obeying the government. The Sherifian Empire is rapidly returning to the state of semi-anarchy that prevailed in the beginning of the century. It was fated that in such an atmosphere the worst instincts should break loose and that mediæval practices which had been checked only by the presence of France should reappear. This explains the kidnappings, extortions and pillaging carried out by gangs of so-called "nationalists" in regions like Oujda, the atrocious massacres of Marrakech and, finally, the growth of anti-Semitism; for one of the first gestures of this young state was to forbid Jewish emigration and hold thousands of Jews in camps. Which, incidentally, goes to show that "independence" and "liberty" should not be confused.

In addition, a new factor of supreme importance appeared in North Africa: the armed riots which broke out in Algeria on November 1, 1954. Because of its scale, its economic and political consequences and the vital character of what is at stake this conflict overshadows all other French problems at present, foreign and domestic. Certain considerations should be underlined.

1. Algeria has been a French territory for 126 years. All her inhabitants (9.5 millions) are French citizens. The Moslem natives (over 8 millions) have the privilege of remaining under the law of the Koran, while Christian and Jewish citizens (1,200,000) come under the French Civil Code. Most of the citizens of French origin, over a million in number, were born in Algeria. Their parents and grandparents already resided there, and they are deeply attached to their land; in their minds, it forms an integral part of France. Contrary to what is often believed, these Europeans in Algeria are not mostly *colons* or landowners. There are only 20,000 landowners or agriculturalists among them. Of these, 7,000 own less than 25 acres apiece and 12,000 less than 250 acres. The large majority which lives in the cities is composed of mer-

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chants, industrialists, workers, officials, doctors, teachers, etc.; they belong essentially to the middle class. Its annual per capita income (Frs. 200,000) is slightly lower than that of a resident of France (Frs. 240,000). They are the people who give cities like Algiers and Oran and even small towns in the interior their typically French character. They are dynamic, hard-working and patriotic. They supplied the French forces fighting alongside the Allied armies in 1944–45 with a relatively enormous contingent —300,000 men, of whom 130,000 were killed or wounded.

2. The Moslem part of the population has risen from about 2,000,000 in 1830 to over 8,000,000 and it increases by 200,000 each year. This very rapid rise is due mainly to the decrease in infant mortality and to the disappearance of almost all endemic diseases, particularly malaria, against which the health services have waged a methodical struggle. Part of the Moslem population—from one and a half to two millions—participates in varying degrees in the life of the European population. As landowners, educators, industrialists, merchants and craftsmen these Moslems, together with the Europeans, form what one might call the "modern economic sector" of Algeria, in all about 3,000,000 people.

The part of the Moslem population enjoying the fewest advantages is the "sector of archaic economy." Here are the small peasants, the *fellahin* who suffer equally from the climate, the imperfect rules of cultivation laid down in the Koran and the inadequacy of traditional agricultural methods. Even though the Moslems own seven-tenths of the arable land and nine-tenths of the flocks, even though the acreage sown to wheat has continuously increased (it has tripled in 100 years), their farming is too inadequate to keep up with the increase in population. Soil erosion ruins almost 100,000 acres of arable land. In the very mountainous parts, such as Kabylia, where the number of inhabitants has more than doubled since 1900, the traditional crops of olives and figs are unable to satisfy the demand. In the central plains the harsh climate severely affects the flocks of the *douar*.

Obviously Algeria's main problem is not only to modernize her agriculture, as the "Sectors of Rural Amelioration" have tried to do since 1946, but in addition to develop her industry, for that alone will create jobs and pay regular wages. This is why more and more importance is attached to the Sahara areas in the south, with their coal, iron, manganese and oil.

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3. To call Algeria a "colony" in the habitual—and depreciatory—sense of the word is to misuse language. There has never been an Algerian state or an Algerian nation. The country is inhabited by an ethnic and linguistic mixture brought into it over a period of two millenniums. It is not an Arab country but essentially Berber, invaded successively by Romans, Vandals, Byzantines and Turks. Far from being exploited by France, it is from France that she has received the main part of her budget (81 percent of the investments in 1955). She sells her agricultural products to France at more than world prices and she exports to France her manpower surplus; over 300,000 workers there send back to Algeria about 35 billion francs every year.

Politically, Algeria is not a "dependent territory" governed in an authoritarian manner by France. She has her elected assemblies and her representation in the French Parliament like any other French province.

4. The armed rebellion which came to a head in November 1954 took in general the form of terrorism. This was directed much more against the Moslem population than against the Europeans. One may count one European to 10 or 15 Moslems killed or mutilated. This seems paradoxical at first glance but it can be explained by the absence of enthusiasm for so-called "nationalism" among the Moslems and by the fact that when the rebels were unable to win people over by persuasion they had to resort to terror. Significantly, today, a year and a half after the outbreak of the rebellion, it is still in the same stage. In other words, it remains in the hands of terrorist gangs; the population as a whole has not rallied to it. It is also significant that in the course of recent months over a thousand Berber villages in Kabylia have taken up arms against the terrorists, as the Berbers of the central Aurès had already done in 1955.

5. Just as the rebellion did not spring from a deep feeling within the native population, so its inspiration, its slogans, its directives and its arms came from abroad. It is directed from Cairo by Mohammed Benbella and his *idara* committee under the control of the Egyptian dictator, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom the terrorists generally refer to as "Big Brother."

Egyptian support takes a variety of forms: radio propaganda from Cairo through the "Voice of the Arabs," which launches appeals for massacre and burning; a constant dispatch of messengers and officers, trained in Cairo or Baghdad, and charged

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to take over the command of certain districts; and a traffic in arms, generally through Libya and the Sahara. Under cover at first, this support has gradually become an admitted fact. Numerous documents which have been published or cited in the French Parliament leave no doubt on all this.

6. The Communist factor has also appeared and has been gaining in importance. At the beginning, its rôle seems to have been rather weak. But since November 1954 Radio Budapest has taken over the usual themes from Radio Cairo in its Arabic language broadcasts and the Algerian Communist Party has made contact with the bands of the Aurès. From 1955 on, doubtless on instruction from outside, the Algerian Communist Party began to come out flatly in favor of "nationalism." This led to its being dissolved by the government. Since then the Communists have formed terrorist bands of their own and also have infiltrated already existing bands. They specialize in sabotage and terrorism in the cities.

In view of the increasing influence of Soviet policy upon the Egyptian dictator one can say that the Algerian conflict is under Communist control on two levels: through terrorist action at the base and through the shaping of strategy at the top. On both levels the nationalists play their part in rousing pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic fanaticism. But there can be no doubt that the management is slipping from their hands and that the conflict they created is becoming plainly and simply an episode of the cold war.

IV. REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN WORLD STRATEGY

The leaders of the Western world may have committed an error with grave consequences when they let themselves be hypnotized by the prospects of a scientific total war, the "push-button war." When the means of destruction become as apocalyptic as those now at the disposal of the Great Powers there is a natural tendency to return to limited wars, that is to say, to conflicts in which it is possible "to pursue one's policy by other means," in the words of Clausewitz, without risking an international catastrophe every time. The "revolutionary war" or "subversive war" which the Communists have conducted against the Western Powers in various parts of the globe since 1945 fills this need. Sometimes it has ended in defeat, as in Greece, sometimes in victory, as in Indochina.

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As stated by Mao Tse-tung, one of its masters, this method of war is not new in principle. It is the Spanish guerrilla against the armies of Napoleon, the fight of the Russian partisans during the Nazi invasion. But in the present world it takes on a special importance, first because the weapons for total destruction make a return to it necessary, but more because any democratic state is automatically at a disadvantage in a conflict of this nature. The extent to which public authority is divided and limited in democratic régimes, the slowness of parliamentary procedures, the restrictions on police action—all are grave impediments in counteracting terrorism. Moreover, the Western armies have adapted themselves with difficulty to the requirements of scientific war in its perfectionized form. They will have still more difficulty in reconverting themselves in order to fight a dispersed and elusive enemy who uses simple weapons, such as rifles and grenades, and vanishes into wild country or goes underground in cities and suburbs.

The guerrilla, as Mao Tse-tung says, lives among the population like a fish in the water. The rebel bands are vitally dependent on the surrounding population for food, money, shelter and, above all, information. Hence terrorism. By fighting the native authorities in the villages and treating them in atrocious ways the rebels seek to frighten the population into obedience. Attacks like those of August 20, 1955, may lead to a complete defeat from a "military" point of view, but they spread terror. Anything will serve to create a myth—the myth of the invincibility of the gangs. Whereas conventional warfare aims to evict an enemy from a certain territory, the revolutionary war aims to break the spirit of the population. In a country like Algeria the goal is to render the situation so tense that the position of the Power in charge becomes literally untenable.

When we try to give the type of war now taking place in North Africa its place in the pattern of world strategy we see that it serves as a substitute for the conventional war which has become too expensive; in place of a hazardous frontal attack it launches a lateral offensive at minimum cost.

It would be extremely dangerous for the Soviet forces to attack directly from east to west across the European peninsula. In view of this, they would find it greatly to their advantage to detach North Africa from the strategic area of the West and to establish there either anarchy or direct Communist rule or

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dictatorships similar to that of Egypt. Thus Europe would be hemmed in from the Baltic to the Atlantic by way of the southern coast of the Mediterranean.

World War II showed that the North African theatre is of vital importance alike to those who wish to preserve Europe or to conquer it. The Russian strategists certainly have not forgotten these lessons but sometimes it seems as if the Western alliance had done so. It is quite clear in this perspective that an attack against France in North Africa is not directed against her alone; it is launched against the entire Western world, which will be threatened with the loss of its naval, air and land bases from Bizerte and Mers-el-Kebir down to Casablanca.

This offensive is evidently connected with the events in the Middle East and primarily with the support the Russians have given to the régime of Colonel Nasser. The goal is to be able to cut the West from its Middle East oil resources and thus threaten it with economic suffocation. This is what leads Moscow to play the neo-imperialist card of the Arab League against the West and against the state of Israel, a true Western outpost in the heart of the Middle East. For Israel and Algeria to fall into pan-Arab hands would create a solid barrier isolating Europe from Arabia and the west coast of Africa. In geopolitical terms, therefore, Israel and Algeria are two pillars of Western strategy; their fall would involve a general collapse.

V. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

How, in the light of these facts, is the Western alliance to be judged from the French point of view? What are its positive and negative aspects?

In the Far East, France has derived no help from the fact that she is an ally of Britain and the United States. As already described, she has found herself ousted even from the south of Indochina under conditions that lead an important part of French public opinion to suspect that the United States actively contributed to this result.

In Europe, NATO (which incidentally includes the whole of Algeria) has certainly been successful in developing an instrument of defense and thus has strengthened French security in the face of potential aggression from the East. But France had to pay a high price: German rearmament. Many Frenchmen are not convinced that it was necessary to pay such a price.

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They point out that the much-feared Soviet frontal attack has not taken place and that the danger seems to have diminished even though there is no German army as yet ready to operate. They believe that atomic weapons alone have averted the threat of a Soviet offensive and that France has been forced to accept an unnecessary sacrifice in the rearmament of her recent foe.

The manner, moreover, in which this sacrifice was pressed upon our country has sown the seeds of lasting bitterness. France's allies called on her to agree that Germany should be given a military force; the threat was made to abandon her if she refused. In spite of the pressure, Parliament rejected the E.D.C. project in a move of genuine national revulsion on August 30, 1954, and it accepted the Paris agreements reluctantly under the urging of M. Mendès-France. The French, perhaps with justification, feel that they know Germany better than their allies do. They believe that a military Germany will all too easily tend to become again a militarist Germany. The high-handed way in which France was pushed into approving German rearmament awoke lasting anxieties. On top of this is a feeling that once again France has been cheated out of her most elementary rights when the Saar, which contributes to her economy in an essential way and which might compensate for her immense losses, is seen to be about to return to Germany.

In North Africa, finally, where France feels that she is playing a vital rôle on behalf of the entire Western world, she has faced apparently inexhaustible complacency by her allies towards Egypt and the Arab League. Responsible British and American quarters have always minimized the important rôle which states like Libya are playing in the traffic of arms for the Algerian rebellion. Articles in American papers—sometimes by correspondents who have not even taken the trouble to spend a few hours in Algeria—have continually described the Algerian situation and the French position there in hostile terms. All this has created the impression in France that our allies across the Channel and across the Atlantic have taken our troubles rather lightly and have accepted without excessive regret the prospect of seeing French Africa—that is to say, French power—collapse, and all without even realizing that their interests and ours are closely linked.

In view of the essentially psychological character of the Algerian conflict nothing would be more unfortunate than to cre-

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ate the impression among the Moslem population that the West is divided. That is just what the rebels tried to do when they paraded at Heliopolis on the day of the massacres, August 20, 1955, shouting "America is with us!" In this respect it is significant that, judging from the press, the attitude of the United States Government immediately following Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal was quite out of line with that taken by the French and British Governments.

Sometimes the political confusion reaches an extraordinary and paradoxical degree. Take, for instance, the decision made in July by the Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Libres, inspired and led by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and by the British trade unions, to accept and subvene the Algerian central trade union, U.G.T.A. In other words, the moral support and money of American and British workers are now going to strengthen an anti-Western and pro-Communist organization. Blunders of this sort are hard to explain.

It is not surprising, in these circumstances, that the Atlantic Alliance has lost much of its credit in France. People cannot see how they can be allied on the European Continent and not allied elsewhere, especially in regions which are of strategic concern to the Continent itself. A restatement of loyalty to the alliance is needed if it is not to lose all its substance. In view of the new menace to peace coming from the East a united front of the three Western Powers is vital.

VI. NEUTRALISM AND "NATIONAL COMMUNISM"

The considerations noted above suffice to explain the great temptation of neutralism for many Frenchmen. No doubt a more profound examination will demonstrate that neutrality is impossible for France. But rational consideration is relatively rare and emotional reactions such as chagrin and resentment often wield more power.

Should France as the result of an unprecedented disaster actually have to quit Algeria, and consequently North Africa and Africa in general, the chances are that she will be thrown back into neutralism and soon after that into Communism. French history over the last 30 years has shown that Communism has no chance at all to gain the leadership of the country so long as national feeling is ranged against it. But if it is able to exploit nationalism it has a good chance to do just that. In the present

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stage, French Communism is ordered by the Soviets to fight against the national interest in Algeria. It goes against the tide and loses influence even among the masses of the workers because it appears as the champion of defeatism and the accomplice of those who are killing our soldiers. But let us suppose Algeria was lost. From that moment the Communist Party with its usual dialectic versatility will have no trouble in falling back into nationalist talk. It will have no shame in exploiting French resentment and rancor and simultaneously will draw new strength from the economic and political chaos created by the defeat. It will turn public opinion against those who lost the Algerian war and at the same time against the Western allies who will be accused of having left France in the lurch. Nor will they be in the least embarrassed by such contradictions.

Thus—and especially if the Kremlin's present orientation persists—we shall see French Communism proclaim itself national; and the influence which it will acquire will be the more irresistible because all other parties will have been discredited by being involved in the defeat. Indeed, one may conclude that the expulsion of France from North Africa will separate her from the Western alliance and throw her into the arms of Russia, somewhat as the defeat of 1940 broke her ties with England and, under the leadership of Vichy, linked her to Germany.

Not just for the sake of France, then, but for the whole Western world must her position in North Africa be maintained. If the tricolor is lowered in Algeria the red flag will soon fly in Paris.

VII. THE PROBLEM OF THE FRENCH RÉGIME

Essentially, of course, the hesitant and uncertain policy of France in Indochina and later in North Africa is due to the instability of French cabinets, their short duration, their internal divisions—in short, to the political system itself.

In the great crises of French history since the beginning of the century France has succumbed whenever, as in 1940, she was unable to overcome the defects of her régime. She has saved herself in spite of the régime, or outside of it, when she could find a Clemenceau or a de Gaulle. But these remedies were temporary only and they did not outlast the danger that had brought them into being. When the threat was over the country fell back into the old track.

Nevertheless it seems as if the very succession of defeats and

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the graveness of the events in North Africa had begun to arouse a sense of responsibility. A young generation is coming of age, and its state of mind is very different from that of its elders. Large sections of public opinion realize that a fundamental reform, in fact an overturn of existing French institutions, is imperative. This is a field where the responsibility rests with the French alone. All we can ask from our friends abroad is to stop showing sympathy for the notorious middle-of-the-road governments which find so much favor in their press and which have presided over the continuous decline of France for the last six years. Can they not be brought to understand that France would not be any less democratic if, like the United States, she were given a strong and stable Executive?

It is possible, of course, that if she is equipped with new and more effective governmental institutions France may be less malleable, more difficult to handle. From 1940 to 1945 Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt often found General de Gaulle difficult. But he was a reliable ally; "one can lean only on something that resists." The Western alliance has suffered from the fact that successive weak French governments have not dared to tell the truth to the United States, as shown in the case of E.D.C. Actually Washington and London can gain only by a strong régime in Paris. The political systems of Great Britain and the United States are not alike; but by different means each manages to achieve stability in democracy. A French system which in turn was different but at the same time had things in common with them, such as the one outlined by General de Gaulle at Bayeux, would achieve the same result. It could be a solid and efficient alliance, no longer perpetually weakened by the instability of one of its members.

The process of changing French political institutions may be brief or long. But it will have time to succeed only if we avoid the collapse which the loss of North Africa would instantly bring about. Everything points up the vital imperative: North Africa, and more specifically Algeria, will decide whether France will be saved or lost to herself and to the free world.

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THE EXPANDING COMMONWEALTH

By Gwendolen M. Carter

THE Commonwealth has always been somewhat of a mystery to those outside it; today it seems also to puzzle a great many who are within. What is the point of an association, ask right-wing conservatives, which shares no common allegiance to the Crown? How can the Commonwealth have cohesion, demand left-wing liberals, without common ideals, openly professed? Both groups, for different reasons, tend to interpret the recent Prime Ministers' Conference as the smile on the face of the Cheshire cat, lingering long after the Commonwealth has ceased to have significance to its own members or to the international community.

Yet those closely in touch with the Commonwealth as a whole and with the meetings of last July in London believe the conference to have been eminently worthwhile. As another in a long series of exchanges between the working heads of far scattered but specially associated states, it provided neither a change nor a climax, but simply the most obvious expression of that continuous process of consultation which is the chief distinction of the Commonwealth, and its strongest bond. Yet it is not without reason that in the British press in mid-1956 there was unusually extensive discussion of the nature and future of the Commonwealth.

The major change which the Commonwealth has undergone so far in its long history resulted from the decision of India, Pakistan and Ceylon to combine independence after World War II with membership in the Commonwealth. As a result, an association predominantly British became essentially multi-racial in character, with its Asian people far outnumbering those of Anglo-Saxon, or indeed of European, descent. Within the next few years the Commonwealth will be asked to admit other new members: the Gold Coast, the Malayan Federation, the Caribbean Federation when it is consummated, the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland when its present direct British safeguards of native interests come to an end, and probably Nigeria. These new members, when they are admitted, will further weaken the British character of the Commonwealth. Still more important, these new states (except for Southern Rhodesia, only

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a part of the Central African Federation) lack the experience of parliamentary institutions and, even more crucial, of administrative efficiency and integrity which had been so well planted in the Indian subcontinent and Ceylon. Thus their independence and their Commonwealth membership will be, in a sense, more of a gamble than was true of the Asian dominions.

Quite apart from the prospect of new members is the extraordinary variety of backgrounds, aspirations and policies already represented in the Commonwealth. Each Commonwealth country has its distinctive reasons for continuing within the association; each hopes for something different from it. Each is viewed in different lights by its fellow Commonwealth members.

To the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth is an important, perhaps even a vital element in maintaining itself as a major international force. The vast network of Commonwealth communications is still centered firmly in London. Despite the professed intention after World War II of building more direct links between the overseas members of the Commonwealth, these are still slight compared to the channels that each maintains with the United Kingdom. Their exchanges of written information and views are made particularly meaningful through constant personal contacts both in the Commonwealth Relations Office and other ministries in London, and in foreign and Commonwealth capitals, as well as at international gatherings.

The presence in the Commonwealth of the Asian members, particularly India, is of major significance to the British in this elaborate network of exchanges. By virtue of its numbers India is potentially a Great Power; it is by far the largest of the so-called uncommitted countries in Asia. Pandit Nehru's obvious regard both for the United Kingdom and for the Commonwealth relationship (expressed most eloquently in his speech at the Mansion House of the City of London, July 3, 1956) may not often have resulted in a common view on policy or on military necessities, but it has produced frank interchanges not unlike those which have long distinguished the relations of the older members of the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom has no need to worry about the closeness of its contacts with Canada, Australia and New Zealand since they exhibit a common approach to most problems, implicit confidence in each other, and extraordinary frankness. But it has been a major satisfaction that so much of the same relationship has been established

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with the Asian Commonwealth members, including India. Perhaps one of the ways in which British policy is most sharply distinguished from American is that the British are more patient in awaiting results. They do not seek commitments, at least within the Commonwealth. They have the patience—often well justified in the long run—to trust that the cross-fertilization of intimate exchanges produces both understanding and influence.

Of all the older members of the Commonwealth overseas, it is Canada which best understands and agrees with British policy in this regard. Economic growth, geographical position and willingness to assume international responsibilities have combined to make Canada one of the three most important countries within the Commonwealth today. Not only significant for Canada itself but equally for the Commonwealth has been the way in which Canada has developed its own distinctive relations with South Asia, and particularly with India. Before World War II, Canada virtually ignored Asia and the Far East despite its Pacific seaboard. But its participation in the Korean War, its active share in the Colombo Plan and, perhaps even more, its willingness to act, along with India, on the Control Commission for Indochina bear witness to its postwar acceptance of responsibilities in that area. As a corollary, Asian participation in the Commonwealth makes that association particularly attractive now to Canadian leaders, eager as they are to understand Asian points of view and to work with the new democratic states of that continent.

Australia, on the other hand, has established less close links with the Asian Commonwealth members, especially India, and views their membership in the Commonwealth with a somewhat less sympathetic eye. Australia, it is true, has contributed generously to the Colombo Plan and takes an important share in training Asians in its institutions. But Mr. Menzies has none of the close personal contact with Pandit Nehru of Mr. St. Laurent, or of Mr. Mackenzie King before him. The Australian Government has long been impatient with the Indian policy of aloofness; it is distressed at the growing republicanism which has caused Pakistan and Ceylon to join India in accepting the Crown only as the symbol of the unity of the Commonwealth as a whole. But perhaps a still more fundamental source of irritation is the awareness that for all of Australia's ties of blood relationship to the United Kingdom, Australia has no deciding

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influence on British policies. There is even a suspicion that India's size may give its words a greater weight than those of the far more loyal Antipodes.

While Canada has extended its international responsibilities to Asia, Australia has narrowed its sphere of action. Particularly since the British have withdrawn their troops from Suez, Australia has no particular responsibilities for the sea route through the Middle East. But within the area for which it has major concern, Australia has assumed new obligations. Thus Australia now has troops in Malaya, though not a great many. Realizing with regret that British power is relatively weak in the Far East, Australia has put an emphasis on SEATO equalled only by that of the United States. ANZUS it sees chiefly important as a consultative mechanism. Here, as elsewhere, the Menzies Government seeks to serve as a bridge between the United Kingdom, to which it is tied by indissoluble bonds of kinship, and the United States, with which it shares strategic interest and a common reaction to the threat of Communism.

Slightly though not essentially dissimilar is the approach of New Zealand. Perhaps more realistically than Australia, New Zealand sees the weaknesses of SEATO and does not share the Australian desire to emphasize its military function. New Zealand shares more nearly the United Kingdom view that Communist encroachment can best be thwarted by building up the Asian countries themselves rather than by military alliances. Like Australia, New Zealand has withdrawn from formal Middle East commitments; like that country it has troops in Malaya. Rather less than Australia does New Zealand see itself as a bridge between the United Kingdom and the United States in the Southwest Pacific but this is partly because it recognizes its own lack of strength. Toward the Crown, its attitude is also perhaps more realistic though essentially similar to that of Australia. Where Mr. Menzies was obviously chagrined at the last Commonwealth Conference over the determination of Pakistan and Ceylon to become republics, New Zealand quietly accepted their decisions as inevitable; immediately thereafter, however, Mr. Holland reaffirmed New Zealand's own loyalty to the monarchy by asking the Queen for permission to add the Crown to New Zealand's official coat of arms.

To the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference is commonly a source

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of strength. For South Africa, with its Afrikaner majority and its own republican aspirations, this is far from being the case. Yet the Commonwealth is not unimportant for South Africa. British territories flank it on the north; British sea power is still important to the Cape. Moreover, the Commonwealth remains the one international organization in which South Africa is still welcome; its membership therein, too, has been a major reason why the older Commonwealth countries have been reluctant to join in the chorus of censure levied at South Africa in the United Nations over its policies towards South West Africa, the Indians in South Africa and *apartheid*. The Commonwealth functions by disregarding the issues which divide its members: thus such matters never come up in its general sessions any more than does the Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, or the future of the High Commission Territories.

On the eve of the Prime Ministers' Conference, Father Trevor Huddleston, whose book, "Naught For Your Comfort," has awakened wide emotional sympathy in Great Britain for the native peoples of South Africa, called openly in the press for that country's expulsion from the Commonwealth on the ground that its racial policies impede good relations with other African states. But there is no disposition among the older Commonwealth members to take so drastic a step. They believe that to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth circle may help to relieve the sense of isolation which intensifies Nationalist fears, and hardens its racial policies. They realize that South Africa dropped from the Commonwealth might well absorb the High Commission Territories—Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland—for whose cession South Africa presses periodically but with marked restraint. Even the Asian members, bitter as they are at South African racial policies, found that country reasonable in its international views at the Prime Ministers' Conference, and they particularly welcomed Mr. Strijdom's implicit assurance that South Africa will not try to blackball the Gold Coast when it applies for membership.

Most interesting of all, perhaps, is the attitude of India to Commonwealth membership. In 1949, when India opted to remain in the Commonwealth despite its decision to become a republic (and was accepted as such by the rest of the Commonwealth), it was largely because of its leaders' sense of common heritage with Great Britain, reflected most obviously in similar

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parliamentary institutions, the common law and a respect for justice, religious toleration, and British liberal and educational traditions. In the years since then, the association has grown still more meaningful for Pandit Nehru and some of his closest associates. To these Indian leaders, Britain's very lack of its former international power has its advantages, for in their view it opens the way for Britain to exercise a moral leadership in international affairs.

Though Americans seldom realize the fact, India's leaders are not unrealistic in their view of world politics. They recognize the threat of Communism and have taken drastic measures within their own country to meet it. Externally, however, they prefer to believe the best of the Soviet Union, and feel that this attitude has fostered "the new look" in Soviet policy. They fully understand the intimacy of the relationship between Great Britain and the United States. But they are impatient (often unfairly) at what they consider too slavish a following of the American lead.

There is no doubt that Indian leaders would like to see the Commonwealth act as a third force, uncommitted to either of the super-Powers and thus, in their views, able to influence both the United States and the Soviet Union through its response to particular situations. This is not thought of as neutralism in the classic sense of the word but as independence of action. That Indian leaders cherish and foster their own free institutions seems to them sufficient evidence of their tacit commitment to the free world. But while they resist formal commitments for themselves, Indian leaders recognize the importance of NATO for Great Britain, and their objection to regional military pacts seems not to extend to that alliance; they are more aware of Great Britain's vital need for bases like Cyprus and Singapore than most outsiders could imagine. In the Middle East, their attitude is less sympathetic and their opposition to the Baghdad Pact is perhaps a final deathblow to a weakly founded organization. Unwelcome as this is, the British believe that a violent crisis in the Middle East would force India to an awareness of its own stake in the stability of that area. Thus British and Indian leaders both have faith in each others' ultimate good intentions and good sense.

Paradoxically, Pakistan feels particularly close to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and particularly irritated by them. It has been a bitter disappointment to the Pakistanis that

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Commonwealth members have not openly supported them in the Kashmir dispute though they know there is much sympathy for them within its ranks. Australia, for example, is definitely pro-Pakistan in contrast to its lukewarm attitude to India, partly because Australia has several close ties of a personal nature with Pakistan, partly because the forthright Pakistani attitude to Communist expansion strikes a sympathetic note. Pakistan is also in the somewhat anomalous position in which Australia now finds itself: bound by personal ties to the United Kingdom and yet less influential than it might have expected in view of its size (after all, Pakistan is the second most populous country in the Commonwealth) and the unequivocal support it gives to Western defense plans like the Baghdad Pact. Yet for all the exasperation that this causes, there is a sense of balance among present Pakistani leaders which makes them aware of the advantages of Commonwealth friendship and also of restraining themselves in the highly sensitive issue of Kashmir.

As for Ceylon, the recent agitation about air facilities and the naval base at Trincomalee has been settled with mutual satisfaction after a tense period following Premier Bandaraneike's accession to office. The base becomes formally Ceylonese; the British are to be granted facilities. Easing the situation for the British is their relief at being freed from the expense of maintaining the base, plus the belief of British military leaders that Trincomalee is not vital to their strategy in the sense that Singapore is. Above all, Mr. Bandaraneike proved conciliatory and this is appreciated. It is felt, too, that he is more closely in touch with the sentiment of his country than was his predecessor. Because of this, because the issue of Trincomalee should be seen in the perspective of the continuing mutual defense arrangement between the United Kingdom and Ceylon which was entered into when the latter became independent, because Ceylon has no background of bitterness against the British such as had developed in India before its independence, and because it feels strongly the need of friends, Ceylon cherishes its Commonwealth membership and is warmly welcomed within that group.

Important and heartening to all three Asian members is the Commonwealth-inspired Colombo Plan for economic development, technical assistance and training. The amount of aid now being provided may not seem outstanding compared to Ameri-

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can programs, but the Colombo Plan has certain definite advantages on its side. The Asian countries particularly appreciate participating as members of the program rather than having aid bestowed upon them; because of this feature, Colombo Plan aid ranks with United Nations technical assistance as the most acceptable of all economic aid. They appreciate the orientation of the program towards self-help. But above all the leaders in the Asian Commonwealth recognize that economic development is essential if their régimes are to maintain themselves against the appeals of Communism. Thus Ceylon puts economic aid highest among its Commonwealth benefits. Indian and Pakistani leaders also recognize that only if outside aid enables them to meet the demands of their people for more adequate standards of living can they maintain either their own political positions or the free institutions they are attempting to operate. To its Asian members, then, the Commonwealth means not only a friendly international group within which they can express themselves freely, but also a source of economic aid of significance in their development.

Here, too, the network of financial relations involved in the sterling area plays an important rôle. The fact that India, Pakistan and Ceylon had accumulated huge sterling balances during the war helped to reëstablish the lines of trade with the United Kingdom. The continuing position of Great Britain as the banker of the sterling area, within which the British pound is freely exchangeable as a common international currency, occasionally produces its own irritations but it also constitutes another level of consultation and mutual dependence.

Still the British are far from happy about the present position of the sterling area and particularly about their own inability to provide sufficient capital for the borrowers from within that area. The sterling area includes one quarter of the world's population, and one quarter of the world's trade, but since the war its financial strength has depended all too heavily on American grants and on earnings from the colonies. It is far from sure, moreover, that increasing British production and the anti-inflationary exhortations of the Eden government can produce the financial stability and economic health which will enable the United Kingdom to play the central rôle in the sterling area comparable to that of the United States in the dollar area. In the long run, failure to recover this rôle will seriously weaken the

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United Kingdom and perhaps the Commonwealth. At the same time it is less true to say that the Commonwealth is bolstered up by the Commonwealth than that the sterling area is the financial expression of the confidence felt by Commonwealth members in each other. So long as this confidence remains (and there is no obvious sign of it weakening) the sterling area—like the Commonwealth—has a powerful underpinning.

As has been all too obvious in recent years, close economic and financial relations with the Asian Commonwealth members are not duplicated in the field of defense. Neither India nor Ceylon has ever shared in the exchange of defense information and planning which form so important a part of United Kingdom communications with the older members of the Commonwealth. Yet there is a growing understanding, as already suggested, that the maintenance of bases is imperative for Great Britain today. Little was more striking in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference than the open mind with which India, and indeed all the overseas Commonwealth countries, approached the delicate issues of Cyprus and Singapore.

On the former question, it was significant that Pakistan's impressive Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, could present so authoritatively the Turkish point of view. He may even, somewhat slyly, have indicated the difficulties of a plebiscite in so complicated a multi-racial situation as Cyprus, since Nehru resists such a solution for Kashmir. In any case, Nehru may feel less strongly about European than about African or Asian colonies. Perhaps the obvious concern of all Commonwealth members over a tragic situation was reassurance enough.

Hardly less anxious is the situation in Singapore, the only base in the Far East which the British believe essential to their international position. In the long run it may be untenable to keep Malaya and Singapore separate but temporarily the stable Malayan Government of Chief Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman, whose elected ministry has an overwhelming majority of seats in the Assembly, contrasts so sharply with the extreme political instability in Singapore that the Federation seems well justified in its desire first to secure self-government for itself, as has been promised by August 1957, and then to consider what terms of fusion there might be. Complicating that settlement is the fact that Singapore's 900,000 Chinese added to the 2,250,000 in the Federation would give the Chinese a slight majority over the

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Malays. Moreover, Chinese business acumen and industriousness might by themselves give the Chinese a predominant influence even if a type of weighted franchise could be devised. Most serious of all, the Chinese, whether long domiciled in the Malayan peninsula or recently arrived immigrants, have a strong ethnic tie with mainland China and, regardless of their ideological sympathies, a strong feeling of pride in its growing importance. Both to the leaders of the Malayan Federation and to the British, therefore, it seems better to defer the issue of the ultimate relationship between Malaya and Singapore. Even Nehru seems to have exerted no pressure to come to an arrangement quickly. In the meantime, the British are negotiating a defense treaty with the Malayan Federation comparable to the agreement which the United States has with the Philippines.

The British are less worried than most outside observers about the breakdown of negotiations with Singapore's mercurial former Chief Minister, David Marshall, the more so since that breakdown created little if any reaction in Singapore itself. Next spring, in fact, they expect to negotiate with the new Chief Minister, Lim Yew Hock, an agreement essentially similar to that which Marshall rejected in the spring of 1956. If the negotiations succeed, internal security will be left in British hands but a further step will have been taken on the road toward Singapore's self-government.

In yielding thus far to the urge for self-determination while retaining control of the vital spheres of external defense and internal security, the British are taking a calculated risk in Singapore which may well succeed. For all their pride in China's new and growing importance, many of the Chinese in Singapore fear, scarcely less than Malays, the ultimate absorption of Malaya into the Chinese orbit. Thus in practice there is much "fence-sitting" by the more moderate Chinese in Singapore on whose ultimate willingness and ability to work with the Malays the stability of a self-governing Malaya depends. Since it is from Singapore rather than the Federation that the pressure for integration comes, the latter will have the greater influence over both the terms and timing of closer association. In the meantime, the Federation endorses the retention of British (including Australian and New Zealand) forces on the peninsula, though it prefers them to be in Singapore rather than over the Causeway.

What is clear, however, is that strategic planning today is a

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regional matter. The British string of bases from Gibraltar to Singapore falls into three, if not four, regions: the Atlantic-Mediterranean sphere of NATO, the Middle East, the Western Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific. No longer can British naval strength tie these far-flung bases into a strategic unity backed ultimately by Commonwealth solidarity. Nowhere is it more obvious that Commonwealth interests are tied inextricably to those of the United States, and vice versa.

But if this is so, does the Commonwealth retain any particular significance today either to its own members or to others? The attitudes, aspirations and interests of its associated states are extraordinarily diverse, as we have seen, particularly since they include the Asian members. Geography makes its own imperatives in different ways upon all Commonwealth members, as do the differences in their stages of social and economic development. Can such a widely varying group have any true cohesion? If so, on what can it be founded?

These are the questions which, as already suggested, gave rise to an unwonted degree of discussion in the British press previous to and during the Prime Ministers' Conference—a discussion set off, interestingly enough, by Prime Minister Menzies in two articles in *The Times* (June 11 and 12, 1956), and through two articles in the *Manchester Guardian* (June 18 and 19, 1956) by the Indian publicist and diplomat, K. M. Panikkar. Both sought in different ways to find a new and, to them, firmer basis of unity for the Commonwealth: Mr. Panikkar in an accentuation of common ideals, high among which he put racial equality and an agreement not to use war as a means of settling disputes between Commonwealth countries; and Mr. Menzies in common interests, since, as he rather sadly indicated, the Commonwealth has ceased to be a "Crown Commonwealth" and become more of a functional organization.

But does the Commonwealth, in fact, need to be pushed in one direction or another? Does it not already possess these characteristics and is not its very diversity among its greatest strengths? The Commonwealth is a unique association, of course, arising out of history and the evolution to independence of former colonies of the British Empire. But the techniques and practices by which the Commonwealth holds together have had remarkable success; moreover, they are exportable. They consist basically of the willingness to have frank and free exchanges before taking decisions.

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The commitment this involves is not to a particular course of action but to a thorough exploration of the facts of the case and of the different points of view held by a wide range of countries. The Commonwealth has demonstrated that it can become a multi-racial association and still function constructively through the same means. Since it has become multi-racial, and is soon to be still more so, the Commonwealth has become a much more significant pattern for other international associations than when it was predominantly British, for it demonstrates how much this practice of prior consultation appeals to peoples of different backgrounds and interests.

What does all this mean to the United States? It means that on many counts the Commonwealth remains an important international association with bonds that are tough despite their lack of written form. It is an important bridge between West and East. It holds together not only well-established mature states like Canada and Australia with their own traditional relationship to the United Kingdom but also more insecure states like South Africa, Pakistan and Ceylon, and the great apparently uncommitted state of India.

What can the Commonwealth actually accomplish? Relatively little, perhaps, with its own resources but potentially much in the way of influence. The Commonwealth rejects the notion of being a closed group, of even aiming at self-sufficiency. Its objective is to secure mutual information, the opening of minds and the better understanding of issues. Such a process provides its own restraints. One of the most significant aspects of the Prime Ministers' Conference in July was the decision not to push for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Every Commonwealth country including South Africa, which has an obvious and special fear of Communism, agreed that it was realistic and useful to have Communist China in the United Nations. At the same time, Pandit Nehru bowed to the reasoned views of Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Menzies that to take such a stand at that time would be unfortunate because of the impending Presidential elections in the United States. In so yielding, Mr. Nehru responded to a major convention of the Commonwealth: that no member should try to force its will upon others if they cannot be convinced by information and by logic. If the Commonwealth thrives because of prior consultation, it does so also because of the self-restraint of its members, and their consideration for each other.

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Because of this, even its most sensitive members are freed from the fear of being pressured along distasteful ways, and the way is open for reasonable influences to operate.

If the Commonwealth is then a stabilizing and unifying force, could the United States do more to reinforce it? Much in this regard has already been done by the United States since the war, as the older Commonwealth countries would be the first to acknowledge. American economic aid underwrote British recovery, though the vital factor there was the sacrifice and discipline the British people imposed on themselves in the effort to reëstablish their country as an international force. American funds now aid the Colombo Plan. American strategic planning is commonly, though not always, closely geared with that of the United Kingdom and, in appropriate areas, with that of other members of the Commonwealth.

But if there were more prior consultation with Commonwealth members, this would not only strengthen them but also make American policy more understandable to them and often more acceptable. Perhaps above all, more American forbearance and understanding of India would help to strengthen the Commonwealth. Between India and the United States has grown up mutual suspicion of each other's motives which complicates not only their relations but also the much closer ones between India and Great Britain. Both now, and as the Commonwealth moves towards its next expansion, in which it will include African and West Indian as well as Asian members, that association can best perform its significant rôle of mutual education and restraint if it has the understanding and support of the United States. And this in turn might well rest on the recognition that there is only one essential qualification for membership in the Commonwealth —adherence to democratic institutions and objectives—and that this, of itself, provides an ultimate commitment to the free world.

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SCANDINAVIAN INTEGRATION AND WESTERN DEFENSE

By Lyman B. Burbank

THERE have been great changes in Scandinavia recently, and now that the Prime Ministers of Denmark, Sweden and Norway have completed their visits to Moscow, it seems to be an appropriate time to pause and appraise them. First, exactly what is the nature of the changes? Second, how do they affect NATO and Western security?

Certain historical facts will help us to answer these questions. The first and most important fact is that Sweden stayed out of two world wars. The Swedes attribute their success to a policy of neutrality. Others explain it in terms of expediency, mixed with good fortune. In any case, the result of Sweden's policy has been that, politically speaking, few concepts are more popular in that country than the one summed up in the word "neutrality."

The second fact of importance is that in 1949, Sweden, Denmark and Norway almost succeeded in establishing a Scandinavian defensive alliance. The basic reason for its last-minute failure was that the United States would not promise to supply the projected alliance with arms. This decision by the National Security Council had consequences of great significance. The Norwegians, led by their very capable Foreign Minister, Dr. Halvard Lange, immediately applied for admission to NATO, and were accepted. With considerably less enthusiasm, Denmark also became a NATO member; Gustav Rasmussen, the Danish Foreign Minister, publicly expressed doubt that the American decision was in the best interests of peace. Sweden did not follow suit.

Fact number three is that there was established in 1952 a Nordic Council consisting of representatives from Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. This organization, founded largely as a result of the efforts of the Danish Prime Minister, has had as its aim the promotion of Scandinavian economic, political and cultural coöperation. Although Finnish representatives had participated in the discussions leading to the Council's formation, Soviet pressure dissuaded Finland from becoming a member in 1952.

The fourth fact is that the great change in Soviet tactics in 1955 and 1956 brought about the Soviet evacuation of the naval base at Porkkala, situated only about ten miles from the center of Finland's capital, Helsinki. This act, of course, was hailed with jubilation throughout Scandinavia. Today there is even some speculation that the Russians may soon return some land taken from Finland in the winter war of 1939–1940.

The fifth fact, closely associated with the fourth, is that recently the Soviet Government withdrew its objection to Finland's joining the Nordic Council. A Scandinavian organization which until the summer of 1955 was being denounced by Moscow as an agency of NATO had now become, in Soviet eyes, a great peaceful organization designed to disrupt American imperialism in Scandinavia.

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A sixth fact is that recently Iceland made clear that it would be happy to get along without American airmen stationed on its soil. This suggestion must have struck a responsive chord in both Norway and Denmark. In 1949, Norway made public a note to the Soviet Union in which the promise was made that there would be no foreign bases on Norwegian soil except during war or in case of the immediate threat of war. In 1953–1954, when the NATO authorities said it was necessary to station American airmen in Denmark, the Danes refused the necessary permission.

The last fact to bear in mind in this discussion is that any attempt to bring genuine economic coöperation among the Scandinavian countries runs squarely up against the unfortunate truth that large sectors of their economies are competitive rather than complementary.

With these facts in mind, we may find it easier to answer the original questions.

II

The proposed Scandinavian defense alliance of 1949 (which was to include only Norway, Sweden and Denmark) would have brought with it a certain measure of integration of the defense, foreign and economic policies of the three nations. The failure of that plan perpetuated a deep division in these fields. Since Iceland, Norway and Denmark are NATO members, while Sweden and Finland are not, the Nordic Council has never been able to concern itself officially with foreign or military policy. A Scandinavian military alliance would have been binding upon its member states; the Nordic Council can only make recommendations and must rely essentially on the force of public opinion to back them up.

It may well be that the progress of the Nordic Council in the social-cultural field has been a reaction to the failure to achieve a Scandinavian defensive alliance in 1949. Thanks to the Council, passports are no longer required of citizens of one Scandinavian country entering another. For all practical purposes, a common Scandinavian labor market has been created, and the Scandinavian workman who has been a member of a sickness benefit society in his own country may transfer that membership, without new health tests, to any other northern country where he may find employment. A Scandinavian convention covering social security was signed in September 1955 by the five Ministers of Social Affairs. This convention, a direct result of the earlier agreement on a common labor market, facilitates to an even greater extent the transfer of workers from one country to another. At its latest meeting in Copenhagen in February of this year, the Council resolved unanimously that an extension of the existing Scandinavian coöperation in atomic research and the peaceful utilization of atomic energy were "of the greatest importance." At the same meeting the Council recommended appointment of an expert committee to study possible further coöperation in nutritional research. In addition, it was proposed to establish an advanced course of journalism at the University of Aarhus, in Denmark, to be supported by all five Scandinavian countries.

The list is long. In the social-cultural field it is impressive; there is no evidence here of any substantial opposition to the work of the Nordic Council.

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However, in the area of economic coöperation the story is different. Some progress seems to have been achieved by the slow day-to-day methods of diplomacy, but the so-called common market, involving a significant reduction of internal trade barriers by Norway, Sweden and Denmark, would appear to lie far in the future.

Norway, less industrialized than Sweden, produces an enormous amount of electricity. Sweden needs electricity. Were modern civilization less complicated, one might reasonably expect the Swedes to buy Norwegian power without excessive difficulty. For some time, however, large-scale export of electric power from Norway to Sweden was frowned upon by Russia, which saw in it only a scheme by which Swedish defense industry would be built up and Sweden would be made a satellite of its neighboring NATO Powers. Furthermore, some opposition came from Norway itself. If it is a question of supplying Swedish industry, asked many Norwegians, why should their country export to one of its chief competitors the very power which is Norway's tremendous competitive weapon in the international manufacturing field?

After lengthy negotiation, the municipal authorities of the city of Trondheim, in central Norway, agreed to the export of electricity to the city of Stockholm. The plan was approved by the Norwegian Parliament by a vote of 81–63 on December 6, 1955. However, this agreement was reached only after the Norwegian Ministry of Industry, in conjunction with the Board of Waterfalls and Electricity, had published a long and considered memorandum on the subject, recommending that in view of Norway's needs the electricity exported must come from Norway's annual increment of newly developed power. This policy would make the export of electricity very modest.

Even Norway's present annual rate of power development is a great drain on her foreign reserves, since she can produce only half her requirements for turbines and other hydroelectric plant and equipment. The report of the Ministry of Industry pointed to the need for foreign loans, and suggested that these should be paid off during the life of the contract for power export. Thereafter, plants built with these loans would revert to meeting Norway's own requirements. The Board of Electricity proposed that the price to be charged for exportable power be sufficient to cover a margin for the cost of developing economically less favorable water power resources. Today it is estimated that Norway's electrical works generate only one-fifth to one-sixth of the total which is economically feasible.

In Norway it is easy to find suspicion of Sweden. The political union of the two countries was dissolved only a half a century ago, and the Norwegians remember that one of the great arguments for that break originated in the different economic facts of life in the two countries. Norway was becoming commercial and was living from its merchant marine and its exports of fish. Sweden meanwhile was becoming industrialized. Norway's continuing fear of Swedish economic power was well expressed by the Oslo newspaper *Verdens Gang* not long ago when it wrote, in opposition to Swedish plans to invest capital in a north Norwegian mining enterprise, that it was simply a matter of preserving that mining region "as a Norwegian area." For a

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mining company in Norway to have a Swedish director, Swedish engineers and Swedish workers appeared to *Verdens Gang* to be nothing short of Swedish infiltration.

In view of all these factors Scandinavian economic coöperation has proceeded at a snail's pace. Much more important, however, is the discussion of the proposed common market.

A 1947 Scandinavian report to the newly-created Council of Europe mentioned the fact that Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland had created a Joint Scandinavian Committee for Economic Coöperation. In 1950, that Committee reported that the conditions required for a Scandinavian customs union did not then exist; but the idea did not perish, and has been before the Nordic Council since the formation of that body in 1952. Present proposals differ considerably from those of a few years ago. Among other things, Iceland today is not included in the proposed common market. Even with Finland in the Nordic Council today, there has been no serious suggestion of including that country in any Scandinavian economic alliance.

It is argued by many in Norway that a common market cannot be created without surrendering a substantial measure of national sovereignty, and that this would leave Norwegian industry at a competitive disadvantage to more efficient Swedish industry and more efficient Danish agriculture. These fears led several members of the Liberal and Conservative Parties in the Norwegian Parliament to vote against joining the Nordic Council when it was created. Although outvoted at that time, many members of these parties still take a negative attitude toward the common market. In Denmark and Sweden, there has been scattered and unorganized opposition to the common market idea; but in 1952 the only votes in those two countries against the Nordic Council came from the Communist representatives. At that time, there were no Communists in the Norwegian Parliament.

Without coördination of taxation, social and investment policies, many think a common market would be impossible; and it is this abridgment of national sovereignty that some Norwegians fear. It is interesting to note that at the recent Copenhagen meeting, Mr. Bertil Ohlin, speaking for the Swedish Social-Liberal Party, and Mr. Bertel Dahlgaard, expressing the concerted view of the Danish delegation, referred to the experience of the Benelux countries and found that in those countries coördinated policies were at a minimum.

Study after study has been made of the proposed Scandinavian customs union. The latest phase of this question started at the Oslo meeting of the Nordic Council in 1954, when the three governments were asked to pave the way for a common market for as large a sector of economic life as possible. The recommendation specifically pointed out that a common market could be introduced by different methods and at different rates for various sectors of the economy. These recommendations were adopted with the support of all the Danish and Swedish votes, nearly all the Icelandic votes and half of the Norwegian votes (those of the representatives of the Labor Party); the remainder of the Norwegians abstained from voting.

The meeting of the Council at Copenhagen early in 1956 lasted ten days, and two full days were given to debate on the common market idea. In order

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to obtain approval of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs—GATT—the Council was informed that if the three nations have any customs union at all, at least 75 percent of their trade within the union would have to be exempt from customs and other barriers. The negotiators have agreed already on 45 percent, and it is hoped that soon there will be agreement on another 15 percent. That would leave a final 15 percent to be worked out.

Although the principal purpose of the debate in Copenhagen was really to decide whether the experts should continue their work, actually the pros and cons of a Scandinavian market were thoroughly aired. All the members of the Danish and Swedish delegations accepted the general idea of a common market. Indeed, a certain economic compulsion, despite the Norwegian opposition, drives Scandinavia toward greater economic coöperation. Norway, Sweden and Denmark together require a large and stable home market as a basis of competitive production in new sectors of industry. "In Denmark," said Mr. Erik Eriksen, former Prime Minister, "we feel that in a world of atomic bombs and automation our countries simply have to stick together. If we don't, we fear that our culture, our economic life, and, indeed, our political self-determination may be in jeopardy." These three Scandinavian countries have lived for some time with the constant problem of foreign exchange difficulties. The three Prime Ministers have all recently made trips to Moscow in search of greater export opportunities for their countries. The concept of a common market, under which productivity would increase and investment capital would flow more easily, is one which certainly has great appeal.

On the other hand, the Norwegian opposition asserts that a common market might divert some of Norway's imports to Sweden and Denmark because of the advantages they would have over Norway's less-developed industries. The result would be that outside countries, particularly the United Kingdom, would take retaliatory measures against Norwegian exports and Norwegian shipping.

The Norwegians have learned that the mountains divide and the sea unites; they know that their standard of living is in large part the result of ocean commerce. For a country with a population less than half that of metropolitan New York, Norway has an enormous merchant marine. Only about 15 percent of it is engaged in trade touching Norway, whereas 85 percent trades almost exclusively among foreign ports. Obviously, therefore, the threat of retaliation of any kind against Norwegian shipping is a source of concern. Leaders of the shipping industry have expressed strong opposition to a common Scandinavian market. Present intra-Scandinavian trade is not great in proportion to the total amount of Norwegian trade with non-Scandinavian countries. In the opinion of many Norwegian shipping men, to hope that the proposed common market could increase inter-Scandinavian trade sufficiently to overcome prospective losses elsewhere is a vain hope indeed.

III

The Nordic Council's work in fostering development of the common market is closely related to problems facing NATO. It is perhaps in Finland and Iceland that this inter-relationship can best be seen.

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The Soviet evacuation of Porkkala and the granting of permission for Finland to enter the Nordic Council were clearly designed to create neutralist sentiment in Scandinavia and to weaken the existing strength of NATO. Finland *in* the Council can do more to pull Denmark, Norway and Iceland away from their NATO ties than Finland *out* of the Council. Considering the recent political and economic instability in Finland and the dependence of the country's new president on Communist support, it appears that in dealing with Scandinavia the Russians have played their cards well.

Following the Soviet withdrawal from the Porkkala naval base came the resolution of Iceland's Althing calling for the withdrawal of all NATO armed forces from their country. This resolution was not unexpected among NATO leaders, because for some time many influential Icelanders had expressed the hope that foreign troops might soon leave. Nobody could demonstrate the actual connection between the Porkkala evacuation and the Althing resolution, but that there was a relationship seems very clear. After all, a month of "Soviet-Icelandic friendship" had been inaugurated by Moscow in October 1955. In seeking to weaken Iceland's ties to NATO, the Russians had a powerful propaganda weapon in the Porkkala evacuation. And, in turn, they may also have a basis for hoping that anti-NATO feeling in Iceland will spill over into the meetings of the Nordic Council.

There is not much doubt that a revolt against NATO's predominantly military character has been brewing for some time. Largely for internal political reasons, Denmark in 1953–1954 resisted the stationing of foreign troops on her soil. The Icelandic Althing is, however, the first legislature which has gone beyond philosophic expression of the revolt. The elections of June 24, though inconclusive, certainly demonstrate the difficulty of trying to harmonize international military policies and local politics.

In 1952, the first full year after arrangements were made to build radar stations in Iceland and to station American soldiers there, the United States purchased one quarter of Iceland's exports, largely fish. By 1955, this figure had fallen to 15 percent. In 1952 the Soviet bloc countries took 7 percent of Iceland's fish exports; in 1955, they took 28 percent. Icelanders may well wonder at a military alliance which cuts across the pattern of its trade.

Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland all have recently sought to increase their trade with the Soviet Union. The Finns have been rather successful—so successful, in fact, that they are tragically dependent on the Soviet world for such necessities of modern life as petroleum products. Premier Einar Gerhardsen, of Norway, accompanied by Minister of Commerce Arne Skaug, went to Moscow in search of urgently needed markets for Norwegian exports. Premier Tage Erlander of Sweden reported after his recent Soviet visit that the Russians did not try to hide their hope that Sweden's "non-alliance" policy would be extended to other Scandinavian and north European governments. Premier H. C. Hansen of Denmark arrived in Moscow just as *Pravda* proclaimed its praise for the Danish refusal to permit foreign combat formations in Denmark. Negotiations are now in progress for resumption of normal trade relations which were broken off in the summer of 1954 when, in response to American protests, Denmark cancelled a delivery of tankers to the Soviet Union.

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NATO, never too strong in Scandinavia, is seriously threatened today in that part of the world. The facts of economic life and the emotions of nationalism are combining to weaken NATO, and in seeking to overcome this, the Atlantic Alliance faces a serious dilemma. NATO divides Scandinavia. The Nordic Council is slowly but surely bringing the Scandinavian countries—all of them—into closer coöperation. In 1949, when the National Security Council decided not to supply arms to the proposed Scandinavian defensive alliance, the decision was made largely on the basis of military thinking. Air bases, within striking power of the Soviet Union, seemed to be the great need of the moment. At the time, there were those who argued that Norway, Sweden and Denmark, united in a defensive alliance and supplied with American arms, would contribute more to the Western cause than a divided Scandinavia. Such a defensive alliance would have brought a large measure of coördination of economic and military policy, and would certainly have avoided the division which now exists in Scandinavia.

Today, without permission to station NATO forces in Denmark or Norway, and threatened with the loss of an effective base in Iceland, the North Atlantic Alliance is greatly weakened. Furthermore, the economic unity emerging in Scandinavia will sooner or later impinge directly upon the defensive planning policies of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. When, in 1949, Denmark's Foreign Minister remarked that the decision of the National Security Council was not in the best interest of peace, he was voicing an opinion widely held in his country. One wonders now whether he was not essentially correct.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

RUSSIA LEAVES THE WAR. By GEORGE F. KENNAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, 544 p. $7.50.

The former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union here turns, with great industry and skill, to the historian's craft. This first volume of his study of Soviet-American relations, 1917–1920, covers the period between the November Revolution and Russia's final withdrawal from the war in March 1918. The experienced Foreign Service officer is evident throughout, not only in the intimate feeling for the ways of international affairs but also in the acute, and often wry, recognition of familiar patterns of diplomatic behavior. Above all, the book makes most interesting and stimulating reading.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1954. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1956, 498 p. $6.00.

The latest volume in the Council's series of annual surveys of foreign policy provides expert and dispassionate guidance through the complexities of the Indochina crisis, the struggle over the European Defense Community, and contemporaneous developments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in Latin America, and on the domestic front in Washington. The unifying theme is found in a transformation in the spirit of American foreign policy under the impact of the developing "nuclear stalemate" and the enunciation of President Eisenhower's "good partner" concept.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1955. EDITED BY PAUL E. ZINNER. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1956, 487 p. $6.00.

The seventeenth volume of selected documents in the series originated by the World Peace Foundation and now prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations.

DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ. By BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL. Paris: Médicis, 1955, 376 p. Fr. 990.

This extended and far-from-easy inquiry into the nature of sovereignty and authority is the direct outgrowth of the author's earlier work on power, which appeared in 1945. Although M. de Jouvenel is necessarily engaged in a number of "débats millénaires," his central preoccupation is with the expansion of public authority in recent times and its relation to liberty and the public weal.

POWER AND COMMUNITY. By ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ. New York: Praeger, 1956, 134 p. $3.00.

The aim of these essays is "to show that the attempt to explain the workings of any society in terms of power—its growth and its pursuit—starts from a woefully incomplete understanding of man, and, more important, that the attempt itself is

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symptomatic of the deep malaise that grips ever more tightly Western society here and now."

THE HERESY OF DEMOCRACY. By Lord Percy of Newcastle. Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 246 p. $4.00. (London: Eyre, 1954, 18/.)

A critique of the principle *vox populi vox Dei* and of all the errors and dangers the author sees as proceeding from the French Revolution.

THE SECRET OF DEMOCRACY. By Suzanne Labin. New York: Vanguard, 1955, 258 p. $5.00.

A vigorous and lucid defense of democracy, by a leading French political writer who is particularly adept at demolishing a number of prevalent anti-democratic arguments and positions.

THE CHANGING CHARTER. By Andrew Martin and John B. S. Edwards. London: Sylvan Press (in association with the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies), 1955, 128 p. 12/6.

A brief argument in support of the thesis that the U.N. Charter has in fact changed more than people think it has, that other U.N. problems can be overcome without recourse to formal amendment, and that the most deep-rooted world issues do not derive from the Charter.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. By James Frederick Green. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1956, 194 p. $1.50.

This survey and analysis of the activities of the U.N. in the field of human rights will form part of a larger volume on the U.N. and the Promotion of the General Welfare, one of a series of studies on the United Nations being prepared by the Brookings Institution.

BEHIND THE U.N. FRONT. By Alice Widener. New York: Bookmailer, 1955, 127 p. $2.00.

Warnings against what the author sees as anti-U.S. and anti-business forces at work in the U.N.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION. By Captain Jacob Schenkman. Geneva: Droz, 1955, 410 p. Swiss Fr. 40. (New York: Lounz, distr., $11.50.)

An extensive monograph on the international aspects of civil air transport, with particular attention paid to the International Civil Aviation Organization.

SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES. By Inis L. Claude, Jr. New York: Random House, 1956, 497 p. $9.00.

An effort to analyze the evolution, present problems, and future prospects of various actions and agencies covered by the general term "international organization." A solid if rather theoretically oriented study.

THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO EXPAND BY CONQUEST. By Raymond De Martini. Washington: Catholic University, 1956, 174 p. $2.00.

A formal exposition of Catholic doctrine regarding conquest, especially "conquest because of necessity"—the pursuit of which may be legitimate if certain carefully defined conditions are fulfilled.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT. By Manuel R. García-Mora. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956, 171 p. $4.50.

An argument in support of the author's contention that "any system designed to protect human rights on the international plane will be significantly incomplete unless the right of a person to seek and to be granted asylum is equally guaranteed."

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NON-INTERVENTION. By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956, 476 p. $8.00.

An extensive analysis of the principle of non-intervention, "one of the most controversial subjects in the law of nations."

THE PRICE OF PEACE. By Charles G. Bolté. Boston: Beacon Press, 1956, 108 p. $2.50.

A thoughtful proposal for universal and complete disarmament. While the problem Mr. Bolté confronts appears as refractory as the squaring of the circle, the failure to master it promises eventual disaster.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD SEA POWER. Edited by E. B. Potter and J. R. Fredland. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955, 963 p. $11.75.

A massive narrative and analysis of the development of navies and sea power, with emphasis on the history of major naval engagements. Written for use at the United States Naval Academy.

TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. By James McLeod Hendry. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955, 186 p. $4.50.

A scholarly analysis of the constitutional limitations of four federal states—Canada, Australia, the United States and Switzerland—to determine their presumed validity in restricting the participation of these states in international affairs, especially with respect to treaty-making.

VOTING IN DEMOCRACIES. By Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert. London: Faber, 1955, 303 p. 25/.

This analysis of electoral mechanics is very critical of the British "first-past-the-post" system and comes out in favor of proportional representation.

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL, 1889–1914. By G. D. H. Cole. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956, 2 v. $16.00.

This third volume, appearing in two parts, of Mr. Cole's important, scholarly "History of Socialist Thought" deals with the era of the Second International to its disruption with the outbreak of war in 1914. While the author pursues the Socialist movement through many countries, his primary emphasis is upon the evolution of the leading ideas and upon ideological conflicts.

RED CHALLENGE TO AMERICA. By Brantley Burcham. New York: Exposition Press, 1955, 222 p. $3.50.

On the international and domestic Communist subversion and penetration. Rather more specific in description than prescription.

THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. By Theodore Edward Kruglak. Geneva: Droz, 1955, 163 p. Swiss Fr. 16. (New York: Lounz, distr., $5.00.)

A study and critical appraisal of American news agencies and correspondents reporting on Western Europe.

ALWAYS THE UNEXPECTED. By Louis P. Lochner. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 339 p. $5.00.

Reminiscences by a journalist who was Associated Press correspondent in Berlin from 1924 to 1941. Not without some controversial judgments on international affairs in those years.

ESSAYS PRESENTED TO SIR LEWIS NAMIER. Edited by Richard Pares and A. J. P. Taylor. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956, 541 p. $10.00.

A *Festschrift,* including essays on recent diplomatic and East European history

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by G. H. Bolsover, E. H. Carr, Hugh Seton-Watson, Stanley Morison, A. J. P. Taylor and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett.

THE DIPLOMAT'S WIFE. By Richard Fyfe Boyce. New York: Harper, 1956, 230 p. $3.00.

A book of helpful advice for wives of American Foreign Service officers.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. By Gunnar Myrdal. New York: Harper, 1956, 381 p. $6.50.

While discussing almost all problems of international economic relations, the eminent Swedish economist, who has been for some years Secretary General of the Economic Commission for Europe, gives major attention to economic development and the policies most likely to produce it. The problem, as Mr. Myrdal sees it, is to "integrate" underdeveloped countries in the world economy and at the same time achieve internal "integration" of their societies, in the sense of improving living standards, expanding economic opportunity, narrowing disparities of wealth, increasing social fluidity, and promoting democracy. Unfortunately, much of the internal "integration" that advanced countries have achieved has been obtained by means that lead to international disintegration—a precarious situation.

DAS AUTARKIEPROBLEM IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By Sven Helander. Berlin: Duncker, 1955, 684 p. DM. 48.

A Swedish economist analyzes at very considerable length and with much supporting information the reasons for, and the international experiences with, economic autarky in recent years. In his view the possibility of a free world market is intimately related to the outcome of this trend.

CAPITAL FORMATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, 677 p. $12.00.

These papers, presented, with comments and replies, at a conference sponsored by the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, deal with both capitalist and Soviet economies, with advanced and with underdeveloped countries. A stimulating symposium.

BRITAIN VIEWS OUR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. By Mark J. Fitzgerald. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956, 221 p. $4.25.

An analysis, by a professor of economics at the University of Notre Dame, of the findings of the 67 British union-management teams which visited the United States between 1948 and 1953.

A REPORT ON WORLD POPULATION MIGRATIONS. Washington: George Washington University, 1956, 449 p. gratis.

Exploratory reports on the economic and demographic effects of migration, especially as they relate to American immigration. The greater part of the book consists of a valuable bibliography of materials on migration.

LAND TENURE. Edited by Kenneth H. Parsons and Others. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, 739 p. $10.00.

An extensive symposium of papers presented at a conference held in 1951 and dealing with problems of land tenure and land reform throughout the world.

THE OPEN MIND. By J. Robert Oppenheimer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955, 146 p. $2.75.

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Eight lectures delivered over the last decade by the Director of the Institute for Advanced Study. Although Dr. Oppenheimer's discussion, which centers on the two themes of atomic weapons and the relationship between science and culture, may be called non-technical—no equations—it certainly requires close attention, and merits it.

The Second World War

VERLORENE SIEGE. By Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein. Bonn: Athenäum, 1955, 664 p. DM. 22.

An important work in military history, not only for the German campaigns of the Second World War but for a general study of military planning, strategy and tactics. Field Marshal von Manstein, an exceptionally able staff officer, played an important rôle in the Polish and Western operations and later as commander of Army Group South on the Russian front.

THE FATAL DECISIONS. Edited by Seymour Freidin and William Richardson. New York: Sloane, 1956, 302 p. $4.00.

An analysis, from the perspective of German commanding officers involved, of six critical battles in the war: the battles of Britain, Moscow, El Alamein, Stalingrad, France in 1944, and the Ardennes.

EISENHOWER'S SIX GREAT DECISIONS. By General Walter Bedell Smith. New York: Longmans, 1956, 237 p. $3.95.

General Eisenhower's former Chief of Staff lists, describes and approves six major strategic decisions made between June 1944 and March 1945. Originally appeared as articles in 1946.

STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS. By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1956, 518 p. $6.25.

GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940–1943. By Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1956, 780 p. $6.25.

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: MOVEMENTS, TRAINING, AND SUPPLY. By Chester Wardlow. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1956, 564 p. $4.25.

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: PLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR. By Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson and Peter C. Roots. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1955, 542 p. $4.25.

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT: HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION, ZONE OF INTERIOR. By Clarence McKittrick Smith. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1956, 503 p. $4.00.

Further volumes in the official series, "United States Army in World War II." The volume by Romanus and Sunderland is the second to deal with the China-Burma-India Theatre and carries the story from October 1943 to Stilwell's recall in October 1944. The volume by Leighton and Coakley, the fourth to appear in the sub-series dealing with the War Department, deals with the major strategic-logistical problems and debates through the Casablanca Conference. The volume by Wardlow is the second to deal with the Transportation Corps, in the sub-series on the Technical Services. The volumes by Green, Thomson and Roots, and by Smith, are further contributions to the Technical Services sub-series.

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UNITED STATES NAVAL CHRONOLOGY, WORLD WAR II. Washington: Navy Department, Naval History Division, 1955, 214 p. $1.75.

A useful reference work: a concise, factual, chronological record of significant events relating to U. S. naval activities in the Second World War.

NINE RIVERS FROM JORDAN. By Denis Johnston. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1955, 496 p. $5.00.

A B.B.C. correspondent's highly readable, literate, often Joycean, report on the war in Africa and Europe. Nothing new except the author's impressions and reflections.

The United States

EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY. By Robert J. Donovan. New York: Harper, 1956, 423 p. $4.95.

In this case the subtitle is altogether fitting. Mr. Donovan, a Washington correspondent of the New York *Herald Tribune*, has evidently been given access to minutes of many Cabinet and other top-level meetings and has also had fruitful interviews with many officials. The result—which seems responsibly handled and written—is a surprisingly intimate picture of the inner workings of the Eisenhower Administration, including some highly illuminating details on the formulation of foreign and domestic policies.

EISENHOWER THE PRESIDENT. By Merlo J. Pusey. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 300 p. $3.75.

In general, a very favorable appraisal of the Eisenhower Administration in both its domestic and foreign policies.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY. By Clinton Rossiter. New York: Harcourt, 1956, 175 p. $2.95.

A concise appraisal of the office, of its place in the American political system, and of its recent incumbents.

THIS IS NIXON. By James Keogh. New York: Putnam, 1956, 191 p. $2.75.

A friendly but not uncritical portrait of the Vice President.

THE POLITICS OF WOODROW WILSON. Edited by August Heckscher. New York: Harper, 1956, 389 p. $5.00.

A selection, with an excellent introduction by the editor, of Wilson's speeches and writings on the principles and standards of politics.

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP. By Dexter Perkins. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956, 200 p. $3.50.

A concise, appreciative but illuminating summary of the lengthy and varied public career of the late Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. A volume in the Library of American Biography.

THE MOFFAT PAPERS. Edited by Nancy Harvison Hooker. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 408 p. $7.50.

A selection from the personal papers of an American Foreign Service officer who died in 1943. An important source for the history of American foreign policy in the 1920s, 1930s and early 1940s.

AMERICAN POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY WORLD. By Chester Bowles. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 131 p. $2.25.

In these 1956 Godkin Lectures, Mr. Bowles first develops a theory of American politics—centering on the recurring periods of national "consensus"—and then

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seeks to define the major problems, national and above all international, for which a new "consensus" is required.

SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM: AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE. By Alpheus Thomas Mason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955, 232 p. $2.90.

An essay, by a professor of jurisprudence at Princeton University, on the "continuing conflict between political and judicial control of government" in American history, especially in the matter of property rights.

WHAT THE TARIFF MEANS TO AMERICAN INDUSTRIES. By Percy W. Bidwell. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1956, 304 p. $5.00.

Departing from the usual approaches of tariff literature, this book analyzes the place of the tariff in the economic life of a series of American manufacturing industries. It shows what has been happening to their production, sales, prices and profits, and discusses the problems they face. Foreign competition and tariff changes—actual or potential—are examined in this perspective to see how important they are compared to other forces influencing the industries. Then Dr. Bidwell, a leading tariff expert, examines the question of the industries' adjustment to tariff changes and their claims to be essential for defense. The industries studied are those making watches, bicycles, chinaware, hand-blown glassware, woolens and worsteds, organic chemicals, heavy electrical equipment, and iron and steel products.

THE EFFECT ON MINNESOTA OF A LIBERALIZATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE POLICY. Edited by Harlan M. Smith and Robert J. Holloway. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1956, 176 p. $2.00.

A pertinent case study in which the authors find that more than half of the state's industries would be unaffected by liberalization, and of the remainder more would stand to gain than to lose.

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY—ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS. By A. Dudley Ward. New York: Harper, 1955, 199 p. $3.50.

A study, based on interviews and discussions with about a thousand persons, regarding their attitudes toward the American economy, their own work, and the ethical issues involved. One of a series of studies on Christian Ethics and Economic Life, now sponsored by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND CONGRESS. By Morgan Thomas, in collaboration with Robert M. Northrop. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956, 301 p. $4.75.

A study, by a research team, of the rôles and relationship of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in directing atomic developments—an important example, in the authors' view, "of the governmental process adapting itself to unusual needs by the creation of an unusual pattern of control."

THE FABULOUS DEMOCRATS. By David L. Cohn. New York: Putnam, 1956, 192 p. $5.95.

An affable party history, in text and pictures.

Western Europe

LES PARTIS COMMUNISTES D'EUROPE, 1919–1955. By Branko Lazitch. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1956, 255 p. Fr. 600.

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A concise manual on the Communist Parties of the various European states, giving a short history of each party, its membership and voting strength, and sketches of party leaders.

HANDBUCH FÜR DEN GEMEINSAMEN MARKT DER EUROPÄISCHEN MONTAN-UNION. Frankfurt/Main: Montan- und Wirtschaftsverlag, 1955, 811 p. DM. 48.

A massive handbook on the European Coal and Steel Community, including an extensive description of plants and firms, and a trilingual technical dictionary.

ÜBERNATIONALE UND NATIONALE MARKTORDNUNG. By Kurt Ballerstedt. Tübingen: Mohr, 1955, 73 p. DM. 5.80.

A study of certain legal questions raised by the European Coal and Steel Community.

RÉVOLUTION, DERNIÈRE CHANCE DE LA FRANCE. By Maurice Lauré. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955, 205 p. Fr. 500.

An essay—less vehement than its title would suggest—on the reasons for France's relative economic and political eclipse in recent years and on the steps the author deems necessary for its recovery. By revolution he means rather a complete renovation of ideals and social concepts.

EN LISANT LES MÉMOIRES DE GUERRE DU GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE. By General Weygand. Paris: Flammarion, 1955, 236 p. Fr. 400.

A critical gloss on the memoirs of General de Gaulle (noted here January 1956). It is not surprising that General Weygand should find himself in disagreement on a number of points of fact and interpretation in those very troubled years of French history from 1933 to 1944.

LE VÉRITABLE PROCÈS DU MARÉCHAL PÉTAIN. By Louis Noguères. Paris: Fayard, 1955, 659 p. Fr. 1200.

An extensive review of the Pétain case, based in good part on documents which the author, former President of the Haute Cour de Justice, feels have not previously been taken sufficiently into account.

MR. FRANCE. By Donald McCormick. London: Jarrolds, 1955, 240 p. 16/.

An admiring but rather journalistic sketch of Pierre Mendès-France.

L'ORGANISATION ET LA RÉGLEMENTATION DU COMMERCE EXTÉRIEUR EN FRANCE. By M. Schmidlin and J. Ducrocq. Paris: Moniteur Officiel du Commerce et de l'Industrie, 1955, 582 p.

The third edition of an extensive handbook dealing with the theory and practice of the organization and regulation of French foreign trade—tariffs, commercial conventions, controls, etc.

GERMANY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. By M. E. Bathurst and J. L. Simpson. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1956, 217 p. $6.00.

An able analysis of the intricate and unprecedented legal problems relating to postwar Germany and its position vis-à-vis the occupying Powers and NATO.

LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DE L'ALLEMAGNE OCCIDENTALE. Edited by Alfred Grosser. Paris: Colin, 1956, 199 p. Fr. 800.

A collection of studies concerning various aspects of West Germany's foreign relations: frontier questions, international economic questions, and the positions of the major German political parties.

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CONFESSIONS OF "THE OLD WIZARD." THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HJALMAR HORACE GREELEY SCHACHT. Boston: Houghton, 1956, 484 p. $5.50.

"Confessions" is scarcely the term for these singularly complacent and only unconsciously revealing memoirs of the German financier.

VERDICT ON SCHACHT. BY EARL R. BECK. Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1955, 201 p. $3.50.

An assessment of the "conservative banker trapped in a mesh largely of his own fabrication." Schacht emerges as "no hero, but not a man without honor."

GESTAPO: INSTRUMENT OF TYRANNY. BY EDWARD CRANKSHAW. New York: Viking, 1956, 275 p. $3.75.

A history, informative but not definitive in its analysis, of the Nazi Secret State Police.

GERMAN EXILE POLITICS. BY LEWIS J. EDINGER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956, 329 p. $4.25.

A scholarly monograph on the German Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi era—an interesting case study of the problems and difficulties confronting a political group in exile.

VOLK OHNE FÜHRUNG. BY HUGO C. BACKHAUS. Göttingen: Göttinger Verlagsanstalt, 1955, 264 p. DM. 11.60.

In this unpleasantly familiar quest for a principle of leadership to guide the German people, the author holds that the Germans have two chief duties: to remain German and not to be a pawn of any alien Power.

STUDIEN. BY LUDWIG BECK. Stuttgart: Koehler, 1955, 302 p. DM. 20.

Previously unpublished essays and pieces on strategy, war and military history, written between General Beck's resignation in 1938 and his death in 1944.

DAS DEUTSCH-ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZOLLUNIONSPROJEKT VON 1931. BY JAN KRULIS-RANDA. Zurich: Europa, 1955, 211 p. Swiss Fr. 9.60.

A monograph on the economic background and implications of the abortive German-Austrian customs union project of 1931.

WHO'S WHO IN GERMANY. EDITED BY HORST G. KLIEMANN AND STEPHEN S. TAYLOR. New York: Daub, 1956, 1425 p. $20.00.

A useful reference work: biographies and a directory of organizations.

FELDMARSCHALL CONRAD. BY OSKAR REGELE. Vienna: Herold, 1955, 613 p. Schillings 158.

An extensive account, based on a great deal of unpublished material, of Austrian Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf, in the years 1906–1918. A valuable contribution to the study of the background and military campaigns of the First World War.

I SINDACATI IN ITALIA. BY G. DI VITTORIO AND OTHERS. Bari: Laterza, 1955, 420 p. L. 1800.

Pieces by Giuseppe di Vittorio, Giulio Pastore, Italo Viglianesi, Giuseppe Rapelli, Fernando Santi, Enrico Parri and Giovanni Canini dealing with the rôle and responsibilities of the trade union movement in present-day Italy.

Eastern Europe

OXFORD REGIONAL ECONOMIC ATLAS: THE U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 134 p. $10.00.

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This first in a forthcoming series of regional economic atlases covers the Soviet Union, the Communist-controlled countries of Eastern Europe, East Germany and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. Maps, text, statistical tables and gazetteer.

DAS OSTPAKT-SYSTEM. By Boris Meissner. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1955, 208 p. DM. 19.

A revised collection of documents, first published in 1951, relating to the postwar Soviet system of pacts and treaties in Europe and Asia. A useful source.

HOW THE SOVIET SYSTEM WORKS. By Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 274 p. $4.75.

In 1950 and 1951 the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System interviewed or gave questionnaires to thousands of Soviet emigrés in Western Europe and the United States. The present volume, while not a summary of the data obtained —this work is still in progress—is a valuable assessment of the nature, strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system as reflected in the information thus gained.

SOVIET RUSSIAN NATIONALISM. By Frederick C. Barghoorn. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 330 p. $7.00.

A very skillful guide to the meaning, background and purpose of that curious and dangerous combination of contradictory elements making up, as the title states, Soviet Russian nationalism.

DOCUMENTS ON SOVIET MILITARY LAW AND ADMINISTRATION. Edited and translated by Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 164 p. $4.00.

A comprehensive collection and translation of laws governing the Soviet armed forces. A companion to the authors' study, "Soviet Military Law and Administration," noted here October 1955.

SOWJETRUSSLAND ZWISCHEN REVOLUTION UND RESTAURATION. By Boris Meissner. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956, 231 p. DM. 9.20.

A collection of essays and portraits dealing with recent trends in the Soviet world, written between 1949 and the eve of the 20th Party Congress. An annex contains a concise Soviet Who's Who.

HANDBUCH DER SOWJETVERFASSUNG. By Reinhart Maurach. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1955, 429 p. DM. 44.

An extensive and detailed commentary on the 146 articles of the Soviet Constitution. A valuable reference.

THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. By Alexander Vucinich. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956, 157 p. $2.00.

This volume in the Hoover Institute Studies (Series E: Institutions) is an examination of the organization of science and scientists in a totalitarian system. Of particular interest is the author's discussion of the extent and limitations of ideological demands upon Soviet scientific inquiry and exploration.

STALIN'S GREAT SECRET. By Isaac Don Levine. New York: Coward-McCann, 1956, 126 p. $2.50.

A marshalling of evidence, some circumstantial, some direct, in support of the thesis that Stalin was a Tsarist police spy before the Revolution.

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LABOUR POLICY IN THE USSR, 1917–1928. By Margaret Dewar. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, 286 p. $6.00.

A useful aid to the study of the changes in Soviet labor policy in the first decade after the Revolution. Extensive documentary annex.

MOSCOW WAS MY PARISH. By Georges Bissonnette. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956, 272 p. $3.95.

The author of this personal report was chaplain to the American Catholics of the foreign colony in Moscow—though he traveled extensively—from 1953 to 1955. While his principal concern is with the vicissitudes of religious expression and the churches in the Soviet Union, he offers many perceptive remarks on contemporary Russian society.

GERMANY'S EASTERN NEIGHBOURS. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 309 p. $4.80.

Miss Wiskemann, long a student of Slav-German relations, here discusses developments in the territories of German-Polish and German-Czech controversy in the years since Hitler's rise to power. Particular emphasis is given to the postwar decade, the territorial changes, the expulsion of the Germans, and the new industrial activities in these lands.

DAS DEUTSCHE REICH UND POLEN, 1932–1937: AUSSENPOLITIK UND VOLKSGRUPPENFRAGEN. By Richard Breyer. Würzburg: Holzner, 1955, 372 p. DM. 14.70.

This well-documented and scholarly monograph pursues two separate but related themes: the diplomatic relations between Germany and Poland, and the history of the German minority in Poland, in the years from the rise of Hitler to the minority agreement of 1937.

DAS DEUTSCHTUM IN POLEN, 1918–1939. By Otto Heike. Bonn: The Author, 1955, 296 p. DM. 8.50.

Hardly an impartial account of the political situation of the German population in Poland during the inter-war years, but containing a good deal of information on the economic, cultural and religious life of these groups.

JUGOSLAWIEN. Edited by Werner Markert. Cologne: Böhlau, 1954, 400 p. DM. 28.

This first volume of a forthcoming Osteuropa-Handbuch is an extensive survey, by a number of German scholars, of Jugoslavia's physical and human geography, economy and recent political and institutional development. A useful reference with numerous maps and charts, chronologies and a bibliography.

THE CROATIAN NATION IN ITS STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. Edited by Antun F. Bonifačić and Clement S. Mihanovich. Chicago: Croatia Cultural Publishing Center, 1955, 441 p. $3.50.

An uneven and frequently erratic symposium by a group of emigrant Croatian writers.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

DAS BRITISCHE KOLONIALREICH. By Heinz Walz. Stuttgart: Schwab, 1955, 327 p. DM. 16.80.

A serious study of the recent evolution and modification of Britain's colonial empire. On the whole the author is impressed with the British capacity for constructive adaptation in meeting the new conditions in Africa and Asia.

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CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: SEPTEMBER 1951 TO OCTOBER 1953. By B. S. Keirstead, with the assistance of Muriel Armstrong. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 268 p. $3.95.

Volume VII is the first of this biennial survey for the postwar years to appear (Volumes V and VI covering the years 1946 to 1950 are in preparation). Its purpose is "to be a reasonably reliable record of contemporary world events in which Canada has a concern or in which Canada has been involved and to provoke Canadian citizens to critical reflection on, and discussion of, the purposes and conduct of Canadian foreign policy."

AUSTRALIA. Edited by Gordon Greenwood. New York: Praeger, 1956, 445 p. $7.50.

Six Australian historians contribute to this comprehensive survey from 1788 to 1950.

THE STORY OF NEW ZEALAND. By A. H. Reed. New York: Roy, 1955, 335 p. $5.00.

A general history, carried up to the Second World War.

THE OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER. By Byrum E. Carter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, 362 p. $5.00.

As the author, an American, notes, the office of the British Prime Minister has not received the attention that has been given to the American Presidency. In this useful study Professor Carter's aim, largely successful, is "to present an objective statement of what the Prime Minister does, and what is done to him."

THE COLONIAL OFFICE. By Sir Charles Jeffries. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 222 p. $2.40.

This volume is one of the New Whitehall Series, the purpose of which is "to provide authoritative descriptions of the present work of the major Departments of Central Government." The author, long a Colonial Office official, frankly approaches his subject with affection, admiration and enthusiasm.

LABOR RELATIONS IN BRITISH NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY. By Sterling D. Spero. New York: New York University Press, 1955, 83 p. $2.75.

The results of a field study by a professor of public administration at New York University. The author concludes that "the British experience with nationalization, though still short, seems long enough, however, to cast doubt on the assumption that the difficulties of industrial relations are principally rooted in the nature of ownership."

TRADE UNION GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN. By B. C. Roberts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 570 p. $6.00.

A thorough and valuable study, based upon an examination of the constitutions of over 130 unions and a close study of some of the largest, of their procedures of government and administration.

MONOPOLY IN BRITAIN. By Sam Aaronovitch. New York: International Publishers, 1955, 191 p. $2.50.

A Marxist-Leninist view of the British economy—deeply in the grip of a handful of monopolies.

MERCHANT SHIPPING AND THE DEMANDS OF WAR. By C. B. A. Behrens. London: H.M.S.O., and Longmans, 1955, 494 p. 35/. (New York: British Information Services, $6.53.)

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THE ADMINISTRATION OF WAR PRODUCTION. By J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes. London: H.M.S.O., and Longmans, 1955, 544 p. 37/6. (New York: British Information Services, $6.98.)

Two further, able contributions to the official British History of the Second World War, Civil Series.

A DISCORD OF TRUMPETS. By Claud Cockburn. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956, 314 p. $3.95.

The Week, a prewar newsletter about high politics written on the assumption that rumors are, after all, facts, was Mr. Cockburn's personal creation. His amusing memoirs have some of the same qualities, but fewer inside stories about high places. He leaves unclear whether he has backtracked on the journey he made from the London *Times* to the *Daily Worker.*

The Middle East

COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Praeger, 1956, 362 p. $6.50.

Feeling that extremist movements—whether Communist or ultra-nationalist—may well be the key to future developments in the Middle East, the author undertakes the difficult task of probing these political trends in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. A most interesting analysis.

ISRAEL: ITS ROLE IN CIVILIZATION. Edited by Moshe Davis. New York: Harper (for the Seminary Israel Institute, Jewish Theological Seminary of America), 1956, 338 p. $4.00.

A rather varied symposium comprising a score of lectures. A number of the pieces deal with current or recent history and international affairs.

I SAW ISRAEL: AN AMERICAN REPORTS. By Ruth L. Polhemus Goldberg. New York: Exposition Press, 1955, 217 p. $3.50.

A personal, enthusiastic journal of a visit to Israel in 1954.

South and Southeast Asia

NATIONALISM AND PROGRESS IN FREE ASIA. Edited by Philip W. Thayer. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956, 394 p. $5.75.

A symposium of papers read at two conferences, in Washington and Rangoon, in 1955, under the auspices of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

CULTURAL FREEDOM IN ASIA. Rutland (Vt.), and Tokyo: Tuttle (for the Congress for Cultural Freedom), 1956, 296 p. $2.00.

Twenty-two papers delivered at a conference held in Rangoon in February 1955, under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Society for the Extension of Democratic Ideals.

THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE. By George McTurnan Kahin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956, 88 p. $2.00.

A brief, perceptive essay based on personal observation and devoted almost entirely to the political aspects of the Bandung Conference. Mr. Kahin believes the major effects of the meeting to have been two: an increased understanding of each other's points of view and an increased self-confidence.

LES INFLUENCES OCCIDENTALES DANS LA RÉVOLUTION DE L'ORIENT. By François Léger. Paris: Plon, 1955, 2 v. Fr. 1350.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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